Houthi Presence on the Western Red Sea Shore: Dimensions and Impact

While attention is currently focused on the Houthi threat along the eastern shore of the Red Sea, the group also maintains a strategic presence on the western shore, posing a threat that could mobilize at any time, as the group has established both a presence and connections. In this context, this paper explores the Houthi presence in the region, the extent of their activities and the potential future implications for the Red Sea and regional security.

The content in this paper examines the Houthi presence in Sudan, which traces its origins back to 2001, rooted in the relationship between the Iranian Republic and the Sudanese Republic at that time. It explains how the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese army and the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces compelled Sudan to restore its relations with Iran, following a break after Sudan’s participation in the Arab Coalition. This restoration lasted for nearly eight years, primarily aimed at securing weapons and ammunition, particularly in the context of the arms embargo imposed on Sudan. In response, Iran began supplying weapons to the Sudanese army via the Houthi group, which possesses the capability and expertise to conduct weapons-smuggling operations using both maritime and land routes. While Iran seeks to bolster its presence in the region, the Houthis aim to strengthen their position on the opposite shore, facilitating arms-smuggling operations and expanding their influence through networks in the Horn of Africa.

This paper also discusses the Houthi presence in Eritrea, which stems from the Iranian-Eritrean relationship established in 2008 and developed over subsequent years. Through its ties with Eritrea, Iran sought to enhance its presence in vital international waterways near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, aiming to surround Saudi Arabia from the west and use Eritrea as a launching point for supporting the Houthi group in Yemen. Eritrea provided the Houthis with islands and training camps where they could receive and smuggle weapons via fishing boats operated by Yemeni or Eritrean fishermen. The relationship between the Houthis and certain figures within the Eritrean regime has expanded into various activities, including human trafficking and money transfers. Although Eritrea distanced itself from the Yemen conflict and severed ties with Iran in 2014, the Houthi group continues to maintain some level of relations with Eritrea, as indicated by several markers. Recently, the confessions of an Eritrean recruit, enlisted by the Houthis and arrested on Yemen’s western coast, revealed the Houthis’ ability to establish cells in the region overseeing the Red Sea. The recruit, a member of the Afar tribe in the Horn of Africa, also disclosed Iranian promises of financial and military support for the independence of the Afar region from Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia.

This work also discusses the Houthi presence in Djibouti, which severed its ties with Iran in 2016 but restored them after more than seven years, following the resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023. The Bab al-Mandeb Strait is a vital international shipping route, and controlling or threatening navigation through it is a significant power dynamic for both state and non-state actors. The Houthis have previously been active in Djibouti during the six wars between them and the Yemeni government, seeking routes and methods to smuggle weapons into Yemen, plus building connections with religious groups or pirates in the Horn of Africa to establish a presence. Djibouti, which is near Yemen, offers the Houthis a further advantage by enabling the transport of weapons via small boats. As a result, Djibouti became a key site for weapons smuggling through its ports and territorial waters for many years. The Houthis developed an alternative route to indirectly acquire weapons from Iran via Djibouti, with weapons transferred from Iranian ports on civilian ships to Djibouti and subsequently redirected to Yemen. These operations could not have occurred without relationships with Djiboutian figures in the ports or security and military officials. 

The Houthi smuggling network in the Horn of Africa spans distances from Sudan to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. The alignment of interests of certain regional and international actors with Iran and the Houthis has led to cooperation and the development of partnerships to exchange benefits and confront shared challenges. The Middle East Institute (MEI) published an analytical paper on August 7, 2024, which highlighted that the material assistance provided, by entities in Djibouti, to the Houthis undermines its claimed neutrality and its efforts to promote peace. The paper noted, “Djibouti is evading scrutiny despite its relationships with China, Iran, and the Houthis, and its involvement in illicit activities.”

The MEI paper also examined the Houthi presence in Somalia, stemming from the relationships they had made with Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, as both groups face common targeting and threats. Iran plays a central role in this relationship, as it has long sought to expand its influence in Somalia due to its extensive coastline in the Horn of Africa, which serves as a potential route for smuggling weapons, drugs, people and other goods. In response to the presence of international forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has cooperated with Somali pirates to achieve various objectives, including smuggling weapons and supporting the Houthi group in Yemen. This was confirmed by international investigators in a report by “Conflict Armament Research”, which referred to maritime inspections conducted between February and March 2016, during which smuggled weapons were found aboard traditional kind of ships called “dhows”. U.S. intelligence also revealed efforts, earlier this year, to arm both the Houthi group and the Somali Al-Shabaab militia, suggesting a potential agreement between the two. 

