The Muscat Understandings: Shifts in the U.S. Position on Red Sea Security and Their Implications for Yemen and the Region
Developments in Yemen can no longer be separated from the wider regional contest over strategic waterways. The Houthi advance along Yemen’s Red Sea coast has unfolded amid continuing tensions around the Strait of Hormuz — and drawn Bab al-Mandab into a security equation that extends well beyond Yemen.
The Houthi advance along Yemen’s Red Sea coast — including the seizure of Mokha and its port on 10 September 2026, followed by the capture of Perim Island, the Hanish archipelago and Zuqar Island on 11 September — has unfolded amid continuing tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.
Together, these developments have drawn Bab al-Mandab into a security equation that extends well beyond Yemen. Expanding Houthi control along the Red Sea coast gives Iran additional leverage over a second strategic maritime chokepoint, alongside Hormuz.
| This can be understood as the “linking of the two straits”: the shift from treating strategic waterways as separate arenas of pressure to viewing them as interconnected sources of leverage within a single regional contest. Pressure in one strait increases the strategic value of the other. |
The Muscat Meeting
It is in this context that recent U.S. contacts with the Houthis take on greater significance. According to Reuters, citing informed sources on 16 September 2026, U.S. officials met Houthi representatives at the U.S. Embassy in Muscat over the weekend in an undisclosed meeting facilitated by Oman. The Houthi delegation included Mohammed Abdulsalam, who is based in Muscat, and Abdulmalik al-Ajri.
The meeting came only days after the Houthi advance along Yemen’s western coast and the seizure of Mokha and Perim Island. According to the sources cited by Reuters, the Houthis told U.S. officials that they did not intend to target American vessels and remained committed to the ceasefire understanding reached with Washington in May 2025. They also said they would refrain from targeting Israeli and commercial vessels, while excluding Saudi vessels from that commitment.
| “The Houthis told U.S. officials they did not intend to target American vessels and remained committed to the May 2025 ceasefire understanding — while excluding Saudi vessels from that commitment.”
— Reuters, citing informed sources, 16 September 2026 |
The U.S. State Department did not confirm that the meeting had taken place, saying only that protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea remains a U.S. interest. President Donald Trump, meanwhile, said on 12 September 2026 that the Houthis had contacted his administration by phone and asked the United States to stay out of the war in Yemen.
These contacts come at a particularly sensitive moment. The United States has designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since March 2025, while the May 2025 ceasefire followed an American military campaign that lasted nearly two months. One of the Houthi participants in the Muscat meeting, Mohammed Abdulsalam Fleita, has also been subject to U.S. sanctions.
The Muscat talks therefore raise a broader question about the direction of U.S. policy in the Red Sea: whether Washington is moving from a strategy centred on military pressure and deterrence towards more limited, transactional understandings with the Houthis.
Such a shift would carry implications beyond U.S. relations with the Houthi group . It could affect Saudi Arabia’s security calculations, the balance of power inside Yemen, and the wider framework through which maritime security in the Red Sea is managed.
Washington’s Rationale
The U.S. approach appears to be shaped by three closely related considerations:
First, Washington is seeking to shield direct U.S. and Israeli interests by reducing the risk of Houthi attacks on American and Israeli vessels.
Second, it is trying to contain escalation without committing to another costly military campaign. A renewed large-scale operation against the Houthis could expose U.S. and Israeli interests to further retaliation and draw Washington more deeply into the regional conflict.
Third, the United States appears to be separating the protection of its own and Israeli interests from the wider regional confrontation. Rather than treating every arena of escalation as part of a single security framework, Washington is narrowing its engagement to threats that directly affect its core interests and immediate security priorities.
A Designated Terrorist Group Becomes a Negotiating Party
U.S. contacts with the Houthis reveal a striking political paradox. Washington designates the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and maintains sanctions on several of its leaders, yet it is also prepared to negotiate with them.
These contacts do not amount to legal recognition of the Houthis. They do, however, show that immediate strategic interests can take precedence over the political and legal framework surrounding the group.
The more important question concerns the nature of the assurances given to Washington. If the understandings remain informal, undisclosed and non-binding, their durability will depend less on institutional guarantees than on the balance of interests and mutual deterrence.
The real test of the Muscat meeting, therefore, is not that it took place, but whether the understanding can survive a change in the regional environment.
From Collective Maritime Security to Selective Security
The U.S.-Houthi understandings raise a broader question about the future of maritime security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. If they effectively shield American and Israeli vessels from Houthi attacks while leaving Saudi vessels exposed, the region risks moving away from a collective approach to freedom of navigation towards a more selective security model, in which protection depends on a vessel’s identity and the political arrangements surrounding it.
Such a shift would weaken the principle that the Red Sea is an international maritime corridor governed by common rules of navigation. Saudi shipping forms an important part of global trade and energy flows, and its security cannot be separated from the stability of markets and supply chains.
The result could be a fragmented and increasingly unstable maritime order in the Red Sea, with different security arrangements operating alongside one another rather than within a single framework.
