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\u00a0\u2013 Dr. Omar Radman<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Since its establishment on September 13, 1990, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah) has generated significant debate within Yemeni and regional political circles. Evaluations of the party typically fall between two opposing perspectives: one portraying it as a model of nationalism and moderation, and another accusing it of extremism and links to external groups. This sharp polarization raises a methodological question: how can Islah be placed under objective scrutiny, testing its positions and the claims made about it based on both its texts and its practical experience?<\/span><\/p>\n This paper seeks to approach an answer to this central question not from a preconceived stance of condemnation or defense, but by examining Islah\u2019s discourse and the extent to which it aligns with its actual practices, and evaluating this within its objective contexts. The methodology is based on:<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In its official literature, Islah presents itself as an \u201cextension of the historical Yemeni reform movement, in thought and practice, across all regions of Yemen, which worked to restore Yemen\u2019s bright image and liberate it from the distortions caused by foreign colonialism and the class-based, racially discriminatory, and authoritarian rule of the Imamate.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n This historical grounding links the party to the national reform movement that emerged in the late 18th century, represented by reformist figures such as Ibn al-Amir al-San\u2018ani, Muhammad ibn Ali al-Shawkani, and earlier Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Wazir. These figures were characterized by their intellectual opposition to the Imamate and its doctrinal and political foundations based on racial discrimination and sectarian intolerance, as well as their efforts toward renewal in identity and thought within a local framework.<\/span><\/p>\n However, some writings indicates the existence of connections with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since the 1940s, through figures such as al-Fudayl al-Wartalani and his influence on certain Yemeni students, as well as his entry into Yemen prior to the 1948 movement against Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din.<\/span> This apparent contradiction between the official emphasis on a purely local extension and historical accounts suggesting external influence requires further examination and evaluation, as will be discussed later.<\/span><\/p>\n Many Yemeni leaders who later founded Islah were engaged, prior to unification, in social and educational activities within institutions and guidance institutes established by President Ibrahim al-Hamdi in the 1970s. It is likely that, like other Yemeni political forces\u2014including leftist and nationalist movements\u2014they were involved in undeclared political activity during a period marked by competing ideological and political projects.<\/span><\/p>\n With the declaration of Yemeni unification on May 22, 1990, the space for open political activity emerged. This led to the establishment of Islah through 1,200 founding members, from whom 60 were selected to form a preparatory committee representing various Yemeni governorates.<\/span><\/p>\n This broad founding structure reflects an attempt to create a wide social base that transcends narrow regional and ideological boundaries. The founding composition also demonstrates diversity, including individuals affiliated with various political parties and currents, tribal figures among prominent Yemeni sheikhs, religious scholars, national figures, businesspeople, academics, students, and others. This reflects a conciliatory character that sought to combine broad social and political representation within an Islamic reference framework, which represents both the country\u2019s identity and its constitutional foundation.<\/span><\/p>\n In this section of the paper, four main hypotheses (claims) raised by some of Islah\u2019s opponents are examined:<\/span><\/p>\n The accusation that Islah is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood is among the most common in the discourse of its critics. In contrast, the party officially denies any organizational or political ties with any external groups or movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood.<\/span><\/p>\n In a statement issued on the occasion of the 26th anniversary of its founding, Islah affirmed that \u201cits national affiliation is the foundation of its existence and political influence, and its reference is purely Yemeni and national. It is a political party open to ideas and components and does not allow any non-Yemeni political actors to interfere in its affairs.