What Impact Will Trump’s Policies Have on the Course of the Conflict in Yemen

Introduction
The return of U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House on January 20, 2025, marked a shift in the external context influencing the ongoing conflict in Yemen. This context has become more prominent due to the clashes in the Red Sea and the exchange of attacks between the Houthis and Israel. This shift gains further significance given Trump’s strong presence, his positions on Israel and Iran, as well as his potential impact on the policies of both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Two days after his return to the White House, Trump signed an order designating the Houthi group as a foreign terrorist organization, with the decision taking effect on March 5. This move is likely part of a broader strategy to punish the Houthis, which will have significant ramifications. This raises the question: What impact might Trump’s policies, concerning the Houthis, have on the conflict in Yemen?

General Background

The United States has maintained a significant influence on the ongoing war in Yemen since March 2015. Former U.S. President Barack Obama initially provided logistical support to the military operations carried out by the Arab Coalition but later moved to restrict this support and pushed for a political settlement to end the war.

Upon assuming office for his first term, Donald Trump decided to lift the suspension on arms sales imposed by Obama in the last month of his presidency. While his administration continued to talk about ending the war, addressing the humanitarian situation and protecting Saudi territory, it did little to actively defend Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which suffered painful attacks on their vital interests during his tenure.

On the other hand, Joe Biden’s administration prioritized ending the war in Yemen, making it a key objective in its foreign policy. It exerted considerable pressure on Riyadh to halt the war. However, this stance shifted, following Houthi attacks on commercial vessels and U.S. warships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. As these attacks persisted, Washington was compelled to carry out several air strikes on various targets in Houthi-controlled areas.

Throughout 2024, Houthi activity in the Red Sea evolved into a major security challenge for the U.S., other Western nations and global shipping. Unlike its earlier approach, the Biden administration began pressuring Saudi Arabia to abandon its pursuit of a settlement, linking progress in negotiations to a halt in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and against Israel.

According to exclusive sources, the U.S. Department of Defense was pushing for a military operation against the Houthis on the western coast and in the port of Hodeidah in December 2024. However, this operation was halted due to a lack of enthusiasm from Saudi Arabia, which conditioned its participation on signing a security partnership agreement before engaging in any military action against the Houthis.

Key Aspects of Trump’s Policies Toward the Houthis

The Houthis and the Red Sea attacks did not feature prominently in Donald Trump’s election campaigns. This could be because his primary focus was on domestic U.S. issues and major international matters that directly impacted the American economy and internal affairs. It is also possible that he sought to avoid committing to military action that could entail significant economic costs — something that contradicts his core policy objective of steering clear of new conflicts. Alternatively, he may have deliberately withheld attention from the Houthis to use the issue as leverage against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, knowing their need for U.S. action on the matter.

Two days after returning to the White House, Trump signed an order designating the Houthi group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The justification for this decision stated that Houthi activities “threaten the security of civilians and U.S. personnel in the Middle East, as well as the security of our closest regional partners and the stability of global trade.”

On March 3, the U.S. State Department announced that the Executive Order classifying the Houthis as an international terrorist organization had officially taken effect. The department emphasized that this decision is part of a broader U.S. strategy aimed at curbing support for groups classified as terrorist organizations, amid escalating tensions in the region.

Following this move, on March 5, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on seven senior Houthi leaders, accusing them of being involved in arms smuggling and negotiating military deals with Russia. The sanctions also targeted another individual and a company implicated in recruiting Yemenis to fight in Ukraine on behalf of Moscow.

