{"id":8865,"date":"2024-10-14T10:25:23","date_gmt":"2024-10-14T10:25:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mokhacenter.org\/?p=8865"},"modified":"2024-11-12T11:18:31","modified_gmt":"2024-11-12T11:18:31","slug":"in-the-context-of-its-threats-how-likely-is-another-israeli-attack-on-the-houthis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mokhacenter.org\/en\/in-the-context-of-its-threats-how-likely-is-another-israeli-attack-on-the-houthis\/","title":{"rendered":"In the Context of its Threats: How Likely Is Another Israeli Attack on the Houthis?"},"content":{"rendered":"

A year after the Israeli war on Gaza, along with its failure to achieve its stated objectives, Israel shifted the conflict northward toward Lebanon. On September 30, 2024, the Israeli army announced the start of a ground military operation in Lebanon, noting that it was being conducted alongside ongoing operations in Gaza and other areas. This escalation followed a series of intense strikes against Hezbollah, culminating on September 27 when Israel targeted the group\u2019s main headquarters in the southern suburbs of Beirut with missiles and precision bombs. The strike killed Hezbollah\u2019s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, along with other senior leaders of the group and the Quds Force commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon.<\/span><\/p>\n

These events triggered further escalation in the region, adding to the chaos Hezbollah had been facing for days and increasing anticipation of Iran\u2019s next move before deciding to launch a full-scale attack on Israel. U.S. efforts to restrain the actions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his hardline government appeared ineffective. Initially, the strikes created significant confusion among Iran\u2019s allies, including the Houthi movement. However, this uncertainty diminished after Iran launched missile attacks on Israel on the eve of October 2, killing more than eight Israeli soldiers and wounding nearly 30 others as they attempted to push into Lebanese territory.<\/span><\/p>\n

In response to the death of Nasrallah, the Houthis fired a missile toward Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv just as Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was returning from addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Following the Houthi missile launch, the Israeli army responded on September 28, stating that although Ansar Allah (the Houthis) would eventually be dealt with, their immediate focus remained on continuing the offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.<\/span><\/p>\n

On September 29, Israeli aircraft carried out air strikes on power plants in Yemen\u2019s Al-Hali area and port of Hodeida. The strikes also hit oil tanks at the port of Ras Issa, causing destruction and leading to casualties. This raises the question: Will Israel carry out more attacks on the Houthis, and what is the broader context behind these actions? This paper seeks to explore and address that issue.<\/span><\/p>\n

Escalation of the Conflict\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

Since the outbreak of the Israeli-Gaza war on October 7, 2023, the Houthi group declared its involvement in the conflict as part of what is referred to as the \u201cunity of the arenas,\u201d which is a coalition of armed groups across the region, supported or influenced by Iran. The Houthis\u2019 role has primarily been focused on launching attacks on international shipping vessels in the Red Sea and sending drones and missiles toward Israel.<\/span><\/p>\n

In response to these actions, the United States, under the banner of a naval coalition called \u201cGuardian of Prosperity,\u201d rallied several nations to protect maritime routes. However, this alliance struggled to prevent Houthi attacks, particularly as many regional countries declined to participate, linking the tensions in the Red Sea to the ongoing Israeli-Gaza conflict. There was a growing sentiment that halting the war in Gaza would also de-escalate clashes across the region, including in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite the alliance\u2019s efforts, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels persisted. In retaliation, U.S. and British forces launched several strikes on Houthi-controlled areas, claiming to target weapons storage facilities, drones, radars and missile launch sites. However, these strikes did not target Houthi leadership or fighters directly. The most recent wave of these strikes took place on Friday, October 4, with 15 air raids on targets in Hodeida, Sana\u2019a, Dhamar and Al Bayda, which were believed to be tied to the Houthis\u2019 offensive capabilities. The strikes did not have a significant impact on the group\u2019s military strength.<\/span><\/p>\n

Unlike the ongoing clashes between Hezbollah and Israel since October 8, which have largely followed established rules of engagement, this new escalation has broken those boundaries. In a significant move, the Israeli government assassinated Fouad Shukr, the commander of Hezbollah\u2019s Radwan Brigades. The situation took a dramatic turn on Tuesday, September 17, when thousands of pagers carried by Hezbollah members were simultaneously detonated across Lebanon. The following day, Icom F82 walkie-talkies were also detonated, leading to the assassination of many Hezbollah members. On September 27, Israel launched a targeted air strike that led to the assassination of several high-ranking Hezbollah military leaders, including the party\u2019s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah.<\/span><\/p>\n

In response, the Houthi group declared that \u201cthe Zionist enemy will not achieve its security and stability by assassinating the resistance leaders\u201d and vowed support for \u201cthe dear peoples\u201d of Lebanon and Palestine, as well as their \u201ccomrades in jihad.\u201d On September 28, the Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Israel, coinciding with Prime Minister Netanyahu\u2019s arrival in Tel Aviv. They also claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.<\/span><\/p>\n

In reaction, on September 28, the Israeli Broadcasting Corporation reported that the Israeli army acknowledged that the Yemeni Ansar Allah group (Houthis) would eventually be targeted, but for now, the primary focus remained on attacking Lebanese Hezbollah members. The following day, Israel launched air strikes on power plants in the Al-Hali area and the port of Hodeida, also hitting oil tanks in the port of Ras Issa, resulting in casualties and significant damage.<\/span><\/p>\n

For several days, it appeared that Israel was entering a phase of dominance, poised to punish the groups that had challenged it in recent confrontations. However, the dynamics shifted after an Iranian strike, the failure of Israel\u2019s ground assault in southern Lebanon and the resulting casualties among Israeli forces. These events brought the region back to a familiar state of conflict, pitting Israel and the United States against Iran and its allies.<\/span><\/p>\n

Several factors will determine whether Israel might launch strikes against Houthi leaders. While Israel has threatened the Houthis, any such action depends on a range of variables. These include the progress of Israel\u2019s ground operations in southern Lebanon, the extent and persistence of Houthi attacks on Israel, the type of attacks if they occur, the evolving nature of the Israel-Iran conflict and the stance of the United States on these developments. These elements collectively shape the likelihood of strikes against Houthi leadership.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Here\u2019s a closer look at these factors:<\/span><\/p>\n