\u201d It further stated, \u201cwith utmost clarity and transparency, that there are no organizational or political ties linking it to the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n These official statements present the party as a national entity rooted in its local environment. However, by nature, they reflect the party\u2019s self-representation and therefore require testing against its positions and practical conduct. From an objective perspective, it can be observed that the party:<\/span><\/p>\n At the same time, the historical roots of the Yemeni national reform movement, with its Islamic reference, indicate early exposure to the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt\u2014particularly among Yemeni students studying there, some of whom maintained connections with the Brotherhood. This occurred within the broader context of competition between leftist and nationalist ideologies among Yemeni students.<\/span><\/p>\n It can therefore be argued that the issue reflects an interaction between individuals influenced by what later came to be known as regional political Islam and local Yemeni actors\u2014including tribal figures, scholars, academics, and political personalities\u2014leading to the transformation of this intellectual influence into a locally grounded national party. This process may have preserved certain intellectual and cultural influences without implying an organizational affiliation.<\/span><\/p>\n Accordingly, a reconciliation can be made between Islah\u2019s official denial of any organizational or political relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and historical accounts that point to connections involving certain individuals.<\/span><\/p>\n . These connections can be understood as personal and intellectual influences affecting some early figures within Yemen\u2019s reform movement since the mid-20th century, particularly during the era of anti-colonial struggles across the Arab world.<\/span><\/p>\n However, the Yemeni national movement maintained its local specificity, in the absence of any formal organizational structure linking it to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, many of the individuals influenced by Brotherhood thought were historical figures active primarily in the mid-20th century and are no longer part of the contemporary political scene, due to factors such as death over past decades or in more recent years.<\/span><\/p>\n In contrast, the current leadership of the party has, since its establishment in the early 1990s, consistently defined its identity within a national Yemeni framework. From the 1990s to the present, it has repeatedly affirmed the absence of any affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and rejected subordination to any external groups or organizations.<\/span><\/p>\n Various actors accuse Islah of having links to extremist organizations. This accusation intensified in the slogans of the Houthi movement during its takeover of Yemeni governorates in 2014. In response, some Islah members argue that such claims are merely political rhetoric used to justify the coup against the state.<\/span><\/p>\n In this context, they point to statements by the Yemeni government indicating that, upon seizing control of Sana\u2019a, the Houthis released a number of individuals accused of terrorism who had been detained in state prisons. They also refer to later Yemeni government reports submitted to the UN Security Council, which documented cooperation and links between the Houthis and al-Qaeda. Additionally, Yemen\u2019s National Defense Council designated the Houthis as a terrorist group, and several major countries have highlighted links between the Houthis and extremist groups both within and beyond Yemen, culminating in the designation of the group as a global terrorist organization by countries such as the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.<\/span><\/p>\n However, these accusations are not limited to the Houthis. Other opponents of Islah\u2014particularly some southern factions aligned with the UAE\u2014have repeated similar claims. In response, Islah and its supporters present counter-evidence denying these accusations. They argue that the party\u2019s leadership and members have themselves been systematically targeted by terrorist operations over the years.<\/span> According to the party, such accusations are politically motivated tools aimed at marginalizing and excluding Islah.<\/span><\/p>\n A review of open-source data indicates that more than 35 Islah leaders were assassinated between 2014 and 2022, in addition to bombings targeting party headquarters and the arrest of hundreds of its members. In Aden alone, dozens of Islah figures were assassinated following the city\u2019s liberation in 2015. This direct targeting, according to Islah\u2019s leadership, positions the party as a victim of terrorism rather than an ally of it.<\/span><\/p>\n According to a journalistic investigation by BBC Arabic, political agendas have exploited assassination operations\u2014approximately 160 assassinations occurred over a three-year period (2015\u20132018) during which the UAE was responsible for security in southern Yemen. Dozens of Islah leaders and members were among the victims, including the former head of Islah in Aden, as well as a failed assassination attempt against the current head.