Monthly Briefing/ January– 2026

Political Scene

Recent developments mark a pivotal phase in Yemen’s political landscape, characterized by the reassertion of sovereign decision-making, a recalibration of relations within the internationally recognized government, and the fragmentation of non-state actors’ influence. Saudi Arabia has played a leading role in steering this trajectory, seeking to contain escalation, dismantle UAE-affiliated armed factions, and reframe southern political dynamics within the framework of a unified Yemeni state.

January 2: The Southern Transitional Council (STC) issued a “constitutional declaration” announcing what it termed the State of the South, outlining an independent state project, a two-year transitional period, the formation of transitional governing bodies, and a call for international sponsorship of dialogue, while signaling potential escalation options.

January 3: The STC welcomed Saudi Arabia’s invitation to sponsor a southern dialogue, affirming its commitment to dialogue and a referendum and its readiness to engage under regional and international auspices. This coincided with a presidential initiative to convene a comprehensive southern conference.

January 4: Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman met in Riyadh with Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) member Lieutenant General Tariq Saleh, marking the first visit by a figure closely associated with the UAE since developments in the eastern governorates.

January 4: PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi commended the handover of military camps in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, calling for unified efforts to build the state, address the southern issue through institutional frameworks, and safeguard civil peace and the rule of law.

January 4: Supporters of the STC dismantled their sit-in tents in Aden’s Parade Square, alongside the conclusion of other sit-ins, amid a noticeable decline in the Council’s influence following setbacks in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra.

January 7: The head of the Southern Transitional Council, Aidarus Al-Zubaidi, refused at the last minute to depart from Aden International Airport for Riyadh to participate in the Southern Conference.

January 7: The PLC issued two decrees dismissing Aden Governor Ahmed Lamlas and appointing Abdulrahman Al-Yafei as his replacement, as part of broader political and security changes in the interim capital.

January 7: PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi issued a decree expelling Aidarus Al-Zubaidi from the Council and referring him to the Attorney General on charges including high treason and leading an armed rebellion.

January 8: A presidential decree relieved Defense Minister Mohsen Al-Daari of his duties and referred him to retirement, within a broader package of dismissals and investigations of senior officials.

January 8: Somalia announced an investigation into the unauthorized use of its airspace and airports by the UAE, suspected of facilitating Al-Zubaidi’s escape, citing violations of sovereignty and international law.

January 8: The coalition spokesperson stated that Al-Zubaidi fled by sea from Aden to Berbera and then by air to Abu Dhabi aboard a UAE military aircraft with disabled identification systems.

January 9: The STC leadership announced the dissolution of the Council and all affiliated bodies, citing preparations to participate in the Saudi-sponsored Comprehensive Southern Dialogue Conference.

January 9: Prince Khalid bin Salman described the dissolution of the STC as a courageous decision, confirming the formation of a preparatory committee for the Riyadh Conference with broad participation.

January 10: The PLC announced the formation of a Supreme Military Committee under coalition supervision to unify command structures and prepare for the next phase.

January 10: PLC member Faraj Al-Bahsani attributed his absence from Council meetings to health reasons, denying reports of UAE restrictions on his travel.

January 12: Aden witnessed a mass rally called for by Aidarus Al-Zubaidi under the slogan “Million-Man March for Steadfastness and Popular Escalation.”

January 14: Somalia’s Foreign Minister stated that the UAE facilitated Al-Zubaidi’s exit from Yemen via Somali airspace using cargo aircraft, citing the incident as grounds for canceling agreements with Abu Dhabi.

January 15: The PLC dismissed Faraj Al-Bahsani, citing violations of sovereign decisions and actions undermining state unity.

January 15: The PLC appointed Lieutenant General Mahmoud Al-Subaihi and Dr. Salem Al-Khanbashi as new members, filling vacancies left by Al-Zubaidi and Al-Bahsani.

January 16: A large demonstration was held in Aden’s Parade Square following calls by the dissolved STC, with participants chanting slogans supporting Al-Zubaidi and opposing government measures.

January 17: The Minister of State and the new Governor of Aden discussed a phased plan to reposition military camps outside the city.

January 18: Hani bin Breik claimed that Al-Zubaidi remained inside Yemen, contradicting coalition statements that he had fled to Abu Dhabi.

January 19: The PLC Chairman met with the Commander of the Joint Forces to discuss strengthening military coordination with Saudi Arabia and consolidating the state’s monopoly over weapons.

January 20: The UAE Ministry of Defense denied allegations regarding secret detention facilities and explosives at Riyan Airport, while local authorities reiterated documentation of violations.

