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A series of regional and international developments unfolded in May that could significantly impact the trajectory of the Yemeni crisis and the future of the decade-long conflict with the rebel group, Houthis. What are the possible scenarios for escalation or de-escalation in light of U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s visit to the Gulf, the visit of the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to Moscow, and evolving regional and international stances on negotiations with Iran and efforts to de-escalate the war in Gaza?<\/span><\/p>\n Trump\u2019s Gulf Visit: Context and Implications<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n President Trump\u2019s visit to the Gulf came at a moment of heightened regional tensions, where conflicts are swinging between escalation and attempts at de-escalation. His administration\u2019s approach blends maximum pressure with selective negotiation, raising threats to gain leverage while backing diplomacy with the display of military power. The visit coincided with the resumption of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks, following a stalled fourth round. The announcement of a fifth round just before Trump\u2019s arrival in Saudi Arabia suggests the timing was intended to exert pressure on multiple regional actors.<\/span><\/p>\n Despite the talks still being limited to broad outlines \u2014 with uranium enrichment, the key point of contention, not formally on the agenda yet \u2014 the optics of their resumption during Trump\u2019s visit carry strategic weight. They hint at a dual-track policy of negotiations<\/span> and leverage to shape regional alignments.<\/span><\/p>\n In the lead-up to the visit, the United States and Oman brokered an agreement with the Houthi movement to halt its attacks on American ships and U.S. air strikes against the group, regardless of continued Houthi operations targeting Israel. While Houthi attacks on international maritime routes ceased, the group has continued to claim responsibility for strikes on Israeli targets, specifically Ben Gurion Airport.<\/span><\/p>\n Meanwhile, Israel has intensified its air campaign on Yemeni infrastructure, targeting key ports \u2014 including Hodeidah, Ras Issa and Salif \u2014 as well as Sana\u2019a International Airport. Since the U.S.-Houthi truce, Israeli forces have carried out three air strikes on Yemen, the latest of which, on May 28, destroyed a fourth aircraft previously seized by the Houthis.<\/span><\/p>\n On another front, President Trump\u2019s visit also coincided with visible tensions in the U.S.-Israel relationship, particularly between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These appeared to reflect tactical disagreements \u2014 whether to grant Israel leeway in handling the Houthi militia or to move forward with a potential strike on Iran. While the core alliance remained intact, these differences surfaced publicly through various official statements and media coverage.<\/span><\/p>\n At the heart of the disagreement lies the U.S. administration\u2019s declared policy of engagement with Iran \u2014 particularly through nuclear negotiations \u2014 and President Trump\u2019s hesitancy to authorize a military strike at this stage<\/span>. In contrast, Israel sees the current regional environment as a rare strategic opportunity to strike Iran and curb its growing influence, which it views as a major competitor for regional dominance, especially in light of recent shifts.<\/span><\/p>\n Although the visit\u2019s public agenda appeared largely economic, centered on the signing of preliminary agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE \u2014 valued at $600 billion, $1.2 trillion and $1.6 trillion, respectively, mostly focused on development projects \u2014 the Saudi deals stood out for their military dimension. These included defense-related agreements worth $142 billion, involving 12 major U.S. defense companies, with a focus on air defense systems, air force capabilities and naval forces. While the agreements did not reach the level of a full-fledged Security Partnership or Joint Defense Pact, they marked a notable step forward in military cooperation and regional security coordination.<\/span><\/p>\n Some observers suggest that President Trump\u2019s Gulf tour was driven by broader strategic objectives. Politically, his decision to make Saudi Arabia his first foreign destination signaled Washington\u2019s recognition of Riyadh as a pivotal regional player capable of shaping outcomes across the Middle East. Economically, the visit is seen by analysts as part of a U.S. effort to counter the growing influence of the BRICS bloc and curb China\u2019s expanding presence in the Gulf<\/span> \u2014 a point raised in U.S. media, including a Fox News report. Supporting this concern, a study by HSBC International Bank projected that China is on track to surpass the U.S. as the world\u2019s largest economy by 2030.<\/span><\/p>\n On the military front, beyond the signed agreements, the visit also seemed to trigger broader regional defense coordination. Notably, after Trump left Saudi Arabia for Qatar, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman visited the UAE and met with President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed \u2014 a move seen as part of ongoing military planning in the region.