Recently, the confessions of a Houthi recruit — broadcast by National Resistance Movement media after Hodeidah security forces captured him in coordination with the General Intelligence Department of the National Resistance on February 27, 2025 — revealed operations involving the smuggling of equipment, weapons and personnel to and from Yemen via Somalia late in the previous year. The smugglers involved were of both Yemeni and Somali nationalities.

The analytical paper, which referenced a variety of sources and provided a comprehensive analysis of the implications of this presence, concluded with a series of recommendations addressed to the legitimate government, the Arab Coalition, the international community, as well as Yemeni embassies and communities in the relevant countries.

First: The Houthi Presence and Activity in Sudan

In mid-September 2023, Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan accused the Rapid Support Forces of employing mercenaries from various nationalities, including Yemenis. This statement is the only one addressing the participation of Yemeni fighters in the ongoing conflict in Sudan. Despite being issued by the highest governing authority, it did not receive much scrutiny or documentation, particularly amid the global focus on the war in Gaza rather than the conflict in Sudan.

The Houthi presence in Sudan began after 2001, as the movement started to build foreign relations in order to secure weapons and financial resources. This later materialized in the form of waves of Houthi-aligned investors who came to Sudan seeking investment opportunities and routes for smuggling weapons and other materials. The group also sent students to pursue undergraduate and graduate studies at Sudanese universities, either through government scholarships or through their own support systems. These students lived in shared residences where they were ideologically and culturally indoctrinated and their conditions were monitored.

It was in Sudan that the Houthis began establishing contact with the Iranian embassy in Khartoum, away from Yemeni oversight. At the time, the Iranian embassy was active and worked to promote Iranian revolutionary ideology and Twelver Shiism across Sudan and the African continent. The embassy also facilitated the issuance of alternative passports for Houthis to travel outside Sudan.

The Houthis’ ties with Sudan are rooted in Iran’s relationship with the Sudanese regime led by Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir. This relationship began in the early 1990s, driven by the political and economic pressures imposed on both Sudan and Iran by Western countries, led by the United States.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been linked to the ongoing conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The UAE has provided weapons and several military logistical services to the RSF. 

Sudan’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations confirmed the UAE’s intervention in Sudan, stating that it continued to supply military equipment, send mercenaries and provide advanced weapons, such as drones, to the RSF, in a speech before the UN Security Council on December 11, 2024. This support is part of the UAE’s alignment with the RSF, viewing it as a bulwark against political Islamic movements in the region, which UAE’s ruling family considers a threat to its power, according to statements from U.S. officials to The New York Times.

This UAE intervention has allowed Iran to play a role in the situation, particularly given the Sudanese army’s need for weapons amid the UN arms embargo on Sudan. Iran began supplying arms through the Houthi movement, which has the capability and experience to conduct arms-smuggling operations via specialized maritime and land routes. The New York Times reported that the Houthis sent weapons shipments to the Sudanese army upon Iran’s request, though the Houthis denied providing military assistance to the Sudanese army.

As a result, the conflict in Sudan has become intertwined with the conflict in Yemen, as the Gulf states involved in Sudan are the same ones involved in Yemen. Furthermore, the Houthis and some Yemeni factions, funded and aligned with the UAE, have become directly and indirectly involved in the fighting.

To date, there are no documented reports or confirmed evidence proving the direct involvement of the Houthi movement in the ongoing conflict in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023 between the SAF, led by al-Burhan, and the RSF, led by Commander Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, a.k.a. Hemeti. However, it is in the Houthis’ interest to maintain a presence in the Red Sea region, as it serves as their global outlet. Any shift in alliances could undermine their influential presence, so it is likely they will seek to impact the Sudanese conflict in favor of their alliances in the Red Sea.

