Yemen on the Sidelines: Trump’s Regional Tour

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Introduction:
The absence of the Yemeni file from the agenda during U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia on May 13-14, 2025, sparked frustration and disappointment among many Yemenis. The issue received only brief and passing mention, despite Yemen’s increasingly central role in regional — and even global — tensions. This includes ongoing clashes in the Red Sea, a sweeping and unprecedented U.S. air-strike campaign against Houthi-controlled areas since mid-March, and devastating Israeli attacks that have severely damaged Yemen’s infrastructure and resources.
Many Yemenis had hoped that Trump’s visit would serve as a turning point — a moment to galvanize Saudi and regional support for a joint military campaign against the Houthis in coordination with the internationally recognized Yemeni government.
Adding to the sense of marginalization was the stark contrast in how the Syrian file was handled. Saudi Arabia facilitated a surprise meeting between President Trump and Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa — a meeting not originally on the schedule — which resulted in Trump announcing the lifting of sanctions on Syria. Meanwhile, Yemen’s leadership was notably sidelined. Presidential Leadership Council President Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi was in Riyadh along with other council members, yet looks to have played no visible or official role in the visit.
This paper explores the reasons behind the marginalization of the Yemeni crisis during the United States President’s high-profile visit to the region.
Context:
Over the past year, several key developments have raised hopes among many Yemenis for a decisive military operation against the Houthis — as well as for strong American backing of such an effort. The region has undergone major and transformative shifts. In Lebanon, Hezbollah — a principal ally of the Houthis — suffered significant setbacks. These blows opened the door for long-stalled political reforms, including the election of a new president and the formation of a government with a clear program aimed at strengthening state authority and ensuring a monopoly on both arms and decision-making within official institutions.
Meanwhile, dramatic events unfolded in Syria. Revolutionary factions made sweeping gains, toppling one province after another until they eventually seized the capital, Damascus. This forced President Bashar al-Assad to flee and led to the collapse of his regime.
At the same time, Iran and Israel exchanged attacks, with Iran showing a weak performance in the face of Israeli military threats, including warnings to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. These developments severely undermined Iran’s regional influence and triggered a broader public sentiment in favor of ending the Houthi takeover in Yemen — inspired in large part by the Syrian example, which many saw as a model for successful resistance and regime change.
A Shift in the American Position:
The Houthis launched a series of attacks on international shipping vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, acting in coordination with the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” led by Iran. These attacks triggered a gradual shift in the U.S. stance on the conflict in Yemen. In response, the United States swiftly announced the formation of a naval military coalition, Operation Prosperity Guardian, on December 18, 2023. However, the initiative quickly faltered. With the exception of Bahrain, Arab and regional countries showed little interest in joining, effectively rendering the coalition stillborn.
As American naval forces began intercepting Houthi attacks targeting Israel, the Houthis retaliated by directing some of their missiles toward Israeli territory. This escalation compelled the U.S. to launch limited strikes on Houthi-controlled areas, targeting radar systems, missile launchers, weapons depots, and other military assets. These strikes were intended to contain and deter Houthi aggression, but were not part of a broader strategic offensive.
The confrontation between the two sides intensified. The Houthis succeeded in downing several American drones and sinking two commercial ships, all while continuing their assaults on international shipping, U.S. naval assets and Israel. This growing escalation embarrassed the U.S. administration and exposed its lack of a strong deterrent posture. Under pressure, former President Joe Biden’s administration designated the Houthis as a “specially designated global terrorist” entity — a classification that carries fewer consequences than designating them as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
This perceived weakness drew sharp criticism from Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, who promised a tougher stance. Just two days after taking office, on January 22, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order formally designating the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and rolled out a series of political, economic, and military measures to increase pressure on the group.
Meanwhile, since October 2024, Saudi Arabia has ramped up its military engagement in areas controlled by Yemen’s internationally recognized government. These efforts appeared to be part of a broader strategy to restructure the military landscape in preparation for a major operation against the Houthis. This period saw a flurry of high-level meetings, military appointments and strategic visits. The commander of Saudi support and logistics forces held closed-door meetings with Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and other senior government and party officials, signaling that a major military operation could be imminent.
At the same time, the U.S. ambassador and special envoy to Yemen were notably active, suggesting coordination and alignment between American and Saudi strategies in the lead-up to potential military action.
In November 2024, leaks began to circulate suggesting that U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration was pushing for a military operation in December — the final month of his term — aimed at liberating Yemen’s western coast and the city of Hodeidah from Houthi control. The operation was reportedly to be supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. However, the likelihood of such an operation diminished somewhat after both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi publicly denied any intention to participate in military arrangements.
Although public military coordination between the Yemeni and Saudi sides had noticeably declined, a series of high-level meetings continued between the U.S. ambassador and key Yemeni figures, including the president and members of the Presidential Leadership Council, the Prime Minister and several cabinet ministers — up until just days before President Trump’s scheduled visit to the region. These discussions were widely interpreted as part of the groundwork for a potential military campaign against the Houthis. Speculation mounted that the visit would be a decisive moment for determining the timing of such an operation.