<\/span><\/p>\n Furthermore, the visit yielded a notable breakthrough on the Syrian file. Chief among these was the lifting of sanctions on Syria, a step that underscored the U.S. administration\u2019s intent to spotlight the joint Saudi-Turkish role in driving that outcome.<\/span><\/p>\n Outcomes of the Visit and Implications for the Yemeni Crisis<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n Although the Yemeni crisis was not explicitly addressed during formal negotiations, it remained indirectly present \u2014 primarily through discussions centered on Iran. For international powers, the Houthi movement is often viewed as a subset of the broader Iranian issue and its regional influence, particularly in the Gulf. In President Trump\u2019s case, various statements and signals suggested that both Iran and, by extension, the Houthis were indeed part of the broader agenda \u2014 and, if not formally, then certainly behind closed doors.<\/span><\/p>\n Evidence of Iran\u2019s central place on the agenda was clear in Trump\u2019s remarks during his stop in Qatar. He stated, <\/span>\u201cIran should be very grateful to the Emir of Qatar, because others would like us to strike Iran hard \u2014 unlike Qatar.\u201d<\/span><\/i> Similarly, during his visit to the UAE, he emphasized, <\/span>\u201cIran is bankrupt and can no longer fund its terrorist proxies.\u201d<\/span><\/i> These comments highlighted Iran\u2019s diminishing capacity and the growing pressure it faces \u2014 both diplomatically and economically.<\/span><\/p>\n As for Yemen, the topic surfaced in the context of regional security and the broader consequences of any military action against Iran, particularly how such action might impact Saudi Arabia. During a speech at the Saudi-American Investment Forum, President Trump criticized the Biden administration\u2019s decision to delist the Houthi militia as a terrorist organization, calling it a \u201cmistake.\u201d He also stressed that he would not tolerate threats to U.S. security\u2014implicitly signaling a tougher stance on Houthi activities and, perhaps, a willingness to revisit past policy reversals.<\/span><\/p>\n Overall, while the Yemeni conflict was not officially on the negotiating table, it was interwoven with the visit\u2019s major themes \u2014 chiefly Iran, regional stability and U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf.<\/span><\/p>\n In the lead-up to his visit, President Trump underscored that security cooperation and joint defense would be key items on his agenda in Saudi Arabia. When asked by CNN about the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, he stated, <\/span>\u201cThey will always need protection. They are not naturally protected, and I will always protect them.\u201d<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n Trump\u2019s strong rhetoric against Iran and the Houthis during his Gulf tour was echoed in international forums. At a United Nations session held during the same period, the U.S. representative reaffirmed Washington\u2019s commitment to disrupting Houthi operations \u2014 particularly efforts aimed at financing and arming the group. She urged the international community to support the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), describing it as a critical tool in preventing the transfer of weapons and illicit funds to the Houthis.<\/span><\/p>\n Yemeni Legitimacy: Actions and Implications<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n Since mid-May, the internationally recognized Yemeni government has taken several<\/span> diplomatic and operational steps aimed at breaking the deadlock in the national struggle, preparing for the next phase, and leveraging the growing international and regional focus on securing maritime routes and countering the Houthi threat to global trade corridors.<\/span><\/p>\n Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi visit to Moscow occurred amid reports from the U.S. and Western sources accusing the Houthis of receiving technical support and weapons through Russia-linked financing networks. In response, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on these entities and individuals last April<\/span> .<\/span><\/p>\n Politically, Al-Alimi\u2019s visit \u2014 the first since the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) \u2014 carried significant implications for the international balance of power. It highlighted the complex choices facing the Yemeni issue, emphasizing the need to manage Russia\u2019s role carefully. This involves maintaining a unified international stance in support of Yemen\u2019s legitimate government while reassuring Russia by exploring opportunities for trade and economic cooperation.<\/span><\/p>\n The discussions also extended to potential military cooperation, especially in defense systems. Al-Alimi emphasized this by stating, <\/span>\u201cWe need air defense, and Russia has systems that can help us.\u201d<\/span><\/i> He further acknowledged the legal complexities related to the application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which adds another layer of challenge to these efforts.<\/span><\/p>\n On the ground, recent military activity has primarily focused on evaluating the readiness of forces and various military formations. Chief of the General Staff and Commander of Joint Operations Lieutenant General Sagheer Hamoud bin Aziz led several inspection visits alongside a delegation from the Ministry of Defense. According to the Armed Forces\u2019 military media, these visits covered most military regions.