While some speak of the presence of Houthi fighters in Sudan as part of political maneuvering, it appears to be more a part of a propaganda war. Direct involvement in combat would make Houthi fighters a clear target for the opposing side. However, it is not ruled out that the group could be involved indirectly in the conflict, using its capabilities and experience, especially given its alliance with Iran, which also has interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. As such, it would be essential for the Houthis to side with one of the factions in the conflict to secure a relationship with them. Since the RSF had previously sent fighters to Yemen to support the Saudi-led Arab Coalition in its war against the Houthis, it is natural for the group to oppose the RSF and align with the Sudanese Armed Forces in this conflict.

In light of the international arms embargo imposed on the warring parties in Sudan, the Sudanese army will have to find alternative ways to acquire weapons, making it dependent on smuggling and supply routes to bring arms into the country. This is where the capabilities and experience of the Houthi movement, developed over two decades, become relevant, particularly in the context of the war and the blockade imposed on them. Additionally, Iran is a suitable weapons supplier, which prompted Sudan’s leadership to restore its relationship with Iran after an eight-year break. On February 5, 2024, Sudan sent its Foreign Minister, Ali Al-Sadiq, to Tehran for a two-day visit, during which he met with former Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi, who welcomed Sudan’s desire to revive relations with Tehran, seeing it as “a basis for compensating lost opportunities and providing new ones”. Raisi also confirmed Iran’s support for “establishing a strong government in Sudan and its sovereignty”, adding that “the reopening of embassies in Tehran and Khartoum and the exchange of ambassadors pave the way for reviving and developing bilateral relations”.

The restoration of relations with Iran yielded results in terms of weapons acquired by Sudan in its conflict with the RSF. The American news agency Bloomberg published a report quoting Western officials who stated that Iran supplied the Sudanese army with drones, specifically the “Mohajer” model. They added that satellites captured images of these drones at the “Wadi Saydna” military base, controlled by the Sudanese army in Omdurman. These drones have a single engine and are capable of hitting their targets with precision.

There is no doubt that Iran aims to strengthen its presence in the region. The Wall Street Journal quoted a Sudanese intelligence official who said that the Sudanese army rejected an Iranian offer to provide drones in exchange for allowing Iran to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea. This indicates that Iran is keen on establishing a presence in the Red Sea as part of the price for the support it provides to the Sudanese army.

There is increasing Israeli concern over a new and alarming front regarding the Houthis’ activities in Africa. Israeli intelligence has recently observed signs that the Houthis, who operate from Yemen, have begun expanding their influence into North Africa, particularly in Sudan, Egypt and Morocco.

Second: The Houthi Presence and Activity in Eritrea

Eritrea, which overlooks the Red Sea, shares historical, genealogical, religious and cultural ties with Yemen. The connection between the two shores of the Red Sea has existed for centuries and has deepened over time. The relationship between the Houthis and Eritrea is a result of the broader relationship between Iran and Eritrea, which began in the 1980s and continues through the first decade of the 21st century.

With the onset of Ethiopian-Israeli rapprochement in 2004 and the deterioration of Eritrea’s relationship with Washington, the regime of Isaias Afwerki began to strengthen its ties with Iran. In May 2008, Afwerki visited Tehran, and Eritrea’s foreign ministry expressed its support for Iran‘s nuclear program.

Iran’s aim in its relationship with Eritrea was to enhance its presence in critical international maritime passages near the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait and to surround Saudi Arabia from the west, in addition to using Eritrea as a base to support the Houthi movement in Yemen. Iran provided Eritrea with hundreds of members of the Quds Force, naval officers and military experts from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who oversaw missile bases along the Eritrean coastline, opposite Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The Eritrean-Yemeni estrangement resulting from the three-day Hanish Archipelago crisis in the 1990s, combined with Eritrea’s growing ties with Iran, allowed the Houthi movement to use Eritrean territory as a base for smuggling Iranian weapons and training its fighters. As the Houthis sought to build their military strength and weapon capabilities, they relied on smuggling weapons from outside Yemen into Saada. The Eritrean Islands provided a suitable station for transferring weapons coming from Iran and from within Africa via Sudan, which were then moved by small boats to the Yemeni coast. The Houthis used fishing boats from Yemen or Eritrea to transport these weapons across the sea to the port of Midi.

Since 2001, arms-smuggling operations through the Eritrean Islands have continued, with the cooperation of the Asmara regime. This developed into a relationship between elements of the Houthi movement and the Eritrean regime, extending into various activities, including human trafficking and money transfers.

