{"id":3914,"date":"2024-02-13T14:27:00","date_gmt":"2024-02-13T14:27:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mokhacenter.org\/?p=3914"},"modified":"2024-08-06T12:21:26","modified_gmt":"2024-08-06T12:21:26","slug":"drivers-contributing-to-the-ongoing-armed-conflict-in-yemen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mokhacenter.org\/en\/drivers-contributing-to-the-ongoing-armed-conflict-in-yemen\/","title":{"rendered":"Drivers Contributing to the Ongoing Armed Conflict in Yemen"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00a0<\/u><\/strong>Abstract
\n<\/strong><\/span>
\nEnding the armed conflict in Yemen appears far-fetched due to various factors driving its
\ncontinuation. This research paper will explore and analyze these drivers, starting with the
\nextremist ideology of the Houthi group. Their ideology, rooted in divine selection, aims to
\ncontrol governance and society by fueling armed conflict and seizing leadership positions in
\ncivil, security and military institutions. The group is determined to not pursue a comprehensive
\npolitical settlement until they dominate oil and gas resources, and they rely on Iran for military,
\npolitical, financial and media support, aligning with Iran\u2019s regional dominance strategy.
\nAnother driver is the weakness of the legitimate, internationally recognized authority. This
\nauthority has failed to establish good governance in areas under its control, fulfill citizen needs
\nand overcome internal divisions. The Presidential Leadership Council, formed over a year and a
\nhalf ago, still struggles with division, clashes and weak consensus on critical issues, like Yemen\u2019s
\nunity and resource distribution, hindering unity of command over military and security forces.
\nIran\u2019s strategic vision for Yemen, aiming to dominate the region, is another significant driver.
\nIran sees Yemen as part of its strategic depth, expanding its influence through the Houthis in
\nvital areas, like the Red Sea coast and Bab al-Mandab. The Houthis have tipped the balance
\nagainst regional opponents, like Saudi Arabia, prompting Iran to continue supporting the
\nconflict.
\nLastly, regional and international competition for dominance over Yemen and its strategic
\nlocation is a key driver. Yemen\u2019s control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait and its proximity to
\ncrucial maritime regions attract international and regional powers seeking control. This has led
\nto the involvement of international powers and regional actors on Yemen\u2019s coasts and islands,
\nfueling the conflict\u2019s continuation.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/span>
\nAfter the Arab Spring in Yemen in February 2011, widespread financial and administrative
\ncorruption, along with a struggling economy, led to large protests demanding the removal of
\nthe ruling regime. Despite efforts to resolve the conflict through The Gulf Initiative, which led to
\nthe transfer of power to Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, the unrest continued. The
\nHouthi group participated in a national dialogue conference but also took military action,
\nexpanding from their stronghold in Saada Governorate to neighboring regions, like Al-Jawf and
\nHajjah. With a weak central state and dissatisfaction with the Government of National Accord
\nand President Hadi, along with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh\u2019s ambitions to return to
\npower, the group seized the opportunity to escalate militarily. On September 21, 2014, they
\nstormed the capital, Sana\u2019a, overthrowing government institutions and seizing control of army
\nand security camps. From there, they aimed to conquer other governorates and regions of
\nYemen.
\nThis event led to a bloody armed conflict, which continues today and has gained significant
\nregional and international attention. Iranian officials claim that Iran now controls four Arab
\ncapitals and assert that the Houthis are a product of the Iranian revolution. On March 12, 2015,
\nthe group held a military parade and maneuvers involving thousands of fighters and various
\nweapons, including heavy weaponry seized from Yemeni army camps. These maneuvers
\noccurred in the Al-Baqa\u2019 area in Saada Governorate, near the Saudi border. The Houthi militia,
\nalong with forces loyal to former President Saleh, also carried out raids on the presidential
\npalace in the city of Aden after President Hadi fled there from Sana\u2019a.
\nThese events and maneuvers prompted the Arab Coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, to intervene on
\nMarch 26, 2015, announcing the \u201cDecisive Storm\u201d military operation. The intervention was
\nbased on President Hadi\u2019s request to Gulf Cooperation Council leaders to militarily remove the
\ncoup and restore legitimacy. This led President Hadi to flee via the Sultanate of Oman to
\nRiyadh, the Saudi capital, where he established the next headquarters for him and his
\ninternationally recognized government.<\/p>\n

