A Week Into the War: The Houthis Between Loyalty to Iran and staying in power
February 28, 2026, marked a major geopolitical shock in the Middle East, as the United States and Israel launched a military operation against Iran. The operation not only targeted Iranian nuclear facilities but also delivered an unprecedented “decapitation strike,” killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and 48 senior military commanders. In the aftermath, most of Iran’s proxy networks—from Iraq to Lebanon—moved into action. Amid this central collapse to the axis, the Houthi movement in Yemen now faces an existential test that goes beyond mere ideological solidarity. It must balance preserving its legitimacy as part of the “Axis of Resistance” with protecting its political gains in Sana’a from an American war machine that no longer appears bound by traditional rules of engagement.
This situation assessment provides an in-depth analysis of the group’s options and strategic calculations during the first week of the war.
Khamenei’s Assassination and the Dilemma of Strategic Autonomy
The killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the operations created a massive spiritual and political vacuum at the top of the Axis of Resistance, leading to a temporary paralysis in the regional coordination centers previously managed by Tehran. For the Houthis, this development meant the absence of the familiar strategic coordination hub, pushing the movement toward a form of strategic autonomy in its initial decision-making while awaiting greater clarity in Tehran and the formation of an interim leadership council. This helps explain the tone of caution and ambiguity that characterized Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s speeches during the early days of the war.
In his first speech following the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, the group’s leader adopted an unusually calm tone, avoiding the fiery rhetoric that typically defines his addresses. While he expressed strong support for Tehran, he stopped short of explicitly pledging military assistance. After Tehran announced the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Houthi delivered another relatively brief speech—shorter than his usually lengthy addresses—in which he offered condolences to the Iranian people. Once again, he refrained from committing to military action. In both speeches, the group’s leader stated that the Houthis were “on full alert” and that they “trust Iran’s ability to sustain its response,” a framing that was echoed in the messaging of the movement’s senior leaders, its political office, and the governing authority in Sana’a, the Supreme Political Council.
Over the past two years, the Houthis have increasingly become the most autonomous arm within the axis, not only because of their geographic distance but also due to their ability to maneuver in an environment that has lost much of its centralized command structure. The absence of the “strategic compass” once embodied by Khamenei could make the Houthis’ next moves more erratic—or even suicidal— depending on which faction within the movement gains the upper hand at critical moments.
The American campaign has sparked debate within the Houthi leadership. The first faction—often described as the “ideologues”—views Khamenei’s assassination as an existential battle that requires activating deterrence and immediately targeting Israeli territory and U.S. bases. They believe they may be the next target—even if they do not formally enter the war in support of Iran. Their concerns stem from the belief that non-intervention could undermine the group’s legitimacy as a “resistance movement.” Prolonged silence, in their view, could erode the gains achieved over the past two years. Notably, the movement’s ideological rhetoric increasingly portrays the Houthis as an emerging regional force. Some within this faction even argue that if the Iranian system were to collapse, the Axis of Resistance would still require a new leader—and that Yemen could potentially assume leadership of a reconfigured axis.
The second faction—the “pragmatists” (realists)—argues that preserving the gains of the de facto Houthi state should take priority and that provoking B-2 strikes on the mountains of Saada must be avoided. For them, concerns about domestic political survival outweigh transnational ideological commitments. They fear losing Saudi financial incentives—including salary payments and economic concessions—and worry that local rivals, particularly the forces of Tariq Saleh and the Southern Transitional Council, could exploit the current uncertainty to attempt to retake Hodeidah.
The killing of senior Houthi leaders in August and September 2025 also reinforced the movement’s awareness that the adversary’s intelligence superiority could eliminate them entirely if they were to fully engage in Iran’s current “retaliatory war,” especially as they observe their Iranian patron directly striking neighboring states without needing them as intermediaries.
During the first five days (until March 5), the movement focused on organizing mass rallies in Al-Sabeen Square in Sana’a and in major urban centers to project an image of popular alignment with the Iranian “center,” while sending messages of solidarity and declaring a state of “readiness.” This approach appears aimed at maintaining the morale of the Houthi popular base—mobilized for years under slogans such as “Death to America”—without immediately incurring the military costs of entering an existential war.
On the ground, the Houthis concentrated on emergency preparedness measures, canceling fighters’ leave and requiring hospitals to prepare for potential developments. The group also increased its military readiness by reinforcing militia positions along the frontlines with Yemeni government forces, deploying additional fighters and equipment. Particular emphasis was placed on the Marib front, given its strategic importance and proximity to the capital Sana’a, as well as on the Hodeidah and Taiz fronts along the Red Sea coast. These moves reflect Houthi concerns that local rivals and regional coalition actors could exploit Iran’s preoccupation with the direct battlefield to launch offensives aimed at retaking key areas in Yemen.