The use of Eritrean Islands for weapon smuggling was not limited to this, as the islands were also exploited for the military training of Houthi fighters. Then-Yemeni Chief of Staff Mohammed al-Maqdashi stated that Iran had provided weapons and training to the Houthi militia, as well as that the Houthis received training on an Eritrean island.

This continued after the launch of “Operation Decisive Storm” in 2015. In a statement, Yemeni military attaché to Cairo, Major General Ahmed Said Bin Breik, revealed that Yemeni security forces had detected suspicious Iranian activity in Eritrea, which was aimed at providing support to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. He reported the storage and accumulation of various Iranian weapons and ammunition in several locations along the Eritrean coast, preparing them for shipment to the Houthis to aid their efforts in seizing control of Yemen.

Despite the Eritrean government’s denial of what it considered false accusations; some Eritrean parties have confirmed these events. Shoukri Ahmed, a leader in the Eritrean opposition party, the Eritrean Party for Justice and Development, revealed the existence of training camps in Eritrea that have been operating since 2009 to train Houthis. He explained that this came after the signing of a cooperation agreement between Eritrea and Iran in 2009, through which weapons flowed via Eritrea to Yemen. Shoukri Ahmed also disclosed the presence of three camps run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to train the Houthis on Eritrean territory. One of these camps is located near the port of Assab, opposite the large Eritrean army camp called “Weia”; the second camp is located on the northern coast between the areas of Hasmet and Abreiti; and the third camp is located in the Sawa area, at the corner of the Eritrean army camp, called “Sawa”.

Various reports have confirmed this, including one issued by the American security consulting firm “Stratfor,” which mentioned that the Iranian naval forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are involved in securing the arms-smuggling operations from an Eritrean port to the Yemeni coast for armed groups rebelling against the Yemeni government in Saada, on the southern border of Saudi Arabia.

This issue is not limited to smuggling gangs; it extends to figures with ties to the regime’s core. A confidential document, obtained by the Platform for Tracking Organized Crime and Money Laundering (PTOC) in Yemen, revealed the involvement of Abraham Afwerki, the son of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, in smuggling arms to the Houthi movement in Yemen. This is not surprising, as smuggling operations cannot be carried out without the cooperation of military, security and political figures within the regime.

By 2014, Eritrea began to extricate itself from international isolation and distanced itself from Iran, especially after the UAE and Saudi Arabia intensified their diplomatic and commercial relations with Eritrea, offering investment initiatives at the Port of Assab. This eventually led to Eritrea severing its diplomatic ties with Iran.

With the intervention of the Arab Coalition, led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, the imposition of a blockade on Yemeni airspace and territorial waters, plus the presence of Saudi, Egyptian and Pakistani warships in the region, Iran’s task of delivering weapons to the Houthis via Eritrea became significantly more difficult.

The Houthi movement attempted to dissuade Eritrea from this shift in alignment by sending a Houthi delegation to Asmara, according to Eritrean sources. The delegation was headed by Houthi field commander Mohammed al-Nakhli (a Saudi national), who met with the Chief of Staff, General Filipos Woldeyohannes, and the second commander of the Eritrean naval forces, delivering Iranian requests to the Eritrean regime. According to Jamal Hamid, the director of the opposition website, Adoulis, the Houthi delegation presented Iranian demands concerning the delivery of weapons shipments to the Houthis in Yemen, the non-participation of Eritrean ground forces in the war led by the Arab Coalition against the Houthis, and the reception of Houthis under the cover of humanitarian asylum if the situation in Yemen turned against them.

The Afwerki regime did not heed the Iranian demands, especially in light of the support and promises it received from the Gulf states. Instead, Eritrea opened its islands to the UAE for Yemeni fighters to train on Eritrean soil. This led to clashes between the Houthis and Eritrean forces in Assab, where the Houthis accused Eritrea of providing logistical support to the Arab Coalition forces fighting against them.

However, the competing policies of the Gulf states and the instability in the Horn of Africa, along with the change in Abu Dhabi’s stance on the war in Yemen, led to a reduction in the strategic importance of the Assab military base for the UAE. In early 2021, the UAE began dismantling parts of its military base there and started looking for a new military base along the Sudanese coastline.

