Monthly Briefing/February 2026

Frontline developments in February 2026 reflected a noticeable escalation by Houthi forces, particularly in Hays district south of Al-Hodeidah. Military reinforcements were reportedly directed toward Marib, Al-Jawf, the western coast, and Taiz, prompting government forces to strengthen defensive positions and repel attacks. These developments underline the persistence of an open conflict environment and the risk of renewed large-scale escalation amid ongoing security and field movements.

• 2 February: Saudi newspaper Al-Watan reported alleged covert coordination between Abu Dhabi and the Houthis that reportedly led to the targeting and assassination of military commanders affiliated with the internationally recognised government, including Major General Thabet Jawas and Major General Abdulrab Al-Shaddadi.

• 18 February: Houthi forces dispatched new military reinforcements led by senior commanders from Sana’a and Dhamar toward the frontlines in Marib, Al-Jawf, the western coast, and Taiz, while trucks carrying missiles and landmines were reportedly transferred to support ongoing military operations.

• 22 February: Six members of the Second Al-Zaranik Brigade were killed and eleven others injured while repelling a heavy Houthi attack on the Hays frontline south of Al-Hodeidah. Brigade forces succeeded in containing the assault despite what was described as the largest escalation in the area in two years.

• 22 February: Yemen’s Minister of Defense chaired an expanded meeting in Aden, emphasising coordination, performance evaluation, transparency, strengthened oversight, and the implementation of electronic governance mechanisms. The session marked the first meeting chaired by the minister in the interim capital in several years.

• 23 February: Houthi authorities reportedly placed hospitals, schools, and government facilities in Sana’a and other areas under their control on maximum alert, requiring medical and administrative personnel to remain on standby amid expectations of potential regional escalation linked to anticipated U.S. actions against Iran.

• 26 February: Al-Zaranik forces foiled a Houthi attack on their positions in the Hays frontline south of Al-Hodeidah, forcing attacking units to withdraw following direct clashes, amid repeated attempts to advance toward the strategically significant Red Sea district.

Alongside the military and political escalation witnessed during February, several security-related incidents emerged in Aden and other parts of Yemen. These developments included major counter-narcotics operations, measures to safeguard state institutions, restructuring of local security leadership, and heightened readiness aimed at containing instability in southern regions and preventing attempts to storm the presidential palace in Aden.

• 3 February: Combined Task Force 150 announced the seizure of more than 16 tonnes of narcotics valued at approximately USD 2 billion during the command period of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces, prior to the transfer of leadership to the Pakistan Navy as part of regional maritime security operations.

• 17 February: The Military Court in Marib issued death sentences against 535 Houthi leaders on charges including rebellion, coup involvement, and collaboration with Iran, ordering the confiscation of their assets. Eight defendants were acquitted, while charges against seven others were dismissed due to their deaths.

• 19 February: Supporters mobilised by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council attempted to storm the first gate of Al-Maashiq Presidential Palace in Aden, prompting security forces to open fire to disperse crowds, resulting in several injuries.

• 21 February: Saudi-backed Nation’s Shield Forces assumed control of Al-Alam, Al-Ribat, and Ras Imran checkpoints in Aden, deploying alongside the Second Giants Brigade following tensions and the attempted storming of Al-Maashiq Presidential Palace.

• 21 February: The Presidential Leadership Council accused regional actors of financing and escalating unrest in Aden, affirming restraint while emphasising the government’s commitment to maintaining institutional operations and protecting state facilities.

• 24 February: PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi issued two presidential decrees appointing Abdulsalam Qaed Abdulqawi Al-Jamali as Commander of the Special Security Forces and Abdulsalam Abdulrab Ahmed Al-Omari as Head of Civil Defense Authority, promoting both officials to the rank of Major General.

• 24 February: The Council of the European Union decided to extend the mandate of the maritime operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, tasked with safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, until 28 February 2027, allocating a budget of EUR 15 million.

During February 2026, Yemen witnessed limited economic movements aimed at improving oil-sector operations and stabilising market conditions. The Yemeni rial showed relative stability, while government efforts focused on addressing liquidity shortages, strengthening market oversight, and partially resuming operations at the Marib refinery to compensate for repeated disruptions caused by technical failures and ongoing conflict-related constraints.

• 1 February: The Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen (SDRPY) signed an agreement with the Social Fund for Development to implement nine health and education projects across several governorates, valued at SAR 1.9 billion, including hospitals, maternity centres, and fully equipped model schools.

• 11 February: Reuters reported that Yemeni oil exports remained suspended due to Houthi attacks on export terminals, depriving the government of its primary source of foreign currency revenues and sustaining high fiscal deficits for several consecutive years.