Despite declaring full solidarity, the Houthis did not announce an official mourning period for Khamenei in the same manner as they had for former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. This subtle signal may suggest that the pragmatic faction within the movement seeks to avoid full organic alignment with the fate of the Iranian regime at a moment of potential crisis. These dynamics suggest that the concept of “unity of arenas” has shifted from a coordinated offensive strategy into a decentralized mechanism of existential defense.
Probability of Participation: Between “Unity of Arenas” and Pre-emptive Hedging
The escalating developments in Iran and the shifting geopolitical landscape place the Houthi movement before an unprecedented test of the resilience of its regional alliances and its capacity for strategic maneuvering at a critical moment in the Middle East. While the doctrine of “support” and “unity of arenas” compels the group to act in order to relieve pressure on the faltering center in Tehran—out of commitment to the ideological framework of the Axis of Resistance—a logic of pre-emptive hedging pushes the movement toward a different calculation: that military engagement may be the most effective way to prevent Yemen from becoming the next arena for U.S.–Israeli “decapitation” operations.
The following competing drivers shape the Houthis’ decision on whether to participate in the war, balancing transnational ideological commitments with the instinct of political survival within Yemen’s complex domestic landscape.
• Organic Dependence and Existential Concerns
The Houthi leadership understands that the collapse of the Iranian regime would effectively dry up the military and technical support that accounts for nearly 90 percent of its advanced capabilities. As such, the likelihood of Houthi involvement in the war remains high if the group perceives the threat to Iran as existential. In their strategic calculus, defending Tehran is synonymous with defending their own lifeline. Likewise, a direct U.S. or Israeli strike on Houthi positions could accelerate their entry into the conflict, framing the confrontation as an existential threat that justifies intervention before their domestic support base.
• The “Cost-Distribution” Scenario
With the formation of a new Iranian leadership, instructions may be issued to regional proxy networks to activate a strategy of “cost distribution” aimed at relieving pressure on Iran’s domestic front. Under this scenario, the Houthis could adopt a gradual escalation strategy, beginning with attacks on Israeli territory and U.S. military bases across the region—excluding those located in Saudi Arabia—particularly bases in the UAE and Bahrain.
Should the escalation extend toward the Horn of Africa, the Houthis may also target Emirati and Israeli military facilities in Somaliland, and potentially in Djibouti, in addition to threatening international shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Such actions would aim to increase the cost of the war for Washington and Tel Aviv.
• Pre-emptive Hedging and Strategic Escalation
The Houthis may choose to participate in the war as a pre-emptive move to prevent their territories from becoming the next target of a U.S.-led regime-change campaign. Reports indicate that the group has already deployed “Palestine-2” hypersonic missile platforms in rugged mountainous areas of Saada and Hajjah, preparing for potential surprise strikes intended to establish a deterrence equation that discourages Washington from targeting Sana’a, Saada, or other areas under Houthi control.
• The “Limited Participation” Option (Face-Saving Strategy)
The most likely scenario may involve symbolic escalation, whereby the movement carries out limited operations—such as launching a single drone or missile every 24 hours. This pattern would allow the Houthis to maintain a delicate balance between demonstrating commitment to the Axis of Resistance and avoiding a large-scale military retaliation that could devastate their remaining infrastructure.
Strategic Constraints
The Houthis are operating under what could be described as a form of “deterrence by eradication.” Following the killing of their chief of staff and several senior ministers in 2025, any poorly calculated escalation now risks becoming a de facto death warrant for the movement as a governing authority.
Within the context of the current regional war, this existential fear has intensified. The ongoing campaign has demonstrated Washington and Tel Aviv’s ability to successfully implement a “decapitation strategy” against the very apex of power in Tehran—most notably the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—through the use of advanced intelligence capabilities and B-2 strategic bombers capable of destroying deeply fortified mountain bunkers regardless of their depth.
At the same time, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi is facing unprecedented domestic pressure within Yemen, including criticism from voices within the movement itself. A public that was willing to accept “sacrifice for Gaza” appears far less prepared to die for the survival of the Iranian regime. This domestic constraint helps explain the unusually measured tone adopted by the group’s leader in his recent speeches following Khamenei’s death, as he seeks to balance maintaining the movement’s standing within the Axis of Resistance while avoiding a decisive strike that could lead to the group’s outright eradication.
The Possibility of Neutralizing the Movement and Shifting Its Strategy
From a strategic perspective, there is a real possibility of neutralizing the Houthis and pushing the movement to recalibrate its approach and distance itself from Iran, based on several political and economic factors:
1. The Desire to Secure Local Authority
Prior to the current war, indicators suggested the existence of effective backchannel communications with Saudi Arabia aimed at reaching an agreement through negotiations to implement the UN-sponsored roadmap designed to address the group’s deep economic crisis. During this process, the Houthis signaled a potential willingness to move from confrontation toward diplomatic engagement, provided that violence subsided while preserving their control over the territories they currently govern in Yemen.