<\/span> These operations were reportedly carried out by foreign mercenaries brought into Yemen, despite official statements attributing them to extremist groups. This suggests that the \u201cterrorism\u201d label has, in some cases, been politicized as a tool for settling political scores against specific individuals or factions.<\/span><\/p>\n A review of Islah\u2019s publicly declared positions on major terrorist incidents in recent years shows that the party has issued multiple official statements condemning terrorist acts both inside and outside Yemen. These include:<\/span><\/p>\n In addition, dozens of statements published on its official platforms over the years have consistently denounced terrorist acts across northern and southern Yemen.<\/span><\/p>\n The allegation of \u201calliance\u201d or \u201ccoordination\u201d with the Houthis is among the most prominent claims promoted in some media outlets affiliated with Islah\u2019s opponents, particularly in the context of the ongoing war since 2014. However, this claim appears contradictory to both the historical and field realities of the relationship between the two sides, which calls for objective examination.<\/span><\/p>\n Looking back at the armed confrontations between the Yemeni government and the Houthi movement during the Saada wars (2004\u20132010), some Houthi leaders accused Islah of participating in those wars through incitement, alleging that certain military leaders involved were close to Islah. However, these wars were led by military officials under the direction of the political leadership and the then Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Ali Abdullah Saleh.<\/span><\/p>\n In examining Islah\u2019s position, the party clarified in its vision submitted to the National Dialogue Conference on the roots of the Saada issue that it opposed those wars. It stated:<\/span> Some Islah leaders have also argued that had the party yielded to pressure from the ruling party at the time to participate in those wars, it could have led to sectarian strife <\/span>that the Houthis would have exploited for their own sectarian agenda.<\/span><\/p>\n Nevertheless, Houthi accusations against Islah regarding participation in those wars contribute to establishing a historical basis of hostility between the two sides. Logically, it is difficult to envision an \u201calliance\u201d between two actors when one believes the other engaged in armed conflict against it from an early stage.<\/span><\/p>\n This state of hostility and mutual distrust continued into later phases, culminating in the Houthi coup against the state in 2014. During their advance into Amran and Sana\u2019a, Houthi propaganda framed their military campaign as targeting Islah, the al-Ahmar tribal leaders, forces associated with General Ali Mohsen, and Al-Iman University founded by the late Sheikh Abdulmajid al-Zindani.<\/span><\/p>\n As the Houthis advanced toward Sana\u2019a\u2014and even after seizing it in September 2014\u2014Islah\u2019s headquarters became direct targets.<\/span> Since then, Islah has ranked among the Yemeni parties that have paid the highest price for their support of the state and opposition to the Houthi coup, through various forms of sacrifice.<\/span><\/p>\n With the launch of <\/span>Operation Decisive Storm<\/span><\/i>, led by the Arab Coalition in support of Yemen\u2019s internationally recognized government, the Islah Party publicly declared its support. The party\u2019s official spokesperson, Adnan al-\u2018Udaini, stated that Islah \u201cwas the only party that announced its support for the operation from its outset, recognizing the danger posed by a group that emerged from outside the political process and stands in opposition to the will of all Yemenis.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n Islah\u2019s declaration of support for Decisive Storm marked a pivotal moment in its relationship with the Houthi movement. In response, the Houthis announced the dissolution of the Islah Party.<\/span> Subsequently, Houthi armed militias stormed Islah\u2019s headquarters, confiscated its assets, and arrested dozens of its senior leaders. Among those detained were three members of Islah\u2019s Supreme Council: the politician Mohammed Qahtan, Sheikh Mohammed Hassan Dammaj, and Sheikh Hamoud Hashem al-Dharhi. (The first remains forcibly disappeared to this day, while the latter two died shortly after their release from Houthi detention.)<\/span><\/p>\n Additionally, Houthi forces raided the homes of Mohammed al-Yadomi, head of Islah\u2019s Supreme Council, and Abdulmajid al-Zindani, former chairman of the party\u2019s Shura Council,<\/span> and abducted hundreds of party members and affiliates. Such actions are fundamentally inconsistent with any notion of alliance or cooperation, and instead reflect a clearly adversarial relationship.