January 26: Saba News Agency reported that Prime Minister Shaya Zindani continues consultations to form a technocratic government under strict criteria.

January 27: The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2813, extending the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) for a final period until 31 March 2026, in preparation for its withdrawal.

January 29: The Giants Brigades closed the headquarters of the dissolved STC’s General Assembly in Tawahi, implementing the government’s dissolution decree and placing the site under security control.

Military Scene

Recent military developments indicate a calculated repositioning of forces aligned with the internationally recognized government and the coalition, alongside a gradual escalation by Houthi forces on multiple fronts. This process is unfolding within a broader framework aimed at unifying command structures, reducing overlapping roles, and preparing for a more decisive phase of military engagement, while simultaneously consolidating security in liberated areas and containing sources of armed instability.

January 1: Military sources reported the withdrawal of approximately six brigades of the Giants Brigades from western coastal fronts toward Hadramawt. Their positions were handed over to Tihami forces and National Resistance forces loyal to Tariq Saleh, amid notable troop movements.

January 1: The Musnad Platform reported the return of three UAE military flights from Mayyun Island to the UAE using C-130 aircraft, indicating the beginning of a drawdown of military presence, with no observed counter-deployments.

January 7: The Giants Brigades assumed control of the Central Bank, Camp 20, and the Ma’ashiq Presidential Palace after Southern Transitional Council forces withdrew from these sites in Aden, as part of security arrangements aimed at stabilizing the situation and unifying control over sovereign facilities.

 

January 14: Government forces carried out targeted operations on Taiz’s western front, striking Houthi vehicles and positions. The operations resulted in casualties and the destruction of an armored vehicle and a military truck, amid ongoing escalation and the disruption of Houthi advances.

 

January 14: A Saudi military committee arrived in Shabwa to initiate arrangements for the handover of key sites to the Nation Shield forces and to integrate local units, within a security and development plan coordinated with local authorities to enhance stability in the governorate.

January 16: Houthi forces established a new military checkpoint south of Taiz and began fortifying the site while imposing levies. The Yemeni army confirmed that it targeted the position with artillery to prevent its consolidation and to protect civilian security.

January 21: Engineering teams, supported by vehicles, dismantled military installations previously established by Emirati forces at the Port of Mocha, which had been converted into a military site in earlier years. The operation included the removal of temporary structures and the clearing of multiple locations.

January 26: The 21st Giants Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Hamdi Shukri, arrived in Aden from the western coast as part of a redeployment plan aimed at reinforcing security and military operations, following the handover of its previous positions to the National Resistance Forces.

January 27: Houthi forces imposed a tight security cordon around the Khash‘ah area in Al-Bayda Governorate, severely restricting civilian movement. The measures were accompanied by military reinforcements and the detention of bodies and prisoners, prompting human rights warnings over escalating violence and serious violations against civilians.

The Security Scene

Recent security developments expose the fragility of the transitional phase, as the withdrawal of UAE-backed forces, the emergence of a security vacuum, and the resurgence of terrorist activity converge with mounting pressures from illegal migration. In response, both the state and the coalition are seeking to reassert control over the security landscape, dismantle sources of instability, and unify security decision-making as a precondition for stability and to prevent a descent into widespread chaos.

  • January 2: The Governor of Hadramawt warned of a suspicious withdrawal of UAE-backed forces and the looting of weapons from Al-Rayyan Airport. He hinted at the possibility of military action to compel the Southern Transitional Council (STC) to withdraw and held the UAE responsible for the ensuing security chaos, issuing these statements at the height of the tensions.
  • January 4: A local source reported a severe security breakdown in Mukalla, marked by the disappearance of security forces and the looting of government institutions. Their contents were reportedly transferred to Aden, amid the absence of any official explanation and growing public calls to halt the misappropriation of public funds.
  • January 21: The Coalition to Support Legitimacy condemned a terrorist car bomb attack targeting Brigadier General Hamdi Shukri al-Subaihi, commander of the Second Giants Brigade, north of Aden. The attack left al-Subaihi slightly injured, killed three people, and wounded five others. The Coalition reaffirmed its commitment to supporting security efforts, pursuing those responsible, and emphasizing unity in confronting terrorism.

January 25: The Ministry of Interior reported the arrival of more than 600 African migrants on the shores of Radhum district in Shabwa governorate since the beginning of January, through three waves of maritime smuggling operations led by Somali sailors

The Economic Scene

The economic landscape reflects a struggle over control of resources rather than a mere service-delivery crisis. Organized smuggling, international pressure through sanctions, and the manipulation of critical infrastructure intersect within an economic landscape that increasingly threatens state revenues and livelihood stability. This dynamic underscores the use of the economy as a parallel battleground in the conflict, even as the government seeks to reassert oversight and safeguard what remains of the state’s economic arteries.