1) The First Driver \u2013 The Extreme Ideology of the Houthi Group and its Aim to Dominate
\nSociety:
\nThe Houthi group bases its authority on an extreme ideological framework that claims exclusive
\nrights to power and governance, tracing back to the lineage of Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein, the
\nsons of Imam Ali bin Abi Talib, following the Prophet Muhammad\u2019s passing. This belief,
\nformalized in a document issued by the Houthi group on February 13, 2012, asserts a divine
\nmandate for their leadership until the Day of Judgment.<\/p>\n

This radical ideology is the main reason for the ongoing armed conflict, shaping the foundation
\nof the Houthi group\u2019s emergence and influencing its policies in governing the state and society.
\nHowever, various associated factors also contribute to this situation, including:
\n\u2022 Sectarian political agenda: The group initiates armed conflict using ideological pretexts:
\nAccording to the spokesperson of the Yemeni Teachers Syndicate, the Houthis have
\nchanged the government curriculum in areas they control, introducing a sectarian bias to
\nperpetuate discrimination. This includes showing favoritism toward the Houthis and their
\nlineage over other Yemenis, ultimately undermining human rights, like freedom, justice and
\nequal citizenship. They have offered sectarian religious justifications that portray war as a
\nholy struggle. Additionally, the Houthis compelled public employees and influential figures
\nto take part in cultural programs where they undergo a process of ideological re-education.
\nThese courses indoctrinate them into Houthi beliefs, reshaping their views and urging them
\nto support and spread the group\u2019s slogans and ideas.<\/p>\n

\u2022 Seizing leadership positions within the state\u2019s civil, military and security institutions:
\nThe Houthi group uses an exclusionary approach that sidelines qualified individuals not
\naligned with Hashemites, who are loyal to the group. They appoint replacements based on
\nfamily connections, followed by loyal supporters from outside the dynasty, ensuring
\ncomplete control over political and administrative decision-making in Yemen. Inequality,
\nalong with feelings of unfairness and exclusion, serves as a driving force behind the ongoing
\narmed conflict.
\n\uf0b7 Expansion and control: The Houthi group prioritizes seizing Ma\u2019rib Governorate,
\nwhich houses the Ministry of Defense headquarters, the Chief of Staff\u2019s office, and
\nvaluable oil and gas fields. Their objective is to extend their influence toward the oil
\nand gas reserves in Shabwa and Hadhramaut. As a result, they are escalating military
\npressure on Ma\u2019rib, the site of some of Yemen\u2019s most intense battles. It appears that
\nthe group aims to secure dominance over the oil and gas fields in Ma\u2019rib before
\nengaging in a comprehensive and sustainable political settlement. This strategy
\nwould grant them control over the primary sources of power and wealth across
\nmany regions of Yemen.
\n\uf0b7 Close ties with Iran: The Houthi group developed complex and close relations with
\nIran, resulting in a significant dependency on Iran across military, political, financial,
\nmedia and logistical dimensions. Numerous reports suggest that Iran, through its
\nambassador Hassan Erloo, has exerted influence over strategic decisions made by
\nthe Houthis. The Houthi group openly acknowledges this relationship, using it to
\njustify Iranian intervention and the involvement of Lebanese Hezbollah in the
\nYemeni conflict.<\/p>\n

\uf0b7 Balance of power in favor of the Houthi group: Their military strength significantly
\nsurpasses that of their adversaries, leading to a sense of arrogance and inflexibility in
\ntheir actions. Critics point out the group\u2019s history of failing to adhere to agreements,
\nmaking it challenging to reach a political resolution. Under these circumstances, it\u2019s
\nunlikely that the Houthi group\u2019s opponents will accept any proposed settlements
\nthat could result in a fragile peace. Consequently, any unjust settlement would carry
\nthe risk of ongoing armed conflict.<\/p>\n

