The Fifth Annual Strategic Report Yemen – 2025
The Mokha Center for Strategic Studies presents in this summary an overview of the key findings of its Fifth Annual Strategic Report for 2025, which examines the political, economic, military, social, and humanitarian developments in Yemen during the year. The report relies on a comprehensive analytical reading supported by verified data and documented information. It adopts an analytical methodology that combines descriptive and quantitative tools, while also exploring future trends shaping the broader transformations in Yemen’s political and social landscape.
This summary aims to provide a concise overview of the report’s main findings and conclusions, offering a focused picture of the most significant developments that took place in Yemen during 2025. It seeks to assist policymakers, researchers, and observers of Yemeni affairs in understanding the current dynamics of the Yemeni scene and anticipating its potential future trajectories.
First: Political Developments
During 2025, Yemen’s political landscape witnessed a state of fluidity and continuous shifts in the balance of power, driven by overlapping conflicts within various political camps and the increasing roles of local and regional actors in managing the conflict. In areas under the internationally recognized government, a clear crisis emerged within the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which was formed in April 2022 as a unified framework bringing together forces opposed to the Houthi movement.
Developments throughout 2025 revealed escalating disagreements among the Council’s components over the distribution of authority, the management of resources, and appointments within sovereign institutions. These disputes weakened the Council’s ability to make unified decisions, which in turn negatively affected the performance of the government and state institutions.
Political developments also revealed that the vacuum created by the weakness of the central government was not filled by a single actor. Instead, it led to the emergence of multiple local forces across several governorates, particularly in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, where tribal and political entities began seeking to manage the affairs of these regions independently from political dominance emanating from Sana’a or Aden. This dynamic contributed to the emergence of a form of regional pluralism within Yemen’s geography, marked by the rise of local blocs seeking to protect their economic and political interests.
Within this context, the eastern governorates increasingly appeared as a new political actor in the Yemeni landscape. Developments suggest the potential transformation of these areas into entities enjoying a high degree of self-governance, supported by emerging regional balances aimed at safeguarding security and economic interests in these strategically important regions.
In contrast, areas under the control of the Houthi movement witnessed a notable shift in the structure of governance during 2025. After years of administering authority through limited political alliances, the group moved toward consolidating a more centralized governing model characterized by unilateral decision-making and an expanded security apparatus. This model has revolved around concentrating authority within the group’s top leadership, strengthening the role of security institutions in managing society, and reshaping the political and social structure in line with the movement’s ideological project.
At the international level, the Yemeni crisis also saw growing attention from major powers. Countries such as Russia and China began demonstrating increased interest in the Yemeni file, particularly as it became more closely linked to the security of the Red Sea and international maritime navigation. At the same time, broader regional tensions further complicated the Yemeni situation, as the local conflict became increasingly intertwined with wider regional power dynamics.
Toward the end of the year, in December 2025, tensions between the internationally recognized government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) escalated into open confrontation following the STC’s attempt to impose military control over the governorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra and its advance toward the Saudi border. Riyadh viewed the arrival of what it considered the UAE-backed arm of influence near its borders as a direct threat to its national security and a crossing of red lines. This led to a combined military and political response that ended the STC’s military control and ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of the UAE from Yemen.
Overall, the Yemeni political landscape in 2025 reflects a continuous process of reconfiguration in the balance of power. The conflict is no longer limited to a binary struggle between the government and the Houthis, but has evolved into a far more complex and multi-layered political contest.
Second: Economy and Development
The Yemeni economy entered 2025 facing a complex set of challenges resulting from the ongoing war, institutional fragmentation, and declining financial resources. Although some indicators suggested relative stability compared to previous years, the economy continued to operate largely within a framework of crisis management, without achieving any real structural transformation.
Yemen’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025 was estimated at approximately $17.35 billion, reflecting the modest scale of the country’s economy compared to the pre-war period. Since 2015, Yemen’s economy has lost more than half of its real value. Meanwhile, real GDP recorded a contraction of around 1.5% during the year, extending the economic stagnation that has characterized the country for several years.
Economic performance was significantly affected by the suspension of crude oil exports since late 2022, following Houthi attacks targeting export facilities. Oil remains Yemen’s primary source of foreign currency, and the halt in exports has deepened the financial crisis and reduced government revenues. During 2025, oil production remained at extremely low levels—approximately 15,000 barrels per day—with most of this output used for domestic consumption and electricity generation rather than export. This situation illustrates the extent of the decline in the oil sector, which was once one of the country’s most important sources of national income before the war. In this context, calls have emerged to restart the Aden refinery and develop refining infrastructure as an important step toward reducing dependence on imported petroleum products and easing pressure on foreign currency reserves.
Yemeni markets also experienced high inflation levels during 2025, particularly in areas controlled by the internationally recognized government, where inflation exceeded 30% annually, driven by the depreciation of the local currency and rising prices of essential goods. In contrast, areas under Houthi control experienced what can be described as suppressed inflation, where exchange rates appeared relatively stable but were accompanied by steadily rising commodity prices due to liquidity shortages and the proliferation of levies and informal taxation.
Analysis of economic indicators suggests that Yemen’s economy currently stands between two possible trajectories. The first path involves the continuation of crisis management, with persistent institutional fragmentation, fluctuating resources, and reliance on external aid—resulting in continued fragile stability without meaningful economic growth. The second path depends on the potential resumption of oil production and exports, alongside improved institutional coordination, which could create conditions for gradual economic recovery.
Overall, Yemen’s economic landscape in 2025 was characterized by fragile relative stability rather than genuine recovery, as the economy remained heavily dependent on external assistance and remittances from expatriates to sustain the minimum level of economic activity.