<\/span><\/p>\n Additionally, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff convened a military meeting in the interim capital, Aden, overseeing operations in the Fourth Military Region as well as the Taiz and Abyan fronts. Prior to this, they had also inspected military units in the West Coast region, the Fifth Military Region and the Sa\u2019dah fronts.<\/span><\/p>\n In a recent development, the PLC chairman announced the establishment of an Eighth Military Region, covering the governorates of Al Dhalea, Ibb and Al Bayda<\/span>, marking a significant restructuring in the military command.<\/span><\/p>\n Path to De-escalation and Reviving the Political Process<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n Alongside signs of escalating tensions, international and regional efforts continue to push for de-escalation in Yemen and the revival of the political process through negotiation. Recently, the UN envoy to Yemen traveled across the region, visiting Riyadh, Muscat and Amman. During these visits, he met with Yemeni officials from the legitimate government in Riyadh, as well as a Houthi delegation in Muscat, to discuss ways to restart dialogue and advance a political solution in Yemen.<\/span><\/p>\n Meanwhile, the 164th session of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ministerial meeting concluded on June 2 in Kuwait. The meeting issued a statement welcoming the ongoing efforts by Saudi Arabia and Oman, along with their continued engagement with all Yemeni parties, aimed at reviving the political process and reaching a comprehensive and lasting political settlement.<\/span><\/p>\n In Amman, on June 1, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs met with the UN envoy. The minister reiterated Egypt\u2019s support for resuming intra-Yemeni dialogue to achieve a political agreement that has broad consensus among Yemeni factions and safeguards the country\u2019s unity.<\/span><\/p>\n At the end of May, local efforts led to the reopening of the Damt-Al-Dhalea road, which connects Sana\u2019a and Aden. This move appears to have been made possible through bilateral understandings between the Houthi group and the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Following the reopening, STC forces increased their presence at military sites and checkpoints in the Murais area, north of Dhalea Governorate, after forces loyal to the legitimate government withdrew.<\/span><\/p>\n The UN envoy to Yemen welcomed the reopening of the Damt-Al-Dhalea road, describing it as a significant breakthrough that will ease the hardship faced by many Yemenis and facilitate the movement of goods and services across the country.<\/span><\/p>\n Trends in the Yemeni File in Light of Political Developments<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n Scenario 1: A Ground Offensive Backed by Regional and International Support<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n This scenario envisions the outbreak of a major military offensive in the near future, involving multiple forces and units operating under a unified plan and leadership. It aligns with broader regional developments and international policies aimed at curbing Iran\u2019s influence across the Middle East \u2014 particularly efforts to sever its arms supply lines in Lebanon and Syria. The Presidential Leadership Council\u2019s chairman\u2019s statement that 2025 will be a \u201cyear of decisiveness\u201d underscores this possibility.<\/span><\/p>\n Several factors increase the likelihood of this scenario. Popular support for the Houthi movement has noticeably declined, as evidenced by uprisings and armed clashes between Houthi fighters and local tribes in Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Sana\u2019a, Amran, Dhamar, and other regions over recent months. These tensions are largely fueled by humanitarian and human rights grievances.<\/span><\/p>\n Additionally, the Houthis have suffered significant damage to their military capabilities due to recent U.S. airstrikes. According to the U.S. Central Command, 73% of the group\u2019s missile arsenal and 50% of its drones have been destroyed. Meanwhile, an extensive military buildup continues in such strategic areas as the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, including the deployment of B-2 stealth bombers and the arrival of a British aircraft carrier. This powerful buildup appears primarily aimed at countering Iran and its proxies, especially if nuclear negotiations fail.<\/span><\/p>\n On the ground, the anti-Houthi forces have shown improved unity and now possess combined striking power capable of overwhelming the Houthis if coordinated attacks are launched across multiple fronts.<\/span><\/p>\n However, this scenario faces significant challenges. One key obstacle is the ability of the legitimate Yemeni government and its allies to secure a unified international backing for such a military campaign. Some global powers may seek to politically capitalize on instability in the Red Sea region, aiming to draw the U.S. into a prolonged conflict that limits its capacity to engage in larger geopolitical struggles elsewhere.