Despite all of this, the Houthi movement has maintained some level of relations with Eritrea, which explains why the Houthis have not targeted the Israeli military bases in Eritrea, despite their involvement in the ongoing confrontation between Israel and the Axis of Resistance, led by Iran. The Houthis have launched missiles and drones toward occupied Palestinian territories and targeted vessels linked to Israel or that deal with it. Additionally, the Afwerki regime has not condemned the Houthi movement or confronted their threats to maritime vessels, despite the Houthis’ attacks on eight ships in Eritrean territorial waters, as reported by Eritrean opposition groups.

Recently, confessions from an Eritrean recruit for the Houthis, who was captured on Yemen’s western coast and belonged to the Afar tribe (which is spread across the Horn of Africa), revealed that the Houthis had established cells in the region overseeing the Red Sea. The recruit also spoke about Iranian promises of financial and military support for the independence of the “Afar” region from Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. He detailed intensive Houthi activity in the Horn of Africa and the establishment of cells tasked with recruiting members of the Afar tribe and sending them to Yemen. This was aimed at instilling a sectarian shift in the region and training them to fight, creating a force similar to the Houthis and Hezbollah. In a video recording broadcast by the Joint Forces of the Presidential Leadership Council member Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, the recruit explained how the Houthis were recruiting members from his region, coordinating their transfer to Yemen for indoctrination and training, before returning them to their areas to engage in activities that would serve Iran’s agendas in the region. The Houthis told them that the Afar tribe had an opportunity for Iranian-backed support for their independence from the three countries, promising that they would become a major and influential force on the Red Sea coast.

This Iranian attempt to create a new faction in Eritrea, linked to it and recruited through its local arms in the region (the Houthi movement), aligns with its strategy regarding the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. It aims to establish its presence through groups loyal to or allied with it, intersecting with its political, military and security agendas.

Third: The Houthi Presence and Activity in Djibouti

Djibouti, located at the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, is very close to the Yemeni coast and islands. It is a small country with a very low population compared to Yemen and hosts military bases from the United States, China and France, due to its strategically important geographic location.

Djibouti was one of the countries that supported the Arab Coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, and the Operation Decisive Storm associated with it. The country opened its airspace and territorial waters to the Arab Coalition forces, driven by its rejection of the Houthi coup against the legitimate government in Sana’a. Djibouti also hosted about 5,000 Yemeni refugees, 3,000 of whom left for other destinations, while 2,000 remained in the country.

In January 2016, the Djiboutian government severed its diplomatic relations with Iran in solidarity with Saudi Arabia, responding to the storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran by Iranian protesters. However, Djibouti restored its diplomatic relations with Iran after more than seven years, following the resumption of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, under a deal mediated by China. This was announced in March 2023, and Iran moved to enhance and restore its ties with Djibouti. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the two countries agreed to “strengthen cooperation across a wide range of areas”.

Given that Bab al-Mandab Strait is a vital international shipping passage, controlling or threatening navigation through it is one of the elements of power for states or non-state actors. The Houthis had previously been active in Djibouti and Somalia during the six wars fought between them and the Yemeni government, seeking arms-smuggling routes into Yemen and establishing ties with religious factions or pirates in the Horn of Africa to extend their influence in the region. Djibouti, being so close to Yemen, provides the Houthis with a strategic advantage as weapons can be transported via small boats. This has been making Djibouti quite a suitable environment for arms smuggling through its ports and territorial waters for many years.

On June 16, 2024, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing Western officials, that the Houthi movement has managed to find new ways to bring in the military equipment it needs from Iran to continue its attacks on ships in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait. The report stated that the Houthis have found an alternative route to bring arms indirectly from Iran, via Djibouti. The weapons are transferred from Iranian ports to civilian vessels heading toward Djibouti, then redirected to Yemen. Such operations would not be possible without relationships with Djiboutian officials at the port or among security and military personnel.

A report by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, released on October 11, 2024, addressed to the Security Council, revealed that Houthi leader Major General Mohammed Ahmed al-Talabi, the head of procurement in the Houthi Ministry of Defense, is responsible for the illegal shipping of arms to the Houthi movement through a network of individuals and entities. According to confidential sources, al-Talabi had a Yemeni customs broker transported to Djibouti in 2022 to facilitate the weapons smuggling intended for the Houthis.