<\/span><\/p>\n Islah\u2019s support for Decisive Storm and the Arab Coalition came at a high cost. Its members became targets of arrests, assassinations, and torture in Houthi-controlled prisons. In response, the party issued a statement warning the Houthis and their allies against continuing what it described as reckless actions targeting the party. Saeed Shamsan, head of the political department and party spokesperson, affirmed that the abduction of Islah leaders by the Houthis would not alter the party\u2019s position in support of Decisive Storm.<\/span><\/p>\n Islah\u2019s stance was not limited to political support. Many of its members and youth actively joined the popular resistance forces to fight against the coup, alongside their tribes and local communities, under the leadership of official state institutions. These forces were later integrated into the internationally recognized government\u2019s regular army. Their sacrifices, including fighting alongside coalition forces in Aden, Abyan, and Marib, further underscore the contradiction of claims alleging cooperation with the Houthis.<\/span><\/p>\n From a methodological standpoint, the burden of proving any alleged alliance or coordination between Islah and the Houthis lies with those making the claim. A review of such allegations reveals that they are largely confined to accusations circulated in media outlets affiliated with Islah\u2019s opponents, lacking concrete evidence or objective substantiation. There are no official documents, signed agreements, verified military coordination, or shared political platforms.<\/span><\/p>\n In contrast, there is substantial evidence of hostility and confrontation between the two sides. This places the claim within the broader context of media warfare, political rivalry, and targeted disinformation. Such narratives appear to serve multiple actors: the Houthis, who seek to weaken Islah\u2019s alliance with the legitimate government and the Arab Coalition, thereby reducing military pressure on themselves; and other anti-Islah actors who use these claims to justify political exclusion and targeting of the party.<\/span><\/p>\n An objective assessment of the relationship between the two parties clearly indicates one of hostility and confrontation, rather than alliance or cooperation\u2014despite limited and occasional dialogue attempts under certain circumstances, which never reached the level of a strategic shift in positions.<\/span><\/p>\n Islah\u2019s electoral experience presents seemingly contradictory indicators. The party participated in the 1993 elections and secured second place, yet voluntarily ceded this position to the Yemeni Socialist Party \u201cin recognition of the importance of preserving Yemeni unity.\u201d In 1997, it won 53 seats but declined to participate in the government despite offers from the ruling authority, thereby reinforcing the principle of peaceful transfer of power. It also contributed to the formation of the Joint Meeting Parties coalition with leftist and nationalist groups, reflecting a broad and flexible approach to political alliances.<\/span><\/p>\n Following the Houthi coup, Islah, alongside other political forces, contributed to expanding political coalitions by forming the National Coalition of Political Parties and Forces Supporting Legitimacy, aimed at backing the legitimate government, restoring the state, and ending the coup. This coalition was later developed and expanded in 2025 under the name the National Bloc of Political Parties and Components.<\/span><\/p>\n These developments portray a party that adheres to democratic norms even when they do not directly serve its immediate interests, and that remains open to broad and flexible partnerships in accordance with national priorities. However, this view may be challenged by pointing to periods of tension with civil actors in some liberated governorates, as well as accusations of leveraging influence in certain areas\u2014issues that require more specialized, context-specific study.<\/span><\/p>\n Some writings suggest that the reformist national movement prior to political pluralism, and the Islah Party after it, participated in three major military conflicts: the Central Regions Wars (1979\u20131981), the 1994 war against secession, and the war against the Houthis since 2014.<\/span><\/p>\n However, according to Islah\u2019s official positions, the party maintains that it is a civilian political entity, not an armed organization. Regarding its role in the current conflict, the party\u2019s official spokesperson stated that, within the framework of its commitment to the state\u2019s national position, its role is limited to providing \u201cpolitical and national cover for the struggle led militarily by the people.<\/span> Without this cover, the popular stance could be reduced to mere military action lacking a clear purpose and unified vision. What is required is that military struggle be supported by a political and national framework that defines and guides its objectives.