Third: Military and Security Developments
The military and security landscape in Yemen during 2025 remained largely governed by a fragile balance between the conflicting parties, amid the continued state of “military stalemate” that has characterized the conflict in recent years. Nevertheless, the year witnessed several military and security developments reflecting ongoing tensions along frontline areas, as well as shifts in the balance of power within certain regions.
On the traditional frontlines between government forces and the Houthi movement, limited clashes continued across several fronts, while the main battle lines remained largely stable. These confrontations were primarily characterized by mutual attrition, without producing any significant changes in the map of military control.
The year also saw ongoing efforts to reorganize military and security forces in several regions as part of attempts to restructure armed formations and integrate them into more organized institutional frameworks. However, these efforts faced significant challenges due to the existence of multiple military decision-making centers and the differing political loyalties of various armed groups.
At the same time, some regions experienced security tensions linked to local rivalries and competition among forces within the anti-Houthi camp. These tensions manifested in clashes in the governorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, following a campaign by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) to impose military control over the two governorates and pursue steps toward secession.
In addition, the security activity of extremist groups remained one of the challenges affecting stability in certain areas, despite a decline in the scale of their operations compared to previous years. Security forces continued to conduct operations aimed at pursuing these groups and limiting their activities.
The security environment was also influenced by regional developments in the Red Sea, where escalating tensions increased international attention toward maritime security and navigation routes near Yemen’s coasts. This was reflected in a series of military and diplomatic moves aimed at protecting international trade routes and ensuring the safety of maritime navigation.
Overall, the report indicates that Yemen’s military landscape in 2025 continued to reflect a state of relative stalemate between the internationally recognized government and the Houthi movement, with neither side appearing capable of achieving a decisive military victory. This situation underscores the importance of the political track as a central pathway toward ending the conflict.
Fourth: Humanitarian Situation and Human Rights
In 2025, Yemen continues to face one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, resulting from the overlapping effects of war, economic collapse, institutional fragmentation, and declining international funding for humanitarian response. The country entered its eleventh year of conflict amid high levels of poverty and food insecurity. Estimates indicate that around 80% of the population lives below the poverty line, while the average annual per capita income has fallen to less than $471. Yemen also ranked 126th out of 127 countries in the Global Hunger Index, reflecting the severe deterioration in living conditions.
Humanitarian operations in Yemen continue to face major challenges due to restrictions on aid access, as well as a significant decline in international funding for humanitarian response. Funding for the 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan reached only 24% of the total required resources, representing one of the lowest funding levels recorded in recent years.
With regard to human rights, 2025 witnessed the continued occurrence of violations across different parts of the country, including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, torture, and restrictions on public freedoms. Press freedom also deteriorated significantly, with Yemen ranking among the most dangerous countries for journalists, placing 154th globally according to the 2025 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index.
Women and girls remain among the groups most affected by the humanitarian crisis. Data indicate that approximately 6.2 million women and girls are exposed to risks of violence, with many facing various forms of gender-based violence.
The year also witnessed new waves of internal displacement as a result of the ongoing conflict and worsening economic and environmental conditions. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 4,371 families were newly displaced during 2025, mainly in the governorates of Marib, Hodeidah, Taiz, and Hadramawt.
The education sector continues to face major challenges due to damage to school infrastructure, the suspension of teachers’ salaries in some areas, and rising school dropout rates. These factors have contributed to the decline in the quality of education and the widening educational gap between regions.
In the health sector, limited resources and damage to health facilities have reduced the capacity of the healthcare system to provide basic services to the population. These challenges have been further exacerbated by the spread of certain diseases and the weakness of primary healthcare programs.
Living conditions have also deteriorated significantly as a result of rising prices and declining incomes, forcing many households to adopt severe coping strategies for survival, such as reducing food consumption or withdrawing children from school to contribute to family income.
Overall, Yemen’s humanitarian situation reflects a continued deterioration in living conditions and essential services, amid fragile social protection systems and the declining ability of state institutions to provide public services. The report indicates that the prolonged years of conflict have left deep structural impacts on Yemeni society, including rising poverty and unemployment, and the deterioration of essential services in health, education, and infrastructure. Internal displacement has also placed additional pressure on host communities in many regions.
Strategic Conclusion
Developments in Yemen during 2025 reveal the continued presence of the structural complexity that has characterized the trajectory of the conflict for years. Political dynamics remain closely intertwined with military, economic, and humanitarian transformations in shaping the overall landscape. Politically, state institutions in areas under the internationally recognized government continue to face challenges related to multiple centers of influence and weak central decision-making, while the Houthi movement continues to consolidate a more centralized model of governance in the territories under its control. Within this context, the political scene remains vulnerable to both internal and regional contestations that hinder the emergence of a stable political trajectory.
From a military and security perspective, the existing balance of power indicates the persistence of a military stalemate, with none of the parties appearing capable of achieving a comprehensive battlefield victory in the foreseeable future. As a result, frontline areas remain in a state of tension that may either escalate or be contained depending on regional developments and shifts in the positions of local actors.
Economically, Yemen faces deep structural challenges resulting from the decline in sovereign revenues and institutional fragmentation. Prospects for economic recovery remain largely dependent on the reunification of financial institutions and the resumption of oil and gas production and exports. On the social and humanitarian level, the continued deterioration of living conditions and the expansion of poverty place Yemeni society under growing pressure, with potential long-term consequences for the country’s social fabric.
Overall, the interaction of these dynamics suggests that Yemen’s future will remain closely tied to the transition from conflict management to a comprehensive political settlement that ends the Houthi coup, enables the rebuilding of state institutions, and restores a minimum level of political, economic, and social stability—ultimately paving the way for a just and sustainable peace.