The arms-smuggling operation is a complex process, governed by several factors, the most important of which is the existence of a network of individuals or gangs that work to infiltrate the military, security and government systems in the countries of transit. This is made possible by the conditions and social structures in the Horn of Africa. The living conditions, income levels and the economic situation of the region’s populations enable the Houthi group, and, behind them, Iran, to build a network of interests that benefits from the transport and smuggling of arms across land and sea routes and territorial waters, without significant threat. Arms shipments are usually costly and require a high level of security and success to avoid detection and confiscation. This means there is a highly coordinated network between military and security institutions, with an unspoken political backing.

The smuggling network relied upon by the Houthis in the Horn of Africa extends from Sudan to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. Some regional and international actors’ calculations intersect with those of Iran and the Houthi group, which motivates them to build cooperation and partnerships with Iran and the Houthis to exchange benefits and face common challenges.

The Djiboutian government has benefited from the Houthi attacks on ships and maritime navigation in the Red Sea. According to an interview with the head of Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, conducted by Bloomberg Magazine, Abubakar Omar Hadi stated, “We benefit from the misfortune of others.” In April 2024, China’s exports to the Houthis surpassed 1,900 containers, an increase of 427% compared to October 2023. The Houthis provided China with a comprehensive safe passage for its shipments, which contributed to the increased shipping traffic in Djibouti. The port dealt with massive quantities of containers transported from the Red Sea ports to the ports controlled by the Houthis in Al-Hodeidah, in western Yemen, using Djibouti-owned and -operated ships.

Despite the Houthi spokesperson, Mohammed Abdulsalam, threatening to target “a list of objectives, including U.S. bases in the region”, if military strikes are directed at them, “Camp Lemonnier” base, the only U.S. base in Africa, did not receive significant attention from the Houthis or other Iranian-affiliated groups in their offensive targets, as seen in Iraq and Syria. This base is located about 80 miles from Bab al-Mandab and serves as the headquarters for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). It hosts around 4,000 U.S. soldiers and has been used for years to launch strikes against the Houthis. This raises questions about the Houthis’ interest in avoiding any provocation in Djibouti that might lead to increased security and intelligence measures.

The Houthi activity in Djibouti over the years has allowed them to build relationships with commercial entities and responsible officials, providing them with a fertile environment for operations through the western gateway of Bab al-Mandab and the adjacent Red Sea coast. A policy paper published by the Middle East Institute (MEI) on August 7, 2024, questioned Djibouti’s neutrality in the Red Sea crisis and revealed that aid had been reaching the Houthi group from entities in Djibouti. The paper confirmed that Djibouti is acting “as a channel for Chinese influence” and is linked to maligned actors, like Iran and the Houthis. It also faced allegations of involvement in various activities in the black market, including money laundering, illicit financing, oil smuggling and arms trafficking. The paper noted that the Djiboutian entities providing material aid to the Houthis undermines its purported neutrality and its apparent efforts to promote peace, stating, “Djibouti evades scrutiny despite its ties to China, Iran and the Houthis and its involvement in illicit activities.”

The American institute called for the reform of sanctions on the Houthis and their enforcement by investigating Djiboutian ships, monitoring international shipping lines and identifying ships flying false flags that have facilitated the delivery of commercial goods to the Houthi-controlled ports since 2023. It also called for a complete reform of the UN’s verification and inspection mechanism, which has proven ineffective, as any government entity carrying prohibited shipments destined for Houthi-controlled ports can deliberately avoid requesting a UN inspection to evade sanctions.

This belated awareness of the presence of the Houthi group and the discovery of the depth of its infiltration in Djibouti, despite the presence of Western bases, including American and French ones, and of international forces along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea to secure international shipping and combat piracy and smuggling, is an indication of the group’s ability to build a vast network in the shadows, away from observation and surveillance. This network may rely on the capabilities of Iran and its allied groups, such as Hezbollah, which has been present earlier in the African scene, or on the group’s own efforts.

Fourth: The Presence and Movement of the Houthis in Somalia

Somalia borders Yemen, with its northern coasts overlooking the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea facing Yemen’s southern shores — granting the two countries a measure of shared history. As in Yemen, the tribe in Somalia is a strongly present and influential factor in public life and the political scene.