2) The Second Driver \u2013 The Weakness of The Legitimate Government and The Contradiction
\nof Its Components:
\nThe weakness of the legitimate government and the contradictions among its components
\nserve as a driver in extending the conflict. While the Houthi group demonstrates strength, unity
\nand territorial gains, the internationally recognized government faces challenges in fulfilling its
\nconstitutional obligations.
\nFollowing the departure of former President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi from Yemen, a non-
\ncombative approach was adopted to restore the state and mostly relied on the intervention of
\nthe Arab coalition. However, this approach allowed the expansion of the Houthi control over
\nmore territories while weakening the legitimate government\u2019s influence, particularly in areas
\nunder its authority allowing the Southern Transitional Council, which is supported by the UAE,
\nto actively work toward establishing a separatist state in southern Yemen.
\nAt the same time, state institutions have struggled to meet basic citizen needs, including regular
\nsalary payments, essential services, such as electricity, water, healthcare and education, and
\naddressing security concerns, in areas under nominal government control.
\nAs a result, public trust in the legitimate government started to decline, jeopardizing the
\nwidespread political support it once enjoyed. The failure to establish effective governance
\nmodels in its controlled areas has further diminished its credibility among Yemenis, except for
\nlimited exceptions in provinces, such as Ma\u2019rib and Hadhramaut. These factors collectively
\ncontribute to the perception of the legitimate government as ineffective and make the conflict
\nin Yemen worse.
\nThe legitimacy of the government further weakened as internal divisions widened, giving rise to
\nparallel entities with significant power and influence on the ground. Despite the Riyadh
\nAgreement signed between the legitimate government and the STC on November 5, 2019,
\nwhich aimed to resolve internal strife and establish a national unified government, the STC
\nconsolidated its authority across most cities and governorates in southern Yemen.
\nDespite the agreement\u2019s provisions to end power struggles and unify state institutions, the STC
\nemerged as the de facto authority, especially in Aden, the temporary capital. The STC\u2019s
\naggressive actions against government forces forced many liberated areas in southern Yemen
\nto fall out of the government\u2019s control. As a result, the STC assumed sovereign functions<\/p>\n

typically held by the government and maintained distinct military formations operating
\nindependently of the Yemeni armed forces.
\nThese formations openly identify as separatist forces, distinct from the Republic of Yemen, and
\nmaintain close ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which exercises control over Yemen\u2019s
\nports and coasts, extending from Mukalla in the east to Bab al-Mandab in the west.
\nIn April 2022, the Presidential Leadership Council was established to replace former President
\nHadi and his deputy, aiming to represent the diverse components of legitimacy in Yemen. The
\ncouncil comprised a president and seven representatives from various political and military
\nfactions, reflecting the discordant and conflicting interests influenced by Saudi Arabia and the
\nUAE.
\nDespite more than a year and a half since its formation, the council remains characterized by
\ndivision and internal conflict among its members. Each faction within the council holds its
\nauthority, leading to a lack of cohesion and a shared strategy on crucial issues, such as Yemen\u2019s
\nunity and the management of power and resources, including control over oil, gas, ports, vital
\nfacilities and local administration in governorates and cities under its jurisdiction.
\nInstead of consolidating all military and security forces under the unified command of the
\nMinistry of Defense, the Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Interior, and under the authority of
\nthe council president as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, new military units
\nwere established under different names. In January 2023, Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, chairman of the
\nPresidential Leadership Council (who does not possess his own military forces, unlike other
\ncouncil members), declared the formation of a new military unit named the \u201cHomeland Shield
\nForces.\u201d This unit operates directly under his command and serves as a reserve for the
\nSupreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In light of the council\u2019s inability to achieve unity of
\ncommand and control over the forces and armed formations of its components, military
\nconfrontations will likely erupt between these forces and formations.
\nAdditionally, the persistent discord among the components of the Presidential Leadership
\nCouncil, coupled with its inability to function cohesively, has further undermined the state\u2019s
\nauthority. This is exemplified by the marginalization of the parliament, the last constitutionally
\nelected popular institution. Instead, a non-elected body, the \u201cConsultation and Reconciliation
\nCommission,\u201d was appointed and granted powers that traditionally fall under parliament\u2019s
\npurview. As a result, the parliament, marginalized in the past, has now become nearly
\nincapacitated in fulfilling its constitutional duties as outlined in the Republic of Yemen\u2019s
\nConstitution.
\nThese developments have collectively weakened the legitimacy of the governing authority \u2014
\nthe presidency, the parliament and the government. A significant portion of Yemeni citizens
\nnow perceive this government as incapable of ending the coup and restoring legitimacy.
\nInstead, it is perceived as severely deficient in preserving the unity, national sovereignty and
\nterritorial integrity of the Republic of Yemen.<\/p>\n

