{"id":13592,"date":"2026-11-04T15:59:58","date_gmt":"2026-11-04T12:59:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mokhacenter.org\/?p=13592"},"modified":"2026-11-04T16:04:22","modified_gmt":"2026-11-04T13:04:22","slug":"mokha-economic-brief-october2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mokhacenter.org\/en\/mokha-economic-brief-october2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Mokha Economic Brief \u2013 October2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/h1>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Fighting between Yemen\u2019s internationally recognized government and the Houthis intensified in October 2026, with civilians bearing the cost through higher prices and deteriorating services. The Houthis reimposed their siege on Taiz after taking control of al-Turbah and cutting the main road to Aden, causing fuel, food, and water prices in the city to double. The World Food Programme warned that 800,000 people were now beyond the reach of aid. Fuel prices also rose in Aden, as well as in Sana\u2019a and other Houthi-controlled areas, while electricity supply hours declined in Aden. Exchange rates remained relatively stable in both markets despite the continuing monetary divide.<\/p>\n

On the financial front, the International Monetary Fund\u2019s management approved a Staff-Monitored Program with the government, and Saudi Arabia provided a new installment of budget support. The Central Bank in Aden froze the assets of 135 individuals and entities linked to the Houthis to cut off the group\u2019s funding sources. Meanwhile, the government began implementing wage increases, although wages remained insufficient to cover basic food costs.<\/p>\n

Regionally, the Houthis expanded their attacks into Saudi Arabia, which supports the government through the Coalition to Support Legitimacy. They targeted Aramco facilities and King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, pushing Brent crude to its highest level since April and disrupting air traffic in the Kingdom for days. The coalition responded by bombing fuel facilities in Sana\u2019a and Ras Isa that it said the group was using to store weapons.<\/p>\n

IMF Approves Staff-Monitored Program with the Yemeni Government<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The International Monetary Fund\u2019s management approved an 18-month Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) for Yemen that provides no direct financing. The program aims to improve tax compliance and customs administration, consolidate government accounts, set limits on central bank financing of the budget, and gradually reform the electricity sector, beginning with improved cost recovery, while protecting social spending.<\/p>\n

The Approval marks the program\u2019s transition from negotiation to implementation and monitoring. The government\u2019s performance will now be measured against specific benchmarks, potentially giving donors, particularly Saudi Arabia, a basis for assessing performance and linking future support to it.<\/p>\n

However, the timing of the approval presents a difficult test for the program. The required reforms depend on customs and tax revenues at a time when escalating hostilities are putting pressure on trade and ports. Electricity reform through cost recovery also means raising tariffs or reducing subsidies\u2014a step that carries a high social cost amid declining purchasing power. Limits on central bank financing of the deficit will also leave the government more reliant on external support and domestic debt instruments to close its financing gap as long as oil exports remain suspended.<\/p>\n

Saudi Arabia Provides New Installment of Budget Support<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

On October 1, Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed Al Jaber announced more than SAR 224 million (approximately $60 million) in new financial support for the Yemeni government through the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen. The funding, provided at the government\u2019s request, will cover operating expenses and salaries.<\/p>\n

This support underscores the national budget\u2019s shows that the national budget has come to depend on regular Saudi funding to cover recurrent expenditure, particularly wages. It gives the government temporary breathing room to avoid salary delays and helps maintain relative exchange rate stability in Aden. However, the amount remains limited compared with the financing gap left by the suspension of oil exports since late 2022. , following Houthi drone attacks on the oil export ports of al-Dabba in Hadramawt and Qana in Shabwa in October and November of that year.<\/p>\n

Central Bank in Aden Freezes Assets of 135 Individuals and Entities Linked to the Houthis<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

On October 20, the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden issued a circular directing banks and exchange companies to freeze accounts, funds, and assets belonging to 135 individuals, entities, and vessels linked to the Houthis and prohibiting transactions with them. The circular implements Attorney General Decision No. 17 of 2026, which placed them on national terrorism and sanctions lists.<\/p>\n

The list included officials at the central bank in Sana\u2019a and the Houthi-run Ministry of Finance, oil and telecommunications companies, and officials at the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank and the National Bank of Yemen. The circular required financial institutions to provide proof of compliance within two working days. This coincided with reports that the central bank was preparing a package of measures targeting currency exchange networks, speculative trading, and domestic money transfers.<\/p>\n

The decision marks an escalation in the economic confrontation, as the central bank seeks to restrict the group\u2019s financial channels and strengthen its control over the banking system amid the military escalation. Its effectiveness, however, depends on banks\u2019 ability to comply, particularly as several still run their main operations from Sana\u2019a. This leaves them facing conflicting obligations and potentially exposes them to retaliation. Implementation therefore requires arrangements with banks and exchange companies to protect household remittances and legitimate commercial transactions between regions, ensuring that the measures affect the group\u2019s financing networks rather than civilians.<\/p>\n

Exchange Rate Stability Despite Escalation<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