With the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia descended into a state of chaos and internal conflict, where the country experienced tribal and partisan disputes that led to the absence of a functioning state. Despite external interventions aimed at restoring security, Somalia suffered from division, which allowed the formation of militias and armed mafias that imposed their control and influence over wide areas of Somali territory. This environment also encouraged jihadist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, to penetrate the Somali arena from an early stage. It is a setting conducive to security breaches, smuggling mafias and criminal gangs in all their forms.

Although the Houthi group follows a Shiite doctrine and the Al-Shabaab Mujahideen Movement follows a Sunni one, both parties suffer from similar crises and threats. This drives them to establish a solid relationship to exchange benefits and roles. Iran plays a key role in this relationship, having long sought to extend its presence in Somalia due to its long coastline in the Horn of Africa, which facilitates the smuggling of weapons, drugs, humans and other goods.

Despite the presence of international and regional forces in the seas surrounding Somalia to combat piracy and the smuggling of weapons and drugs, these forces have not been able to eliminate the various smuggling routes and methods under different guises. This situation makes the Houthis, along with other non-state actors in the region, contributors to maintaining a state of chaos and continuous threats in the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea — so these groups and entities do not lose their supply routes for weapons, fighters and smuggled goods that they rely on militarily and economically.

For a long time, acts of maritime piracy originated from Somalia and posed a threat to international navigation. Although international efforts have succeeded in curbing them — with piracy operations on the decline since 2011 — some threats persist. On January 14, 2009, the “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)” was established to combat piracy off the Somali coast, in response to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008). The group currently includes more than 60 countries and organizations.

With the worsening situation in Yemen and the country plunging into an internal war with the Houthis and al-Qaeda since 2004, Iran’s need to smuggle weapons into Yemen required greater diversification and securing of smuggling routes — especially given the presence of international forces in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. This, in turn, compelled Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to cooperate with Somali pirates to achieve several objectives:

1. Smuggling Iranian oil to the countries of the Horn of Africa and selling it there as an attempt to circumvent sanctions and the economic blockade imposed on the Iranian regime.
2. Smuggling and selling weapons to armed militias and rebel groups in the region, including Yemen’s Houthi group.
3. Monitoring international shipping, blackmailing global commercial vessels and threatening foreign presence in the region if necessary.

International investigators, in a report issued by the Conflict Armament Research organization, confirmed the existence of a maritime weapons-smuggling route from Iran to the Houthis, via Somalia. The investigators based their findings on maritime inspections conducted between February and March 2016, during which smuggled weapons were found aboard traditional “dhow” sailing vessels.

At the beginning of 2024, a rise in piracy acts was recorded in the Horn of Africa region, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). This further confirms the ongoing coordination between actors on both sides of the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Consequently, the Abaad Studies & Research Center in Yemen sounded the alarm about potential threats stemming from the relationship between the Houthi group and Iran on one side, and Somali pirates and the Al-Shabaab Mujahideen Movement on the other.

Amid the growing surveillance and blockade imposed on the Houthis following their involvement in Red Sea attacks — under the so-called Unity of Arenas strategy led by Iran’s Axis of Resistance — the Houthis have sought to expand their activities in the Horn of Africa. This expansion came particularly after the Arab Coalition countries granted Sana’a some openness recently, in pursuit of a political settlement with the Houthis. That opportunity allowed Houthi members to move and travel across several countries to establish direct or mediated contact with various active entities in the Horn of Africa. The aim has been to explore possible areas of cooperation between the group and these entities on both shores of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.

In mid-2025, U.S. intelligence revealed Houthi efforts to arm Somalia’s Al-Shabaab. Intelligence reports pointed to a potential agreement between the two parties, prompting American intelligence officials to begin searching for evidence that the Houthis were supplying weapons to the movement. This development would open a new revenue stream for the Houthis, as a senior U.S. administration official stated that the group’s ability to sell some of its weapons would bring in the “money” it needs.

In return, the Somali movement — classified as a terrorist organization — would gain access to a new source of weapons, including drones, which would enable it to strike American targets in the region, especially given the repeated U.S. air strikes targeting the movement’s facilities and operatives.

In mid-July of the previous year, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre visited Iraq, where he met with his Iraqi counterpart Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid, and other senior Iraqi officials and political leaders over two days. According to the Somali news outlet Horn Observer, citing Somali intelligence sources, the prime minister’s visit aimed to mediate with the Houthi group through their Iranian backers, in an effort to convince them to stop supporting Al-Shabaab.