3) The Third Driver: Iran\u2019s Strategic Vision for Yemen in its Project of Hegemony Over the
\nRegion:
\nThe power that Iran has accumulated over the past decades has enabled it to strengthen its
\nregional intervention tools based on concepts ingrained in its geopolitical framework, namely
\nexporting the revolution and strategic depth. In his speech, which is considered a guiding
\ndocument for all Iranian foreign policy-making institutions, the Supreme Leader of the Iranian
\nRevolution, Ali Khamenei, during his meeting with Iranian diplomats, outlined six factors
\nshaping foreign policy in the forthcoming phase. Among these factors is the strengthening of
\nthe allied and pro-Iranian governments and factions, alongside the expansion of the nation\u2019s
\nstrategic depth.
\nIn this context, Iranian leaders see Yemen as an essential part of their country\u2019s strategic depth.
\nThe current Iranian president, Ibrahim Raisi, emphasized this during his election campaign. Ali
\nReza Zakani, a parliamentarian close to Khamenei, also referred to the Yemeni capital (Sana\u2019a),
\nfollowing its capture by the Houthi group, as the fourth Arab capital linked to Iran. This
\nviewpoint was echoed by former Minister of Intelligence, Haider Moslehi, who described the
\nHouthis in Yemen as a result of the Iranian revolution. Additionally, Deputy Commander of the
\nRevolutionary Guard, General Hussein Salami, stated that \u201cAnsar Allah\u201d in Yemen had become a
\nsignificant player in the region\u2019s dynamics, akin to \u201cHezbollah\u201d in Lebanon.
\nBased on this strategic viewpoint, Iran is actively supporting the ongoing conflict in Yemen by
\nproviding the Houthi group with diverse forms of military, political, financial, media and
\nlogistical aid. This support aims to facilitate the group\u2019s control over Yemen and its strategic
\nlocation and to guide them toward establishing a political governance model aligned with the
\ninstitutions of the Iranian regime. Furthermore, Iran\u2019s strategy aims to promote the Houthi
\ngroup as a model that inspires and encourages the spread of the revolution to other areas in
\nthe region.
\nThe Houthis have effectively demonstrated their important role in advancing Iran\u2019s hegemonic
\nstrategy. Through their actions, Iranian influence has expanded into crucial new areas, and Iran
\nhas established a military presence along the Red Sea coast and near Bab al-Mandab. This
\nexpansion was acknowledged by the current commander of the Revolutionary Guard, General
\nHussein Salami, who stated, \u201cToday, Iran\u2019s reach extends far beyond what geographical maps
\ndepict.\u201d
\nAdditionally, the Houthis have helped shift the balance of power in Iran\u2019s favor against its
\nregional adversaries. During heightened tensions with Saudi Arabia, they carried out hostile
\nattacks targeting Saudi and Emirati infrastructure and oil installations. These attacks resulted in
\na significant reduction of about 50% in Saudi Aramco\u2019s production and targeted cities and
\nregions deep within Saudi Arabia. These actions aimed to demonstrate Riyadh\u2019s inability to
\nprotect its oil facilities and major cities.<\/p>\n