• 12 February: The Marib Refinery partially resumed production and distribution of petroleum derivatives following temporary repairs to a cooling system malfunction that had halted refining operations for several days, pending the arrival of spare parts for full restoration.

• 13 February: Indicators from the Al-Kuraimi Mobile financial application showed a slight improvement in the Yemeni rial exchange rate against the Saudi riyal to YER 410 for purchase after stabilising around YER 425. The Central Bank of Yemen denied any official adjustment to the exchange rate, affirming continued strict market supervision and liquidity management in line with approved monetary policies.

• 18 February: Anadolu Agency warned of shrinking humanitarian and economic funding for Yemen in 2026, noting that declining international pledges threaten food security programmes and risk pushing additional households into extreme poverty.

• 20 February: A media report published by Al-Masdar Online highlighted a liquidity crisis in Aden attributed to cash hoarding outside the banking system and delays in salary payments, contributing to market stagnation and increasing daily transaction costs.

• 23 February: A press report indicated declining customs revenues at government-controlled ports due to disrupted import activity and rising shipping costs, further constraining public revenues and increasing reliance on external grants.

• 26 February: Prime Minister Shaye Al-Zindani directed the Central Bank of Yemen and the Ministry of Finance to disburse public sector salaries using Saudi financial support amounting to SAR 1.3 billion, previously announced by Prince Khalid bin Salman through the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen.

Developments in February reflected a systematic escalation in violations attributed primarily to Houthi authorities, ranging from mass death sentences issued following political understandings, to torture and medical neglect leading to death, as well as arbitrary detentions and expanded security deployments targeting perceived opponents. At the same time, selective prisoner releases underscored the continued use of detainee files as instruments of political control and deterrence in areas under their authority.

• 1 February: Human Rights Watch reported that the Southern Transitional Council detained government investigators in Socotra and prevented them from inspecting an unofficial detention facility, highlighting the continued existence of secret prisons and calling for accountability.

• 2 February: Yemen’s Ministry of Legal Affairs announced the documentation of serious violations allegedly involving Emirati officials and affiliated forces, including assassinations, torture practices, and secret detention facilities, confirming that investigations were underway.

• 3 February: Ahmed Abdullah Al-Helmani, a leader affiliated with the Islah Party, died from complications linked to torture and medical neglect following his release from Houthi detention in critical condition.

• 4 February: The National Commission for Prisoners and Detainees condemned death sentences issued by Houthi authorities against 32 detainees following the Muscat understandings, urging the United Nations to intervene urgently to halt their implementation.

• 5 February: The National Commission of Inquiry conducted field visits to Bir Ahmed and Al-Mansoura detention facilities in Aden, reviewing the conditions of approximately 620 detainees, amid ongoing demands to clarify the fate of individuals forcibly disappeared since 2016.

• 15 February: Houthi forces deployed reinforcements in Al-Hasaba district in Sana’a and imposed a security cordon around the residence of Sheikh Hameer Al-Ahmar, following the abduction of Sheikh Jubran Abu Shawarib, while visitors were reportedly compelled to sign pledges prohibiting further visits.

• 17 February: The Rasd Center for Rights and Development, in its report “Al-Bayda 2025,” documented 868 violations during the year, including 690 arrests and 40 killings, attributing 98% of violations to Houthi authorities and recording a 132% increase compared to previous reporting periods.

• 19 February: Houthi authorities released teachers Mohammed Noman Al-Kholani and Rizq Allah Al-Lahbi in Ibb after months of detention, following local mediation efforts.

• 20 February: Forces affiliated with Presidential Leadership Council member Tariq Saleh released Salah Al-Hammadi after two years of detention on accusations of collaboration with the Houthis, reportedly following human rights pressure.

• 26 February: Houthi authorities released journalist Mohammed Al-Miyahi after 524 days of detention in Sana’a, implementing a delayed judicial ruling following his arrest in September 2024 over writings critical of the group.

Escalating conflict dynamics during February 2026 contributed to increasing humanitarian fragility across Yemen, accompanied by renewed UN calls for detainee releases and improved humanitarian access. At the same time, the United States’ decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Yemeni nationals introduced an additional layer of humanitarian concern affecting vulnerable migrant communities abroad. International efforts during the month continued to focus on fostering a stable environment capable of supporting humanitarian operations alongside a parallel political process.

13 February: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Yemeni nationals within a 60-day period, potentially exposing individuals without alternative legal status to deportation. Authorities also introduced a voluntary departure option through the CBP Home application, offering travel assistance and financial incentives, a move expected to compel hundreds of Yemenis to leave the United States.

• 1 February: A Yemenia Airways aircraft was forced to return to Jeddah after being denied landing clearance at Al-Mokha Airport, amid accusations by the Yemeni government that Houthi authorities had violated civil aviation regulations.