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This study examines the position of Hadramawt Governorate within Yemen\u2019s political and military equation, based on the premise that the governorate is no longer merely an arena of competition among rival forces, but has become a factor capable of shaping the future structure of the Yemeni state. The paper begins by examining Hadramawt\u2019s importance in the strategies of the main actors: its sovereign and economic significance to the internationally recognized government; its role as an economic pillar without which the separatist state project pursued by the Southern Transitional Council, with clear Emirati backing, cannot be completed; and its direct importance to Saudi national security given the kingdom\u2019s extensive border with the governorate.<\/span><\/p>\n The first section<\/b> examines the background and broader context, explaining how Hadramawt was divided into two distinct geographic areas of influence and regional patronage before January 2026. It also traces the emergence of a local current opposed to subordination to traditional centers of power and calling for self-rule, while critically examining the ambiguity of this demand and its lack of a clearly defined political framework to date. The paper then examines the indicators of tension that preceded the Southern Transitional Council\u2019s military advance into Hadramawt, interpreting the escalation as a reflection of broader tensions between competing regional agendas rather than simply a local conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n The second section <\/b>addresses what the study describes as the strategic turning point: the Southern Transitional Council\u2019s military defeat and withdrawal from Hadramawt. It examines the scale of its military and political losses, the factors behind the rapid collapse of its forces, and the role of tribal mobilization in providing social and political backing for the decision to confront the council militarily. <\/span>The third section <\/b>examines the dynamics of the transitional phase that followed the withdrawal, from the struggle to secure key access points and Hadramawt\u2019s strategic depth to the consolidation of local forces, the Southern Transitional Council\u2019s loss of political initiative following its announcement of dissolution, and the emergence of the Nation\u2019s Shield Forces as a new balancing force.<\/span><\/p>\n The fourth section<\/b> provides a detailed map of the main domestic and external actors shaping the Hadramawt landscape. It identifies the main Hadrami political entities, examines their respective roles and areas of convergence, and analyzes the complex position of the Hadrami Elite Forces and the Barshid Brigade. It also examines the evolving role of regional actors, particularly the growing Saudi presence and the decline of Emirati influence.<\/span><\/p>\n The fifth section<\/b> examines the implications of these developments for Yemen\u2019s wider political landscape. Among the most significant are the erosion of the Southern Transitional Council\u2019s claim to be the sole representative of the south, the strengthening of the concept of local empowerment, and the growing prominence of the eastern governorates as a distinct political space alongside the traditional north-south framework.<\/span><\/p>\n The sixth and final section<\/b> presents three possible scenarios for the future of Hadramawt, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each. It identifies the empowerment of Hadramawt as a region within the Yemeni state as the most likely scenario, based on several factors: the shift in Saudi policy toward the Southern Transitional Council and Emirati support for the separatist project, the growing political maturity of Hadrami forces, and the exposure of the Southern Transitional Council\u2019s limited grassroots base in the governorate.<\/span><\/p>\n The study concludes that Hadramawt is gradually moving toward a form of administrative autonomy within the framework of the Yemeni state. This trajectory could alter the balance of power across Yemen and make Hadramawt a major factor in shaping the country\u2019s future political structure. At the same time, it leaves an open question regarding the ideological implications of the growing presence of the Nation\u2019s Shield Forces, which include a significant Salafi current, within a social environment traditionally characterized by a predominantly Sufi religious orientation.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Yemeni Ministry of Oil and Minerals. \u201cProduction Sectors.\u201d Official Website of the Ministry of Oil and Minerals \u2013 Republic of Yemen. Accessed April 6, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/mom-ye.com\/site-ar\/\u0627\u0644\u0642\u0637\u0627\u0639\u0627\u062a-\u0627\u0644\u0623\u0646\u062a\u0627\u062c\u064a\u0629\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Giulia Antrici. \u201cSaudi Arabia vs. UAE for Regional Headquarters: Strategic FDI Trends in the Gulf.\u201d <\/span>Middle East Briefing<\/span><\/i>, February 6, 2025.<\/span> https:\/\/www.middleeastbriefing.com\/news\/saudi-arabia-vs-uae-for-regional-hqs-strategic-fdi-trends-in-the-gulf\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Junaid S. Ahmed. \u201cThe UAE\u2019s Imperial Project: Ports, Generals, and Silent Coups.\u201d <\/span>Palestine Chronicle<\/span><\/i>, November 5, 2025.<\/span>\u00a0 <\/span>https:\/\/www.palestinechronicle.com\/the-uaes-imperial-project-ports-generals-and-silent-coups\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Junaid S. Ahmed. \u201cThe UAE\u2019s Imperial Project: Ports, Generals, and Silent Coups.\u201d <\/span>Palestine Chronicle<\/span><\/i>, November 5, 2025.<\/span>\u00a0 <\/span>https:\/\/www.palestinechronicle.com\/the-uaes-imperial-project-ports-generals-and-silent-coups\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Ismail Al-Suhaili. <\/span>The End of Gray Balances: Eastern Yemen, Saudi Security Imperatives, and Yemen\u2019s Unity<\/span><\/i>. Mokha Center for Strategic Studies, January 6, 2026. Available at:<\/span> https:\/\/2u.pw\/eVIei<\/span><\/a> \u00a0\u201cHadrami Elite Forces.