  • January 6: Official documents revealed serious irregularities at the customs office of the Port of Mocha, which is controlled by UAE-backed forces loyal to Tariq Saleh. These violations contributed to the expansion of smuggling networks and a significant erosion of state revenues, amid the absence of effective customs oversight.
  • January 16: Houthi authorities imposed measures that restricted citizens’ access to bank accounts and electronic financial wallets in areas under their control, in the absence of any official explanation. The Yemeni Banks Association held the YemenNet network responsible for severe service disruptions and warned against the use of internet control as a tool to exert pressure on the banking sector.
  • January 16: The U.S. Treasury announced its most extensive sanctions to date targeting Houthi financing and smuggling networks, designating 21 individuals, entities, and vessels. The measures cover oil, finance, weapons, aviation, and maritime shipping, and aim to dismantle the group’s military and financial capabilities.

January 22: The UAE abruptly shut down solar power plants in Aden and Shabwa without prior notice, disrupting electricity stability in both governorates. The Ministry of Electricity held the General Services Unit (GSU) responsible and called for the immediate resumption of operations, describing the move as part of the dismantling of existing systems following the UAE’s withdrawal from the coalition.

Violations:

The human rights dimension has become one of the most pressing aspects of the conflict, where political executions, forced mobilization, and systematic violations unfold amid delayed and uneven accountability. This dynamic reveals deep disparities in the administration of justice across different areas of control and places human rights at the heart of the struggle for legitimacy, rather than at its periphery—making them a decisive test for the state and for any future transitional justice framework.

  • January 5: The Houthi group compelled academics and students at Ibb University to attend mandatory military and sectarian indoctrination courses, suspended academic activities, and threatened those who refused. The university was reportedly transformed into a platform for mobilization and military displays.
  • January 7: The Houthi group issued new death sentences against nine abductees on charges of espionage for foreign countries following trials widely described as sham proceedings, as part of an ongoing escalation through exceptional judicial mechanisms.
  • January 10: Judicial authorities in Marib approved the execution of four individuals convicted in two separate cases of espionage for the Houthi group, following the completion of legal procedures and final ratification. The individuals were found guilty of managing espionage cells and carrying out assassinations that resulted in both civilian and military casualties.
  • January 15: The Attorney General issued a decision to form an investigative committee into allegations against Aidarus al-Zubaidi, including charges of high treason, the formation of armed groups, murder, and serious violations. The committee was granted full authority and instructed to expedite its work and submit its findings along with a legal assessment.
  • January 19: The Houthi group continued issuing death sentences against abductees on espionage charges, with its court upholding the death sentences of eight individuals. This escalation coincided with the imminent implementation of a UN-brokered deal to exchange thousands of prisoners.
  • January 19: In Mukalla, Hadramawt, victims shared testimonies documenting arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and systematic torture over a decade in secret detention facilities allegedly operated under UAE control.

January 26: The National Commission to Investigate Alleged Human Rights Violations held a public hearing in Aden for victims of arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance since 2015. The commission heard documented testimonies as part of broader transitional justice efforts aimed at promoting accountability and providing redress to victims.

The Humanitarian Scene

January 2026 witnessed a sharp deterioration in Yemen’s humanitarian situation, marked by escalating forced displacement and a contraction of UN relief operations. These developments reflect the collapse of the protection environment and a growing erosion of the international humanitarian response within active conflict zones.

January 27: The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded the displacement of more than 400 families across Yemen during January, primarily due to ongoing conflict, with displacement concentrated in Marib. The United Nations confirmed that the total number of internally displaced persons had reached approximately 4.8 million.

January 28: The World Food Programme (WFP) informed its staff in Sana’a of a complete cessation of operations and the termination of contracts for 360 employees effective March 31, citing the lack of a safe operating environment and severe funding constraints. WFP also reaffirmed its continued efforts to secure the release of its staff detained by the Houthi group.

General News

January 17: Former Yemeni Vice President Ali Salem al-Beidh passed away in Abu Dhabi at the age of 90, following a long political career that included a central role in Yemen’s unification and the later declaration of secession. The Yemeni Presidency announced three days of official mourning.

January 26: Yemen Airways announced the launch of new flights from Al-Mukha and Socotra airports to Jeddah starting in early February, with two weekly flights on each route. The move is part of the airline’s network expansion plans and aims to ease travel hardships for Yemeni passengers.


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