<\/span><\/p>\n Moreover, the willingness of certain Arab and regional countries to fully commit to an offensive against the Houthis remains uncertain \u2014 especially amid the ongoing war in Gaza. The Houthis use their support for the Gaza conflict in their political propaganda to rally local and regional backing.<\/span><\/p>\n Within this context, many official statements about the peace process may actually serve as political maneuvers or deception tactics designed to mask preparations for an impending military confrontation.<\/span><\/p>\n Scenario 2: A Phase of Stalemate Marked by Fluctuating Escalation and De-escalation<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n This scenario envisions a continuation of the current situation \u2014 characterized by limited, intermittent escalation, alternating between threats of renewed conflict and declarations of intent to achieve peace, without any major shift in the overall trajectory of the war.<\/span><\/p>\n This outlook is reinforced by the conclusion of the U.S. air campaign, which was not followed by any coordinated ground operations by the National Army or other Yemeni military formations. It is further supported by signals from various international and regional actors acknowledging the persistent complexity of the Yemeni conflict. Additionally, allegations have emerged that Russia and China have provided technical support to the Houthi group \u2014 such as electronic jamming systems capable of downing U.S. aircraft during the aerial campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n Other developments contributing to this scenario include the ongoing U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, the recent withdrawal of the USS <\/span>Harry S. Truman<\/span><\/i> aircraft carrier from the Red Sea, and continued U.S. diplomatic efforts with Palestinian factions to end the war in Gaza. These, along with repeated statements by international and regional powers emphasizing the importance of peace and de-escalation in Yemen, point to a temporary pause rather than a decisive shift.<\/span><\/p>\n However, this scenario remains inherently unstable and could eventually give way to renewed military operations, depending on how broader regional developments unfold \u2014 particularly negotiations with Iran concerning its nuclear and missile programs, as well as its regional influence.<\/span><\/p>\n In the meantime, the consequences of this limbo are significant: continued attrition among local actors caught in a \u201cno peace, no war\u201d state, increased economic fragility, deteriorating public services and ongoing suspension of oil exports, which remains a critical revenue source for the internationally recognized government.<\/span><\/p>\n Scenario 3: Comprehensive Political Settlement Under Regional & International Sponsorship<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n This scenario envisions regional and international powers exerting coordinated pressure on all Yemeni factions to reach a comprehensive political settlement that ends the war and revives the political process, under external sponsorship. The premise here is that influential foreign actors have largely secured their strategic interests in Yemen \u2014 particularly in the Red Sea \u2014 and are now more focused on maintaining regional stability than on reshaping Yemen\u2019s internal political structure, so long as any agreement does not jeopardize their external priorities.<\/span><\/p>\n However, several major obstacles stand in the way of this scenario. Within the internationally recognized government and among armed forces elements, there is strong resistance to any political arrangement that legitimizes the Houthi group. Many view such a move as a betrayal of the sacrifices made over the past decade and a threat to the broader national interest. For its part, the Houthi group now sees itself as a regional power and continues to reject any settlement based on the three agreed-upon references (the GCC Initiative, outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference and UN Security Council Resolution 2216).<\/span><\/p>\n Despite years of regional and international mediation, the legitimate government and the Houthi group have failed to reach a political solution since the war began \u2014 and prospects for doing so have only worsened. There have been no meaningful shifts in control on the ground and no significant changes in conditions that might support a breakthrough. Another major challenge to this scenario is its apparent disregard for shifting dynamics in the region \u2014 most notably, Iran\u2019s weakened position, its growing isolation from global politics and the deepening political and economic crises within the Iranian regime.<\/span><\/p>\n Moreover, key objectives \u2014 such as securing international maritime routes \u2014 remain unmet. Tensions continue to escalate between the Houthi group and Israel, with ongoing mutual attacks.<\/span><\/p>\n Given all these factors, the overall trajectory of the Yemeni conflict in the near future appears more likely to tilt toward <\/span>renewed military escalation<\/b>. Indicators increasingly point toward a large-scale military campaign aimed at restoring the Yemeni state and ending the Iran-backed Houthi coup. Many observers estimate that such a comprehensive battle could erupt in the coming months of 2025, but it will depend on how regional developments and international alignments unfold.
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