The growing cooperation between the Houthi group and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab, as part of their plans to carry out attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from the Somali coast — thereby expanding their operational reach against international maritime navigation — was confirmed by a report from the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, affiliated with the UN Security Council. The report accused the Houthis of extorting shipping agencies in exchange for not targeting their vessels, with the panel estimating that the group earns up to $180 million per month through such extortion.

In early 2025, the National Resistance media aired a Houthi recruit’s confessions, after Al-Hodeidah security forces captured him, while working with the General Intelligence Division of the National Resistance. He said that smuggling operations to move equipment, weapons and personnel to and from Yemen via Somalia had been carried out in late 2024, and the smuggled people were from both Yemen and Somalia.

The recruit, who had joined the Houthis in 2023, said he underwent a 50-day combat training course and 40-day specialized naval training before being assigned to a weapons-smuggling network between the Houthi group and Al-Shabaab, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda.

Findings and Recommendations

Events from 2004 to 2024 have demonstrated that the Houthis have extended their relationships with various entities across the Arab and African regions in pursuit of mutual interests and objectives. While the Houthi group maintains loyalty to Iran and its affiliates in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria — actively participating in what is known as the Axis of Resistance — they have also capitalized on the resources, capabilities and networks that Iran has developed over the decades. This has enabled them to expand into the opposite shore of the Red Sea, taking advantage of state absence, security chaos or rampant corruption in some African regimes to build economic, military and security ties that enhance their capabilities, broaden their presence and secure their supply lines.

As a result, the Houthis have established a presence in Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia:

• In Sudan, the recent civil war has provided the Houthis with an entry point into the Sudanese scene, by offering support to the Sudanese army in its conflict with the Rapid Support Forces rebellion. This may allow the Houthis to fulfill their needs and promote their agendas in various ways.
• In Eritrea, the Houthis have long enjoyed space for training and access to arms- and personnel-smuggling routes, owing to the strong Iran-Eritrea relationship that has developed over many years. This cooperation has helped both regimes bypass sanctions and international pressure. The Houthi group continues to maintain personal networks with members of the Eritrean government and society, receiving certain services that facilitate their operations.
• In Djibouti, the proximity of Djibouti’s coastline to Yemen — only around 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) across the Red Sea — makes it an ideal corridor for small boat movements and weapons smuggling. Moreover, widespread administrative and financial corruption has enabled the Houthis to exploit loopholes for transferring money and people between the two countries.
• In Somalia, the situation is even more favorable for the group due to the absence or weakness of the state, the presence of armed groups and pirate networks, as well as the possibility of forming multiple alliances. These conditions make it easier for the Houthis to achieve their military, security and economic goals.

These conditions in the African Red Sea coastal countries have granted the Houthis maneuverability and opportunities for expansion, strengthening their capabilities and military power. Accordingly, this paper recommends the following:

• The legitimate Yemeni government must enhance its security and intelligence role by monitoring these developments and cooperating with relevant Arab, African and international bodies to counter these threats, adopting more stringent measures against Houthi expansion.
• The government must also reshape its alliances and relationships with regional states to serve the interests of both sides of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. This requires an active and visible Yemeni diplomatic presence in these countries through embassies, consulates and residential communities.
• The Arab Coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, should work seriously to empower the legitimate government to exercise its sovereign and constitutional responsibilities without restrictions. The coalition should lift the unofficial blockade that prevents the government from fulfilling its military and security functions independently, allowing it to address the threats posed by armed and unlawful groups.
• The international community must lift the arms embargo on the legitimate government. This embargo contradicts international recognition of the government and limits its ability to perform its sovereign functions, particularly in defense and security — at a time when armed groups enjoy access to weapons through multiple channels and in full public view.
• African countries bordering the Red Sea must refrain from engaging in actions that harm Yemen and its people. They should seek their national interests without endangering their neighbors, thereby preserving friendly relations between nations on both official and public levels, and also by maintaining long-term regional security and stability.
• Yemeni embassies, consulates and communities in Red Sea African states must actively counter the Houthis’ efforts by raising awareness about the Yemeni cause and the suffering of its people. This should be done both socially and officially to close the doors of cooperation with the Houthi group, which threatens Yemen’s security and interests. Achieving this requires media and educational campaigns, as well as active engagement with host societies through outreach and relationship-building.