The list of sanctioned individuals includes:

• AbdulSalam Salah Falita (Mohammed Abdulsalam), the Houthis’ spokesperson residing in Oman, whom the statement described as a key figure in managing financial networks and negotiating arms deals with Russia.
• Mahdi al-Mashat, head of the so-called Supreme Political Council (SPC), created by the Houthis.
• Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a member of the SPC.
• Ishaq Abdul Malik Al-Marouni, described in the statement as “a senior aide to Abdulsalam who participated in high-level Houthi delegations to Moscow and contributed to advancing Houthi interests internationally.”
• Ali Mohammed Mohsen Saleh Al-Hadi, head of the Sana’a Chamber of Commerce, which the Houthis took control of in May 2023. He became a key financier of arms purchases.
• Abdul Malik Abdullah Al-Ajri, a senior Houthi figure who traveled to Moscow and Beijing to represent Houthi interests in meetings with Russian and Chinese officials.
• Khaled Hussein Saleh Jaber, a member of the Houthi financial network who participated in Houthi delegations to Moscow, met with Russian Foreign Ministry officials, and has close ties to Houthi financier Saeed Al-Jamal. Jaber is involved in smuggling and illicit financing within Al-Jamal’s network.

Despite these measures, Trump’s policy toward the Houthis lacks clarity and remains incomplete. It is subject to evolution, which is based on the positions of Washington’s regional allies, developments in U.S. relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as the outcome of the war in Gaza. However, the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization has provided insight into the broad contours of Trump’s approach, which can be further elaborated on as follows:

1. Economic Strangulation:

The implementation of the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation for the Houthis is expected to result in a global financial ban on transactions with the group, restricting their access to international markets. Banks operating in Houthi-controlled areas may face U.S. and possibly international sanctions. Additionally, regional and global financial institutions are expected to close any accounts linked to individuals or companies suspected of dealing with the Houthis, while financial flows to Houthi-controlled areas will likely be subjected to strict international monitoring.

Furthermore, financial assets within the U.S. belonging to individuals or entities proven to have directly or indirectly supported the Houthis could be frozen. The sanctions may also extend to a ban on imports through Hodeidah port, unless approved by Yemen’s legitimate government, along with other measures designed to deprive the Houthis of financial resources and economically strangle them.

1. Cooperation with Regional Partners to Cripple Houthi Capabilities

The Trump administration does not seek to adopt a unilateral approach toward the Houthis in military, economic or security matters. Instead, it aims to act through its regional allies, including Israel and the UAE, with a primary reliance on Saudi Arabia, which plays a central role in U.S. strategy concerning Yemen.

Saudi Arabia possesses extensive intelligence on the Houthis and, along with the UAE, is financially capable of bearing the costs of any measures that Washington may take against the group, particularly military actions. Coordination on Houthi-related policies is a shared objective for both Washington and Riyadh.

This was evident in the February 25, 2025, visit of Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman to Washington, where he held discussions with several U.S. institutions. Notably, Mohammed Al Jaber, the Saudi ambassador to Yemen and Riyadh’s top policymaker on Yemen, was part of the visiting delegation — indicating that the Yemen file was a key focus of the bilateral talks.

1. Ending Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea:

The primary goal of Trump’s pressure campaign against the Houthis is to eliminate their threat to international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and to neutralize their attacks on U.S. and Western naval assets in the southern Red Sea and surrounding waters.

The FTO designation explicitly stated that the move reflects the Trump administration’s commitment to protecting U.S. national interests and citizens’ security. It further emphasized that the designation is part of a broader U.S. strategy to curb support for terrorist-designated groups, amid rising regional tensions.

Potential Impacts on the Conflict Dynamics

It is expected that Trump’s policies will have significant implications for the Yemen file, particularly in terms of easing pressure on Saudi Arabia, expanding its maneuvering space regarding the Houthis and prioritizing economic suffocation over military action. These policies could lead to changes in the military balance between the parties in the conflict, as well as exacerbate the already fragile humanitarian situation.

• Providing Greater Space for Saudi Arabia:

Perhaps the most obvious impact of Trump’s policies is the expansion of Saudi Arabia’s maneuvering space and its ability to diversify its options in dealing with the Houthis. Trump’s return to power means that Riyadh will be freed from the intense pressure it faced from the Biden administration to halt the war in Yemen, a position that shifted after the Red Sea attacks, as previously mentioned.