Yet, despite high hopes within Yemeni political circles, many were disappointed by the outcome. The Yemeni issue was largely sidelined in public discourse during Trump’s visit, and the Presidential Leadership Council’s chairman was notably absent from any meeting with the U.S. president or other American officials, despite being present in Riyadh. The public neglect of Yemen’s crisis came as a shock to many observers.
What Happened During the Visit?
President Donald Trump had previously indicated that, as in his first term, his first foreign trip during his new term would likely be to Saudi Arabia. The visit took place from May 13 to May 14. Unlike his earlier trips, this visit expanded to include stops in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates — three countries known for their financial surpluses, active investment portfolios, and ambitions to play larger political roles both regionally and globally.
In Saudi Arabia, Trump held private talks with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and participated in the Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum, where he delivered a keynote speech. One of the major announcements from that speech was his plan to lift sanctions on Syria. The following day, he met with the Syrian president and took part in a Gulf-U.S. summit alongside leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Although President Trump gave two public speeches — one of which lasted nearly an hour — and spoke with members of the press, his references to Yemen were extremely brief and offered no new policy direction. He merely noted that the U.S. Navy had conducted over 1,100 strikes against Houthi targets, describing the Houthis as “tough fighters” who had since agreed to stop attacking American ships. “We didn’t want to strike them,” Trump said, “but they were targeting [our] ships, and they had previously targeted Saudi Arabia”.
During his stop in Qatar, Trump hinted that the U.S. might resume military action against the Houthis if they were to launch new attacks. “We’re dealing with the Houthis, and I think it’s been very successful,” he stated. “But if an attack happens tomorrow, we’ll go back on the offensive”
The Saudi Crown Prince, in his remarks at the Gulf-U.S. Summit, also offered no new position on Yemen. He reaffirmed the importance of promoting intra-Yemeni dialogue and creating the conditions for a genuine political process under UN auspices — one that includes all Yemeni factions and leads to a just resolution that fulfills the Yemeni people’s aspirations for peace, stability and development.
One notable moment during the summit was a correction made by the Emir of Kuwait. After delivering his speech, he was discreetly prompted by the Saudi Crown Prince to clarify his position, after which he emphasized that the Houthis are an “illegitimate” authority.
Reasons for the Absence of the Yemeni Issue During the Visit
While the Yemeni file was likely discussed behind closed doors — particularly in bilateral meetings between President Trump and Saudi or Gulf leaders — it was noticeably absent from public remarks and official statements. Given the ongoing conflict, including Houthi missile attacks on Israel during the summit itself, the issue could not be entirely ignored. Yet its public visibility was minimal, and several factors may explain this:
- Saudi Arabia’s Desire to Keep the Yemeni File Frozen:
The exact reasons behind Saudi Arabia’s apparent preference to leave the Yemeni issue on hold remain unclear. However, given the lack of momentum or change in the status quo, it is perhaps unsurprising that the chairman of Yemen’s PLC was neither invited to participate in the summit nor mentioned in any joint announcements. Similarly, the absence of any substantive public discussion on Yemen from either Saudi or American leaders reflects this strategic pause.
- The Visit’s Predominantly Economic Focus:
The agenda and structure of President Trump’s visit clearly emphasized economic and investment interests over political or security matters. Trump arrived with the intent of closing major deals, and much of the visit was centered around deepening economic partnerships.
Saudi Arabia pledged to invest $600 billion in the U.S. economy. In Qatar, a series of agreements were signed, amounting to no less than $1.2 trillion in economic cooperation. Trump also announced economic deals with Qatar totaling more than $243.5 billion, including a landmark agreement for the sale of Boeing aircraft and General Electric engines to Qatar Airways. A $142 billion arms deal was signed, and the UAE unveiled an investment plan worth $1.4 trillion. This overwhelming focus on economics overshadowed other issues, pushing security and humanitarian concerns — such as the Yemeni conflict — down the list of priorities. As a result, the public narrative of the visit centered on trade and investment, leaving Yemen largely in the background.
- Trump’s Reciprocal Approach
President Trump’s visit underscored a clear shift toward a more “reciprocal” and pragmatic foreign policy, one that prioritizes immediate economic and security interests over long-term, complex conflicts. This was evident in major decisions such as lifting sanctions on Syria and engaging in negotiations with Hamas to secure the release of American hostages. As a result, issues like the war in Yemen — which demand sustained diplomatic and military engagement — have been sidelined.
- Other Issues Take Priority
For both the American administration and its Gulf partners, other matters currently hold greater urgency. These include normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, addressing escalating threats from Iran, and navigating the crisis in Gaza. Against this backdrop, the Yemeni conflict has slipped further down the agenda, especially given Saudi Arabia’s apparent preference to keep the situation in Yemen frozen for now.
- The Security-Sensitive Nature of the Yemeni File
The Yemeni conflict remains, above all, a sensitive security issue. While it may be actively discussed in closed-door meetings, public references are deliberately kept to a minimum. This mirrors how Gulf states are also handling the war in Gaza — with caution and discretion. Gulf leaders have been careful not to provoke political backlash, particularly from influential pro-Israel groups closely aligned with Trump and the Republican Party. While this consideration may seem indirectly related to Yemen, it likely influences the public silence surrounding the issue during high-profile visits and summits