4) The Fourth Driver: Regional and International Rivalry over Yemen and its Strategic
\nLocation:
\nYemen\u2019s strategic location places it at the center of international and regional strategies,
\noverlooking four crucial maritime regions: the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and
\nthe Indian Ocean (via the Socotra Archipelago). Additionally, its many islands further enhance
\nits strategic importance, offering opportunities for establishing naval and air bases, as well as
\nconstructing commercial ports, facilitating global trade distribution.
\nControl over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the world\u2019s most significant waterways and the
\nshortest sea route linking East and West, underscores Yemen\u2019s strategic importance. This strait
\nserves as a vital hub for international trade, facilitating the transfer of goods between the
\nEuropean Union and countries, such as China, Japan, India and Southeast Asia. It also serves as
\na crucial artery for transporting oil and gas from the Arabian Gulf to Europe and the United
\nStates. Geographically, the strait regulates access to and from the Mediterranean Sea and the
\nArabian Gulf, ranking third globally after the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz. Approximately 3.3
\nmillion barrels of oil pass through it daily, accounting for 4% of global demand, and it sees the
\npassage of 21,000 commercial ships annually.
\nThe ongoing conflict in Yemen has resulted in international and regional powers asserting
\ncontrol over most of Yemen\u2019s coasts and islands. Internationally, the territorial waters and
\ncorridors overlooking Yemen are dominated by the American, British and European navies,
\nalong with those of other allied countries. Regionally, the UAE exercises military and political
\ncontrol, both directly and through affiliated local forces, over most of Yemen\u2019s coasts and ports
\nin the Arabian Sea, from Hadhramaut in the east to beyond Bab al-Mandab in the west on the
\nRed Sea, including the Socotra Archipelago. Meanwhile, Iran, through its support for the Houthi
\ngroup, controls much of Yemen\u2019s western coast, extending from the vicinity of Bab al-Mandab
\nin the south to the Saudi border in the north.
\nIn our view, the desire to control this strategic location has been a driving force behind the
\nongoing conflict in Yemen. The Iranian presence through the Houthi group in the vicinity of Bab
\nal-Mandab, including the coasts and islands, is a significant security concern for major Western
\ncountries and Arab Gulf nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose oil exports rely on the strait.
\nThe Houthi group\u2019s increased attacks using explosive boats and drones on ships near Saudi oil
\nfacilities in the Red Sea have heightened security apprehensions. Additionally, the UAE is
\nincreasingly worried about the impact on commercial maritime shipping traffic linked to the
\nport of Dubai.
\nIran, on the other hand, sees the need to adopt a political and military approach, leveraging its
\ndirect and indirect naval presence along Yemen\u2019s coasts to address issues crucial to its national
\nsecurity and interests. These include its nuclear program, sanctions, missile industry, the Syrian
\nconflict and asserting its influence in Iraq and Lebanon. This explains Iran\u2019s patient approach
\ntoward finding a political settlement to the armed conflict in Yemen and its reluctance to rush<\/p>\n

into agreements with Saudi Arabia, even within the framework of efforts to restore relations
\nmediated by China. It appears that Iran will pursue a policy aimed at reducing conflict rather
\nthan seeking a definitive resolution.
\nWhile Iran sought to reduce tensions with Saudi Arabia in Yemen, it heightened tensions with
\nthe American military presence by supporting the Houthi group. Despite this presence being
\nlong-standing, the Houthi group intensified their rhetoric regarding the capabilities and
\nadvancements of their naval forces, suggesting that they could target any objectives in Yemeni
\nwaters and islands. This culminated in their Deputy Foreign Minister warning American forces
\nto steer clear of Yemeni territorial waters, cautioning that any intrusion could spark the longest
\nand most expensive battle in human history.
\nSummary
\nThe prolonged conflict in Yemen has shown that lasting peace will be achieved only when all
\nYemeni parties involved in the conflict prioritize the interests of the Yemeni people and commit
\nto finding a fair political solution. The Yemeni population is weary of war, and the country\u2019s
\nsovereignty, independence and territorial integrity have been threatened by regional and
\ninternational interference.
\nFrom a strategic standpoint, continuing the conflict is not beneficial for any Yemeni faction
\nseeking to promote national political progress. It is evident that achieving peace and stability in
\nYemen, as well as in the broader region, requires regional and international actors to cease
\nsupporting the continuation of the war and instead assist the conflicting parties in pursuing a
\ngenuine peace process based on UN Security Council Resolution No. 2216.
\nThis process should culminate in a true democratic transition where Yemenis can freely elect
\ntheir leaders, including the presidency, the House of Representatives, the government and local
\nauthorities. It should also involve establishing a just state that safeguards the rights of all
\ncitizens, prohibits the monopolization of medium and heavy weapons, and ensures Yemen\u2019s
\nsovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Such efforts will contribute to achieving an
\nenduring, stable and peace in Yemen, fostering positive relations with neighboring countries
\nand promoting regional peace as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\t\t

<\/div>\n\t\t
\n\t\t\t

References: <\/span><\/h3>\n\t\t\t
\n
    \n
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    \n

    download<\/a><\/div><\/span>
    \n<\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Abstract
    \nIn the final quarter of 2023, the Houthi group in Yemen intensified its aggressive actions, launching missile attacks and deploying unmanned suicide drones in the Eilat (Umm al-Rashrash) region. 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