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n An analysis of the pattern of Islah\u2019s attributed participation in these conflicts reveals several consistent characteristics:<\/span><\/p>\n This pattern reflects a functional approach to military engagement, limited to supporting state legitimacy and defending its institutions and national constants, followed by a swift return to civilian political activity once the exceptional circumstances end. This approach differs fundamentally from that of other armed groups and militias that have engaged in armed activity outside the framework of the state, or maintained permanent armed structures, thereby becoming an additional burden on state institutions and legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\n The campaigns against Islah cannot be understood in isolation from their broader political contexts across different phases. A recent analytical report indicates that the use of the \u201cterrorism card\u201d against the party began during the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh following the events of September 11, when the regime employed this file to pressure its political opponents. The assassination of Jarallah Omar, a leader in the Yemeni Socialist Party, during an Islah conference in 2002\u2014an incident that was subsequently linked to Islah in media narratives\u2014represents a notable example of such politicization.<\/span><\/p>\n With the UAE\u2019s involvement in the Arab Coalition, similar rhetoric was reproduced, but within a broader regional framework aimed at countering \u201cpolitical Islam.\u201d<\/span> This suggests that part of the accusations directed at Islah falls within the context of regional political contestation rather than objective assessments of its actual behavior.<\/span><\/p>\n One of the most important practical indicators for understanding Islah\u2019s positions\u2014beyond both its own discourse and that of its critics\u2014is a review of its political history, particularly its relationships and engagements with local, regional, and international actors. This is reflected in the extensive record of meetings involving Islah\u2019s leadership, members, and representatives with ambassadors and diplomatic missions accredited to Yemen, conducted within the framework of Yemeni law and constitutional legitimacy. Equally important is examining how these international actors themselves assess Islah, its positions, and its roles in various issues.<\/span><\/p>\n After examining the official literature of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah), tracing its practical trajectory across key turning points, and analyzing the main claims directed against it, several conclusions can be drawn\u2014subject to further testing and analysis rather than mere impression:<\/span><\/p>\n At the same time, there remain areas requiring further objective research, particularly regarding the evolution of Islah\u2019s internal and external discourse during periods of conflict, its local behavior in areas where opponents claim it exercises influence, the extent to which it has moved beyond intellectual influences from regional experiences in its literature and programs, and its ability to develop a comprehensive and modern political discourse that aligns with societal changes, state development, and shifting regional and international dynamics.Research Problem and Methodology<\/b><\/span><\/h3>\n
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Evaluating the Reference Framework and Intellectual Roots<\/b><\/span><\/h3>\n
Local Extension of the Yemeni Reform Movement<\/b><\/h4>\n
Transition from Social Roles to Declared Political Activity<\/b><\/h4>\n
Evaluating Islah\u2019s Position on the Key Issues Raised<\/b><\/span><\/h3>\n
First Claim: Affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood<\/b><\/h3>\n
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Second Claim: Relationship with Terrorism and Extremist Groups<\/b><\/h3>\n
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Third Claim: Alliance or Cooperation with the Houthi Movement<\/b><\/h3>\n
\n<\/span> \u201cThe position of the Joint Meeting Parties\u2014of which we in Islah are a part\u2014was clear regarding the Saada issue and the painful wars that followed. We rejected them from the outset, affirming our opposition to the use of violence, whether for repression or for imposing ideas, as this contradicts the principle of dialogue, which we believe is the optimal means of reaching effective solutions to various problems.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\nOperation Decisive Storm: Islah Supports, While the Houthis Dissolve the Party<\/b><\/span><\/h3>\n
Fourth Claim: Monopoly, Exclusion, and Lack of Commitment to Democracy<\/b><\/h3>\n
Testing the Position on Violence and Military Participation<\/b><\/span><\/h3>\n
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Islah in the Face of Accusations \u2013 Political Dimensions<\/b><\/span><\/h3>\n
\nConclusions<\/b><\/span><\/h3>\n
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