This means that all options will be open for Saudi Arabia, including military action, as the Trump administration is likely to support these options, including war, to a large extent. This also means that Saudi Arabia will have greater latitude in shaping Yemen’s conflict dynamics.

• Cementing the Political Isolation of the Houthis:

In addition to the economic strangulation, Trump’s policies aim to further isolate the Houthis politically. The U.S. State Department, in its announcement of the Houthis’ inclusion in the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list, emphasized that the U.S. would not tolerate any country engaging with terrorist organizations, like the Houthis, under the pretext of conducting legitimate international business.

On the same day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with his Omani counterpart, Badr bin Hamad Al- , stressing the need to put an end to the illegitimate Houthi attacks on the Red Sea and surrounding waterways. There were also reports of U.S. pressure on Oman to restrict any Houthi presence within its borders, depriving them of a critical channel for international dealings.

Media outlets also reported that the U.S. requested that Iraq shut down the Houthi office in Baghdad, which coordinates with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Sha’abi).

• Delay in Military Action:

Contrary to the assumptions that Trump’s return would expedite military action in Yemen and that regional actors may have been waiting for Trump’s return during the final months of Biden’s presidency, Trump’s policies in the first month of his second term point to prioritizing economic pressure and political isolation over immediate military action. If military action does occur, it is likely to be a secondary step, following these other measures. This is further reinforced by the priority of addressing the Gaza issue among Arab countries.

• Shift in the Balance of Power:

It is anticipated that Trump’s policies toward the Houthis, which focus on economic strangulation and political isolation, will cause a shift in the political power balance in Yemen. This shift is expected to benefit the legitimate government, as the Houthis’ economic capabilities will be significantly reduced, as will their regional and international presence, as well as their relationship with the population in their controlled areas.

Despite the fact that the legitimate government will bear some of the repercussions of these policies, it will gain several advantages and be in a stronger position relative to the Houthis. This is especially true if U.S. policies signal an intent to undermine Houthi rule rather than contain it.

• Wide Humanitarian Consequences:

The decision to include the Houthis on the terrorism list, along with other potential measures, is expected to have devastating humanitarian consequences, such as reducing the flow of humanitarian aid. Additionally, it could lead to price hikes, bank bankruptcies in Houthi-controlled areas and other adverse effects. The United Nations has called for measures to ensure the continued flow of humanitarian assistance and essential goods to Yemen.

In a press briefing on March 4, 2025, Stephane Dujarric, the UN Secretary-General’s spokesperson, said that “this designation must be accompanied by appropriate guarantees to ensure effective humanitarian aid delivery and allow civilians access to basic goods and services.”

The UN also emphasized the importance of continuing humanitarian efforts in Yemen, where approximately 19 million people require life-saving assistance and 17 million face the threat of famine. Dujarric warned that any disruption in the flow of commercial goods and humanitarian aid could have catastrophic consequences, especially in a country that relies on imports for about 90% of its food needs.

Conclusion

The return of U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House marks a shift in the external context influencing the ongoing conflict in Yemen, as well as the U.S. approach to dealing with the Houthis. He quickly signed a decision that placed the Houthis on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and this decision came into effect in the first week of March 2025. Additionally, the U.S. Department of the Treasury placed several Houthi leaders on the sanctions list, aiming to tighten economic pressure and cut off their access to resources.

These developments are expected to have significant repercussions in Yemen, particularly in terms of economic suffocation and political isolation of the Houthis, reducing pressure on Saudi Arabia and expanding its space for maneuvering in Yemen, including the possibility of resuming military action. Moreover, this may shift the military balance in favor of the legitimate government, while simultaneously having severe humanitarian consequences in Yemen’s fragile situation.

It is crucial for the legitimate government to adopt a clear strategy to mitigate the humanitarian suffering that could result from these developments and to engage positively with these shifts, enabling it to resolve the conflict decisively.