Bin Buriek Government and the Crisis Challenge

 

 

Introduction
On Saturday, May 3, 2025, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) President Rashad Al-Alimi issued a decision appointing Salem Saleh bin Buraik as prime minister. Article 2 of the decision stated, “Members of the government shall continue performing their duties according to their appointments.”

This decision occurred after a period of conflict between Yemen’s former prime minister, Ahmed Awdh Bin Mubarak, and PLC President Al-Alimi, which led to the collapse of the government overhaul that Bin Mubarak had proposed. In contrast, several ministers, who were going to be replaced, refused to attend the government meeting, resulting in division and paralysis within the government amidst escalating tensions between Bin Mubarak and Al-Alimi, with the latter insisting on dismissing the former.

Amid a significant deterioration of services in the city of Aden, particularly the electricity service, which has had power outages for years, alongside the continued collapse of the Yemeni currency and worsening living conditions for citizens, the PLC convened after a period of disruption and agreed to appoint Finance Minister Salem Saleh bin Buraik as prime minister, replacing Bin Mubarak, who submitted his resignation.

With Bin Buraik now in office, questions arise about the environment in which his government will run, the challenges it will face and how it plans to address them.

“Ibn Mubarak” Government: A Complicated Beginning

On February 5, 2024, the president of the PLC appointed Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak as prime minister. Article 2 of the decision stipulated that government members would continue their duties as per their original appointments. This looked like an attempt to avoid forming a completely new government, which would have required a meeting of the Parliament to discuss the government program and grant it a vote of confidence. An agreement was reached, allowing Mubarak to request changes to certain ministers, given that he was leading a government whose members he had not selected himself.

Almost one year later, Mubarak proposed changes to several ministers within his government. During a meeting of the PLC, members reached an agreement to implement these changes through a specific process. Each political component had to provide a list of three potential candidates to replace each ministerial position, so the prime minister could choose one. According to a government source, most parties and groups had sent in their lists of candidates.

However, the process of implementing the changes stalled due to a severe crisis between the prime minister and the chairman of the PLC. This crisis stemmed from several issues, most notably disagreements over the management and allocation of financial resources, as well as the relationship between the government and the Presidential Leadership Council. Mubarak was pushing for a more independent approach in executing the government’s executive duties. Tensions between the two men escalated, leading to increased media speculation about Mubarak’s potential replacement. Numerous leaks circulated, suggesting that his replacement had already been decided. Despite this, on February 28, Mubarak left Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and returned to Aden. Upon his return, a major crisis unfolded within the government. Media sources reported that several ministers refused to attend a Ramadan iftar banquet hosted by Mubarak, and some ministers began to escalate against him. According to local media, citing sources close to the government, a number of ministers met with the chairman of the PLC  in Aden and demanded the replacement of the prime minister.

In what seemed to be an implicit response to the increasing demands, Mubarak posted on his X account: “We will continue, as we promised our people, to confront all challenges …,” noting his intention to stay in office. However, government paralysis persisted, and the cabinet had not been able to hold a regular meeting since early November 2024. Tensions between the director of the Prime Minister’s Office and the secretary-general of the Council of Ministers escalated to the point of a fistfight, which became a public matter. As a result, the Leadership Council was compelled to dismiss Anis Baharitha, director of the Prime Minister’s Office; Ali Muhammad Al-Nuaimi, assistant director of the Prime Minister’s Office; and Mutee Damaj, secretary-general of the Council of Ministers, during a meeting at the end of December 2024.

They were referred for investigation, and the prime minister was prohibited from appointing replacements, leaving a significant vacuum in the Prime Minister’s Office, affecting its operations.

Mubarak also suspended several department directors and referred their cases to the Public Prosecution for investigation based on corruption reports from the Central Organization for Control and Accounting (COCA). Although he made decisions about their replacements, the Presidential Leadership Council halted these appointments. Despite the ongoing crisis, Mubarak continued to manage the government without holding regular meetings with ministers. He made appearances at various events, either alone or accompanied by ministers with whom he had better relations. He also intensified his field visits to ministries and departments, as well as to senior officials and figures in Aden. Meanwhile, the city’s services and living conditions continued to deteriorate, and protests erupted in Aden and other areas under legitimate authority, demanding action on the failing electricity service. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) responded to these protests with widespread repression and the arrest of many young participants.

In the midst of these protests, the PLC met in Riyadh on May 1. Leaks indicated that council members had agreed to replace Mubarak in an effort to break the government’s paralysis. The next day, Mubarak arrived in Riyadh, seemingly after being summoned by the PLC. While political sources suggested the PLC was close to making a decision to dismiss him, Mubarak preemptively submitted his resignation to the council’s president. In his resignation, he stated that he had done his utmost to restore the state, defeat the Houthi coup, combat corruption and implement administrative and financial reforms. However, he pointed to “major obstacles,” which had hindered his ability to perform, particularly, the inability to exercise his constitutional powers and the refusal to carry out a government reshuffle.

A Challenging Context

On May 4, Salem bin Braik formally assumed his responsibilities as Yemen’s new prime minister, taking the constitutional oath in Riyadh. The Yemeni News Agency reported that the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council presented bin Braik with a list of urgent priorities for his government. 

Chief among them were: 

• halting the economic and service sector deterioration, 
• supporting the national liberation efforts and 
• strengthening partnerships with members of the Arab Coalition — led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — as well as international allies. 

However, questions loom over the government’s capacity to deliver under bin Braik’s leadership, given the extraordinarily complex and deteriorating conditions in the country. 

Two of the most pressing challenges are outlined below:

Economic Collapse

Yemen is facing a severe economic crisis marked by dwindling resources and a sharp collapse in the national currency. According to a United Nations report, the Yemeni rial has lost over 72% of its value in the past five years. This has triggered a spike in prices and an alarming decline in the living conditions of ordinary citizens.