\u201d Accessed April 6, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/ar.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Aden Time. \u201cPoll: \u2018Population Demographics\u2019 in the Hadramawt Valley.\u201d <\/span>Aden Time<\/span><\/i>, September 18, 2022.<\/span> https:\/\/www.aden-tm.net\/news\/219692<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Amr bin Hubraish. \u201cStatement by Sheikh Amr bin Hubraish, Chairman of the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance and Chairman of the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference, at the Consultative Meeting.\u201d YouTube, April 5, 2025.<\/span> https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=j2fit7WVMVg<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Al Jazeera Net. \u201cHadramawt Tribal Alliance: A Tribal Force Calling for Self-Rule in the Governorate.\u201d December 3, 2025.<\/span> https:\/\/www.aljazeera.net\/encyclopedia\/2025\/12\/3\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Ibb Post. \u201cAl-Alimi Announces Support for Hadramawt Managing Its Own Affairs.\u201d June 25, 2023.<\/span> https:\/\/ibbpost.net\/diverse\/details\/6506<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Ashraf Al-Falahi. \u201cWhat Are the Implications and Significance of the Announcement of the Hadramawt National Council from Riyadh?\u201d <\/span>Arabi21<\/span><\/i>, June 22, 2023.<\/span> https:\/\/arabi21.com\/story\/1519978\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Watani Post. \u201cHadramawt: The Kathiri Tribe Condemns the Raising of Al-Zoubaidi\u2019s Images on Seiyun Palace.\u201d October 19, 2022.<\/span> https:\/\/watanipost.com\/news\/single-details\/regional-7797<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Ali Al-Nasi. X post, September 18, 2022.<\/span> https:\/\/x.com\/aalnaasi\/status\/1903187659180118056<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Anadolu Agency. \u201cYemen: Hadramawt Governor Announces Operation to Take Over Military Positions.\u201d January 2, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/ar\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Fakhr Al-Azab. \u201cSouthern Yemeni Separatists Expand: Hadramawt and Al-Mahrah under the Control of the \u2018Transitional Council.\u2019\u201d <\/span>Al-Araby Al-Jadeed<\/span><\/i>, December 5, 2025.<\/span> https:\/\/www.alaraby.co.uk\/politics\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0<\/span>Independent Arabia<\/span><\/i>. \u201cNation\u2019s Shield Forces to Enter Shabwah in the Coming Hours.\u201d January 6, 2025.<\/span> https:\/\/2u.pw\/zhYSrZ<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Anadolu Agency. \u201cHadramawt: Deadly Clashes between the Transitional Council and the Tribal Alliance.\u201d December 26, 2025.<\/span> https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/ar\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0BBC News Arabic. \u201cAnnouncement of the Dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council and the Abolition of Its Bodies.\u201d January 9, 2025.<\/span> https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/arabic\/articles\/cgjw5e7x695o<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Al-Araby Al-Jadeed. \u201cHadramawt Inclusive Conference Opens Today: Protecting the Governorate First.\u201d April 22, 2017.<\/span> https:\/\/2u.pw\/Ososoc<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Al Jazeera Net. \u201cAnnouncement in Yemen of the Formation of a Unified Council of the Eastern Governorates.\u201d January 9, 2024.<\/span> https:\/\/n9.cl\/1pjncq<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Yemen Monitor. \u201cSupreme Coordinating Council: A New Entity to Unite Forces and Components in Hadramawt.\u201d May 7, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/www.yemenmonitor.com\/Details\/ArtMID\/908\/ArticleID\/171094<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Al-Quds Al-Arabi. \u201cYemen: The Transitional Council Rejects Coordinating Councils.\u201d May 9, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/2u.pw\/DEBj4c<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Al-Watan Al-Adaniya. \u201cBin Hubraish Apologizes to Al-Khanbashi for Membership in the Preparatory Committee of the Hadramawt Coordinating Council.\u201d July 7, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/al-wattan.net\/news\/306630<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0Tarabah Today. \u201cSaleh bin Hareez, Chairman of the Hadrami Uprising, Apologizes for Membership in the Preparatory Committee of the Coordinating Council.\u201d July 7, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/www.tarebhtoday.online\/2026\/07\/07\/302029\/<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Abaad Studies and Research Center. \u201cNation\u2019s Shield Forces: A New Player in a Shifting Theater.\u201d June 2, 2024.<\/span> https:\/\/abaadstudies.org\/policy-analysis\/topic\/60114<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0Defense Line. \u201cLearn About the Hadrami Elite Forces and Security Support Forces Deployed in Hadramawt.\u201d January 1, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/defenseliney.com\/posts\/369<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Erem News. \u201cSources for Erem News: Nation\u2019s Shield Forces to Enter Shabwah in the Coming Hours.\u201d December 26, 2025.<\/span> https:\/\/www.eremnews.com\/news\/arab-world\/cbeiv0q<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Al-Masdar Online. \u201cAl-Khanbashi Calls for a Presidential Decree to Establish the Barshid Brigade.\u201d March 30, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/almasdaronline.com\/articles\/340357<\/span><\/a> \u00a0Yemen Daily News. \u201cAl-Khanbashi: Oman Is Against the Transitional Council.\u201d June 3, 2026.<\/span> https:\/\/ydn.news\/?p=122658<\/span><\/a> <\/p>\n
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