According to currency traders, the US dollar traded at around YER 1,558 for buying and YER 1,582 for selling in Aden, compared with YER 533 and YER 535, respectively, in Sana\u2019a. Exchange rates remained relatively stable in both markets throughout October despite the escalation.<\/p>\n

In Aden, this stability reflects inflows of Saudi support, remittances from abroad, and the central bank\u2019s import regulation measures. In Sana\u2019a, stability is administratively imposed: the Houthis set a nearly fixed exchange rate and prohibit the circulation of newly printed banknotes.<\/p>\n

Stable exchange rates, however, do not mean stable prices. On October 24, the Houthi-controlled oil company in Sana\u2019a raised gasoline and diesel prices for the second time in roughly six weeks, bringing the increase in the price of a 20-liter container of diesel to around 30 percent since mid-September, amid persistent cash shortages and rising money transfer costs.<\/p>\n

A direct comparison between exchange rates in Aden and Sana\u2019a is not valid, as each applies to currency circulating within a different monetary system.<\/p>\n

Government Begins Paying Wage Increases and Allowances as Purchasing Power Erodes<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Minister of Civil Service and Insurance Salem al-Awlaqi announced that public sector employees at institutions that had completed their employee records would begin receiving wage increases and the allowances to which they were entitled, starting with their October salaries. Neither the size of the increase nor its cost was disclosed.<\/p>\n

The move comes amid a wide gap between wages and living costs. Many government employees in Aden earn around YER 70,000\u2013120,000 per month (approximately $45\u201377), while the Yemen Economic Tracking Initiative estimates basic household food costs in government-controlled areas at around YER 130,000 (approximately $83), excluding rent, transportation, and medical care. In early October, the World Food Programme also reported that 74 percent of households in government-controlled areas could not meet their food needs.<\/p>\n

Given this gap, the increase will have a limited impact unless accompanied by measures to curb rising prices, particularly as current wages do not even cover basic food costs. Financing the increases also places an additional burden on a budget reliant on external support and partly conflicts with the spending restraint required under the IMF program, leaving continued payments dependent on regular Saudi funding.<\/p>\n

Attacks on Saudi Energy Facilities Push Oil Prices to Their Highest Level Since April<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Saudi Arabia\u2019s benchmark stock market index fell 2.5 percent on October 22 following reports that Aramco\u2019s headquarters in Dhahran had been evacuated. The following day, Brent crude closed at $116.72 per barrel, its highest closing price since April 29, ending the week up 6 percent amid fears of supply disruptions following Houthi attacks on Saudi energy facilities.<\/p>\n

Higher oil prices affect Yemen\u2019s economy in two opposing ways. As a net importer of petroleum products, Yemen faces a higher fuel import bill whenever global prices rise, putting upward pressure on domestic fuel prices and the costs of electricity generation and transportation. This was reflected in fuel price increases in Aden during the same month.<\/p>\n

Conversely, higher prices could have generated gains for public finances had crude oil exports resumed. However, government efforts to restart exports have yet to translate into regular shipments, and the current security environment makes this more difficult. Yemen\u2019s economy therefore bears the cost of higher oil prices without benefiting from the revenues they could generate.<\/p>\n

Fuel Prices Rise in Aden and Sana\u2019a as Electricity Supply Deteriorates in Aden<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

New fuel prices took effect in Aden on October 22. Diesel rose from YER 1,800 to YER 1,930 per liter, imported gasoline from YER 1,475 to YER 1,620 per liter (YER 32,400 per 20-liter canister), and locally produced gasoline from YER 1,385 to YER 1,450 per liter. Sources at the Yemen Petroleum Company attributed the increases to rising global prices.<\/p>\n

Electricity service in the city deteriorated at the same time. By the end of the month, outages lasted around seven hours for every two hours of supply, according to local sources.<\/p>\n

These developments show how quickly higher global oil prices feed into local markets in government-controlled areas, where fuel prices are linked to international prices and import costs. Higher diesel prices, in particular, increase the costs of transportation, irrigation, and running the private generators that households and businesses rely on as public electricity service deteriorates. These costs gradually feed through to the prices of goods and services.<\/p>\n

The increases also put additional pressure on the Saudi fuel grant for power plants and complicate the electricity sector reforms agreed with the IMF. Raising tariffs to improve cost recovery is difficult when the service itself is deteriorating.<\/p>\n

In Houthi-controlled areas, the oil company in Sana\u2019a raised the price of a 20-liter canister of gasoline from YER 10,500 to YER 11,400 (8.6 percent) on October 24, and diesel from YER 11,500 to YER 13,000 (13 percent), citing higher global prices. This was the second increase in roughly six weeks, following the September 14 rise in gasoline prices from YER 9,500 to YER 10,500 and diesel from YER 10,000 to YER 11,500. Gasoline prices have therefore risen by around 20 percent and diesel by around 30 percent since mid-September, despite the stable exchange rate in Sana\u2019a.<\/p>\n