The root causes include prolonged conflict, the suspension of oil exports and the diversion of state revenues by various factions. A large share of what remains is spent on non-essential areas — particularly on budgets for political elites and state officials — while corruption and mismanagement persist at alarming levels.

The government is no longer able to pay public sector salaries and now depends heavily on financial aid from Saudi Arabia. Adding to the uncertainty, the departure of former Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak — who had taken firm steps against corruption and won the trust of international donors — is widely viewed as a setback for reform. His exit may erode confidence among donor nations and funding institutions, potentially jeopardizing future support for the new administration.

Reversing the economic decline, halting the currency’s collapse and ensuring liquidity will require exceptional effort from bin Braik’s government. Success will hinge on the level of financial and political support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as on whether Yemen can resume oil and gas exports.

Electricity Crisis in Aden

For decades, the city of Aden has endured a chronic electricity crisis, which has worsened in recent years. This crisis is rooted in the dilapidated infrastructure of power plants, declining production capacity due to war-related damage and lack of maintenance, as well as frequent fuel shortages — both crude oil and diesel — needed to operate the plants.

Corruption has further compounded the problem, particularly in the procurement and transportation of fuel through energy purchase contracts. These contracts impose a heavy financial burden on the state without delivering consistent or reliable electricity. Government negligence and insufficient investment in new energy projects have only served to deepen the crisis, leading to regular blackouts and widespread public frustration.

Electricity has also become one of the most corruption-prone sectors. During the past three years, it has turned into a financial black hole, consuming approximately $600 million annually for fuel purchases in Aden alone — without any proportional improvement in service delivery. While former Prime Minister bin Mubarak took bold steps to address contract abuses and fuel mismanagement, these efforts failed to yield meaningful improvements.

There are, however, viable short-term alternatives to ease the crisis. These include increasing fuel allocations for power plants in Aden, ensuring their timely and uninterrupted transportation, rationalizing expenditures, enforcing strict oversight mechanisms to prevent fuel diversion and ensuring that allocated funds are used transparently and efficiently.

Addressing this crisis requires robust backing from the Presidential Leadership Council and, more critically, urgent support from the Arab Coalition. Securing immediate assistance — particularly in the form of petroleum derivatives — will be vital to stabilizing electricity services and easing the burden on Aden’s population.

Government Management

One of the key challenges facing the new prime minister, Salem bin Braik, is managing the relationship with the PLC — a longstanding issue, as the presidential authority has often tended to restrict or marginalize the role of the prime minister. This challenge becomes even more complex under the structure of the PLC, given the potential for interference by its eight members — particularly its chairman — in government affairs and executive responsibilities. Former Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak cited such interference, especially from the PLC’s chairman, as a primary obstacle during his tenure.

However, initial indications suggest that the relationship between bin Braik and the council’s chairman may be less problematic, owing to bin Braik’s more flexible and accommodating approach, compared to his predecessor. The more pressing issue lies within the structure and composition of the government itself.

To avoid the need to form a new cabinet — an action that would require convening the House of Representatives to review the government’s program and grant it a vote of confidence — bin Braik was selected from among the existing members of the current administration. The official decision stated, “Government members will continue performing their duties according to the decree by which they were appointed.”

The core problem is that many ministers were originally appointed during the tenure of former Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed in 2020, and several of them face serious accusations of corruption and administrative failure. Ahmed bin Mubarak had previously called for the replacement of around 11 ministers. Media reports suggest that bin Braik also made it a condition upon accepting the post that he be granted the authority to make changes to the cabinet at a later stage.

Nonetheless, the deep-seated political divisions and complexities within the legitimate government could delay, or even obstruct, such changes. Furthermore, managing a group of ministers who have served for five years — and who now suspect they may soon be replaced — does not create an environment conducive to success. On the contrary, it may lead some to exploit their remaining time in office for personal or illicit gain.

The Relationship with the Southern Transitional Council

One of the critical challenges facing Prime Minister Salem bin Braik is managing the government’s complex and often strained relationship with the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Despite being a formal partner in both the PLC and the government, the STC maintains a dominant presence in Aden, exercising de facto control through its military and security forces. It also retains control over significant financial resources in Aden and other southern regions.

Although the STC is nominally part of the legitimate government, it frequently adopts oppositional stances, obstructs government initiatives or pursues its separatist agenda under the cover of its official role. Salem bin Braik will have the persistent and delicate task of balancing the need to contain the STC’s influence while preventing it from derailing government policy or undermining state institutions.

Supporting the Liberation Battle

Salem bin Braik’s appointment comes at a time of heightened public expectation for renewed efforts to restore the state and end the Houthi coup. Regional and international developments have further fueled hopes for a decisive military campaign. In this context, the previous dispute between Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi and former Prime Minister Ahmed bin Mubarak was seen by many as a damaging distraction from the national imperative of state restoration.

Bin Braik must signal clearly that his administration supports the liberation battle. While his immediate priorities may focus on stabilizing the currency, addressing economic deterioration and ensuring liquidity, these efforts must be framed as contributions to the broader goal of restoring state institutions and defeating the coup.

Conclusion

Overall, the environment in which Prime Minister Salem bin Braik has assumed office is far from ideal. Deep political divisions, competing agendas, internal chaos within the legitimate government, the near-total depletion of resources, the collapse of the currency and a dire economic situation all pose immense challenges.

At the same time, public pressure is mounting for the government to seize the moment, capitalizing on favorable regional and international conditions to push for the restoration of the state. The success of bin Braik’s government will ultimately hinge on two critical factors: the level of financial and logistical support provided by the Arab Coalition — especially Saudi Arabia — and the strength of political backing he receives from the Presidential Leadership Council.

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