Signs of this disruption are already visible in trade and energy markets. The United Nations has warned that developments around Bab al-Mandab, even while shipping continues through the strait, are adding further risk to energy and transport markets already under pressure from instability around Hormuz.
In his briefing to the UN Security Council on 11 September 2026, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg said that fighting had intensified across several fronts, particularly along the western coast. He called on the Houthis to halt attacks inside Yemen, across the border against Saudi Arabia, and against commercial shipping.
| Brent crude rose to around $105 per barrel following the Houthi takeover of Mokha and the Red Sea islands. |
Saudi Arabia and the Reassessment of Regional Security
One possible consequence of recent developments is that Saudi Arabia may reassess the extent of its reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, without necessarily seeking to abandon it.
Washington’s reluctance to provide direct military support to an ally, combined with its direct contacts with the Houthis, could encourage Riyadh to further diversify its security relationships and defence partnerships. This comes against the backdrop of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan in August 2026, which established mechanisms for defence coordination, joint exercises, technology cooperation and defence industries.
The current environment could accelerate this trend towards more diversified regional security arrangements, including deeper cooperation with Türkiye, Pakistan, Egypt and other partners.
If the shift in Washington’s approach becomes more pronounced, its consequences may extend beyond Saudi Arabia. It could contribute to a gradual reshaping of Gulf security from a system heavily centred on the U.S. partnership towards a more plural regional order, with a wider range of security partners and centres of influence.
Implications for Yemen
If sustained, U.S.-Houthi understandings may reduce or remove the threat to American and Israeli maritime interests, but they would not resolve the war in Yemen. Managing a maritime threat is fundamentally different from settling the Yemeni conflict.
Limited understandings may reopen channels of communication or reduce attacks on particular categories of vessels, but they do not address the central issues driving the conflict: control of state institutions, political authority, resources, the structure of the state, security arrangements and national sovereignty.
They could also lead to a growing separation between Red Sea security and the Yemen file, with maritime stability treated as an independent priority rather than as part of a broader effort to resolve the conflict.
This could create a situation in which international powers are willing to engage with the Houthis on issues that directly affect their own interests, while Yemen’s political process remains stalled. In that case, U.S. engagement with the group could become another factor that helps manage the conflict without resolving it, potentially prolonging the armed confrontation rather than bringing it to an end within the framework established by UN Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 2216, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Future Scenarios
Scenario One : Limited Understandings Amid Continued Regional ConflictUnder this scenario, U.S. channels with the Houthis remain open and the existing understanding on avoiding attacks against American and Israeli vessels is maintained, while Houthi pressure on Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s internationally recognized government continues. This would mark a shift from direct confrontation towards selective risk management, with Washington seeking to protect its core interests without becoming more deeply involved in the conflict. Red Sea security, however, would remain fragile. The underlying drivers of the conflict would persist, and shielding one category of vessels from attack would not prevent the threat from being redirected towards others.
Scenario Three : Collapse of the Understandings and Renewed EscalationThe understandings could break down if the regional balance shifts, Houthi attacks expand, American vessels or interests are targeted, or Iran seeks to use the Houthis to link pressure in Bab al-Mandab more directly to escalation around the Strait of Hormuz. Washington could then return to military deterrence, while a wider confrontation would further militarize the Red Sea and increase risks to trade, shipping and energy flows. |
Conclusion
The U.S. understandings with the Houthi group in Muscat point to a possible shift in how Washington manages risks in the Red Sea. As Bab al-Mandab has become more closely tied to the wider regional confrontation, Houthi control of strategic positions along the Yemeni coast has increased the group’s ability to affect maritime security, energy flows and international trade.
This is where the concept of linking the two straits becomes particularly relevant. The simultaneous pressure surrounding Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab has drawn Yemen’s geography into a broader regional equation, making Red Sea security part of an interconnected network of pressure, strategic interests and negotiation.
U.S. contacts with the Houthi group also highlight a tension in Washington’s approach. The United States can maintain its legal designation and sanctions framework against the group while engaging with it directly when U.S. and Israeli interests are at stake. If this pattern continues, it could contribute to a more selective maritime security order in which the level of protection depends increasingly on the identity of the vessel and the political understandings surrounding it, rather than on a common framework for safeguarding international navigation.
The regional implications would extend beyond the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia, and potentially other Gulf states, may face stronger incentives to diversify their security partnerships and strategic options. Bab al-Mandab would therefore become less a narrowly Yemeni, Saudi or American security issue and more directly connected to the security of global trade and energy flows.
| For Yemen, the most significant change is the growing strategic value of geography itself. Territory is no longer simply the arena in which the conflict is fought; control of the coast, islands and maritime approaches has become a source of leverage within the conflict.
For this reason, Red Sea security cannot be sustainably managed in isolation from the war on Yemeni territory. Limited understandings may temporarily reduce the cost of escalation for particular actors and contain specific maritime threats, but they do not address the political and security conditions that produced those threats in the first place. |