2. Preserving the Truce with Washington and Maintaining the Saudi Ceasefire
In May 2025, the Houthis signed a surprising truce agreement with the Trump administration, under which Washington suspended its strikes in exchange for the Houthis halting attacks on U.S. vessels. The Houthi leadership portrayed the agreement as a major political victory. A return to hostilities now would risk collapsing this strategic gain.
Similarly, launching attacks on U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia could end the fragile—though largely undeclared—ceasefire that has persisted since April 2022, potentially prompting Riyadh to re-enter the conflict through a ground offensive led by Yemeni government forces with Saudi air support. Such a scenario could lead to the Houthis losing strategic territories, including Hodeidah or even parts of Sana’a.
3. The Risk of Losing Iranian Support
The Houthis recognize that the collapse or severe weakening of the Iranian regime would inevitably dry up the financial channels and halt the flow of military technology and expertise on which the group relies. From a more optimistic regional perspective, the erosion of the movement’s principal patron could compel the Houthis to reassess their organic alignment with Tehran, pushing them toward pragmatic political concessions and a negotiated settlement in Yemen that secures their continued political survival.
4. Domestic Economic Pressures
Political survival calculations require the Houthis to take into account the “threshold of endurance” within their social base, which is already suffering from the severe effects of Yemen’s economic crisis—conditions that are likely to worsen as the current war unfolds. The movement understands that full-scale engagement could lead to the destruction of what remains of essential service infrastructure, potentially turning public anger driven by hunger and hardship into an internal uprising that would be difficult to contain.
The movement’s decision to participate in the war will ultimately be shaped by three key determinants. First, the ability of the group’s leadership to reach a unified decision on whether to enter the conflict. Second, the limitations of its military and logistical capabilities, including the sustainability of its supply chains. Third, the potential consequences of military involvement for the movement’s political gains and for the durability of its political and military presence.
Scenarios
The Houthis’ options in dealing with the war are limited due to the strategic nature of their relationship with Iran and the anticipated U.S. and Israeli response. Accordingly, three possible scenarios can be outlined:
Scenario One: Avoiding Participation in the War
This scenario assumes that the Houthi movement may attempt to avoid direct involvement in the war, recognizing the risks such a confrontation would pose at this stage to its survival and its continued control over the territories under its authority. This cautious approach is likely influenced by the shock resulting from the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader and other senior leadership figures on the first day of the conflict.
Additional factors may reinforce this tendency toward restraint, including the blows the movement sustained during previous rounds of confrontation, the weakness of its popular support base, the unprecedented U.S. military mobilization, and recent developments within Yemen. These include the UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen, the dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council, and efforts to unify Yemeni government forces and other anti-Houthi factions. Saudi Arabia may also attempt to encourage Houthi neutrality and discourage their entry into the war.
In the short term, this scenario is supported by the Houthis’ current political stance, which emphasizes symbolic solidarity with Iran while avoiding explicit commitments to participate militarily—unless such positions were merely tactical in nature.
Scenario Two: Calibrated Limited Participation
This scenario assumes that the Houthi movement becomes involved in the war in a controlled and calculated manner, without escalating to the level of full confrontation. This could take the form of symbolic or limited operations, such as selective targeting of maritime routes, launching missiles or drones at intermittent intervals, or intensifying mobilizing rhetoric without broad military escalation.
This approach aims to strike a balance between demonstrating commitment to the Iranian axis and preserving the group’s image as a regional actor, while avoiding the kind of large-scale military response that could threaten its internal structure and political gains.
The likelihood of this scenario increases if the war remains short in duration, if Tehran prefers to distribute roles among its regional allies without opening all fronts simultaneously, or if informal regional understandings continue to hold. Early warning indicators of this scenario would include gradual media escalation without a formal declaration of war, the resumption of limited maritime attacks, and heightened military readiness without a comprehensive mobilization of domestic fronts.
Scenario Three: Full Participation
Under this scenario, the Houthi movement would fully enter the war, resuming attacks on shipping and striking Israeli and U.S. interests, as well as the interests of regional states. It assumes that the delay in Houthi participation may be part of coordinated role distribution with Iran, allowing Tehran initially to demonstrate its ability to rely on its own capabilities in defending its interests, with Houthi involvement activated if the war continues and expands.
This scenario becomes more likely if the war prolongs and escalates, particularly if Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz and calls on the Houthis to intervene directly by expanding the scope of confrontation—targeting energy infrastructure, attempting to disrupt traffic through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and striking maritime routes in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Such actions would aim to increase the economic and security costs of the war at both regional and global levels in order to accelerate pressure for a ceasefire.
It could also be triggered if the Houthis themselves come under direct attack, experience the assassination of senior leaders, or perceive that they are on the verge of becoming the next target.