Siege of Taiz Doubles Living Costs<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The Houthis reimposed their siege on Taiz after taking control of al-Turbah district and cutting the Taiz\u2013al-Turbah\u2013Aden road, the city\u2019s main supply route for goods and fuel. Fuel stations have been closed since October 5, and the black-market price of a 20-liter canister of gasoline rose from YER 30,000 to around YER 120,000. Diesel rose from YER 46,000 to YER 90,000, a cooking gas cylinder from YER 11,400 to YER 40,000, and bus fares from YER 200 to YER 500, according to Al Jazeera\u2019s reporting.<\/p>\n

The Associated Press reported that bottled water prices had risen by as much as 75 percent and some food prices by around 50 percent compared with the summer. UNICEF said the cost of a tanker of water had increased from around YER 23,000 to around YER 70,000. On October 20, the United Nations announced that prices for remaining food and fuel supplies had doubled and that water production in the city had fallen by half.<\/p>\n

The doubling of prices reflects not only shortages but also higher transportation costs along lengthy, rugged alternative routes and reduced competition, amid accusations by residents that some traders were monopolizing supplies. The burden falls most heavily on households dependent on daily earnings, which can no longer afford cooking gas or fuel, with some turning to firewood.<\/p>\n

Diesel shortages also disrupt water pumping and hospital operations, turning the fuel crisis into a crisis in essential services. A prolonged siege will widen the price gap between Taiz and other governorates and further erode the purchasing power of cash assistance in the city.<\/p>\n

These figures and developments indicate that the Houthis are using the siege as a weapon to pressure the city and its residents. On October 29, Human Rights Watch said the siege could amount to the war crime of using starvation as a method of warfare.<\/p>\n

World Food Programme Warns of a Humanitarian Catastrophe<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The World Food Programme reported a 10 percent increase in wheat flour prices over two weeks in parts of Taiz, citing traders\u2019 estimates that wheat stocks would last two months. On October 14, it warned that 800,000 people were beyond the reach of lifesaving assistance, including more than 600,000 in Taiz, and that 10 of the governorate\u2019s 16 districts were classified at the Emergency level of food insecurity(IPC Phase 4) .<\/p>\n

The programme noted that more than 18 million Yemenis face acute food insecurity and that around 75 percent of households in accessible areas cannot meet their basic food needs\u2014the highest level recorded this year. The programme also needs $268 million to sustain its operations until 2027.<\/p>\n

These indicators reflect the fragility of food security in a country that imports most of its food, where any disruption to roads, shipping, or fuel supplies quickly affects prices and consumption. The humanitarian funding gap, coupled with rising needs, also reduces the capacity of aid to cushion the shock, leaving households increasingly reliant on negative coping strategies such as borrowing, reducing meals, and selling assets. The consequences of selling assets, in particular, persist beyond the crisis.<\/p>\n

The Houthis bear primary responsibility for the deteriorating situation in Taiz. The programme\u2019s inability to reach more than 600,000 people in the governorate stems from the group\u2019s siege and closure of supply routes. The Houthis are also detaining 37 programme staff members among a total of 72 UN personnel, restricting humanitarian agencies\u2019 work in areas under their control.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Developments in October 2026 mark a new phase in how the costs of war are transmitted to Yemen\u2019s economy. The escalation has extended from shipping to energy facilities and the internal roads connecting cities to markets, as seen in Taiz. While Saudi support and remittances have helped maintain relative exchange rate stability, the pressure has clearly shifted to fuel, food, water, and electricity prices. These increases have the most direct impact on household living conditions, with wages covering only part of basic food costs.<\/p>\n

At the institutional level, approval of the IMF program gives the government a framework for reform and a basis for engagement with donors. Implementation, however, is taking place amid declining revenues and growing needs. The central bank\u2019s measures against Houthi financial networks are a step toward cutting off the group\u2019s funding sources and strengthening the bank\u2019s authority over the banking sector. Their success requires compliance by banks and exchange companies while protecting household remittances.<\/p>\n

Yemen\u2019s economic outlook now hinges on three main factors: the course of Houthi escalation domestically and regionally, and its impact on trade and remittances from Yemenis abroad; the lifting of the siege on Taiz and restoration of supply routes; and the government\u2019s ability to secure fuel, electricity, and salaries while meeting its fiscal reform commitments.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

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Introduction Fighting between Yemen\u2019s internationally recognized government and the Houthis intensified in October 2026, with civilians bearing the cost through higher prices and deteriorating services. The Houthis reimposed their siege on Taiz after taking control of al-Turbah and cutting the main road to Aden, causing fuel, food, and water prices in the city to double. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":13595,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[965,966],"tags":[876,179,294,263],"class_list":["post-13592","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-economic-and-development-studies","category-monthly-economic-report","tag-aden","tag-mokha-center","tag-saudi-arabia","tag-the-houthis"],"yoast_head":"\nMokha Economic Brief \u2013 October2026<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Introduction Fighting between Yemen\u2019s internationally recognized government and the Houthis intensified in October 2026, with civilians bearing the cost\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, 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