Monthly Briefing/ November– 2025

November saw a sharp escalation in fighting between the national army and Houthi forces, alongside rising tensions in Taiz, Al-Jawf and Saada. Hadhramaut witnessed intense tribal and military mobilization amid Saudi-UAE rivalry, as clashes erupted between STC forces and local units. Other regions experienced assassination attempts and increased Houthi drone activity, underscoring the fragility of the security landscape and continued military attrition.

• 3 November: A consultative meeting in Taiz, convened by the Supreme Resistance Council under the leadership of Sheikh Hamoud Al-Mikhlafi, addressed rising security unrest and campaigns targeting the army. Al-Mikhlafi called for unified ranks to complete the liberation of the city. The statement urged stronger security support, responsible media messaging  and the formation of a committee to liaise with national leadership.
• 18 November: The Yemeni army announced that its forces in the Sixth Military Region repelled a Houthi attack on positions in the Jawas sector east of Al-Jawf, then launched a counteroffensive that secured front-line positions and inflicted heavy losses on the attackers — the third such operation since recent redeployments.
• 19 November: Army units in the Razamat Axis of Saada shot down a Houthi Samad-1 attack drone over Al-Safra district after close monitoring by air-defense units, amid a noticeable increase in Houthi drone use.
• 22 November: Tensions surged in Al-Waziya west of Taiz after tribal fighters downed a drone and launched attacks on positions held by forces loyal to PLC member Tariq Saleh, following a security operation linked to the theft of humanitarian equipment. The incident triggered heavy clashes, tribal mobilization and military reinforcements.
• 22 November: The armed forces thwarted a Houthi assault on positions east of Al-Jawf, destroying vehicles with drones as fighters attempted to retreat, and the several Houthi members were wounded and killed after a landmine exploded after intense clashes.

● 30 November: On the Hadhramaut plateau, clashes broke out between STC forces and the Hadhramaut Protection Forces after the STC advanced toward oil fields. Armed tribal reinforcements moved into Al-Aleeb and Ghail Bin Yamin, forcing STC forces to pull back under tribal pressure as newly appointed governor Salem Al-Khanbashi arrived in Mukalla.

November saw a notable rise in efforts to dismantle smuggling and criminal networks, alongside escalating Houthi violations against international organizations and official steps to restructure security institutions. The month highlighted the complexity of balancing crime prevention and civilian protection amid ongoing challenges coordinating the government’s multiple intelligence bodies.

• 4 November: Authorities reported intensified interceptions of weapons shipments smuggled to the Houthis, with major seizures recorded between July and October, indicating expanding Iran-backed smuggling networks.
• 5 November: The General Directorate for Counter-Narcotics seized over 1.5 tons of drugs and arrested 803 suspects between January 2025 and September 2025 across 411 cases involving drugs trafficked from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Operations uncovered a Captagon and meth lab in Al-Mahra, seized 599 kg of cocaine at Aden Port, confiscated 646,000 pregabalin tablets and intercepted a vessel carrying two tons of methamphetamine north of the Arabian Sea.
• 6 November: Houthi forces raided the Oxfam office in Sana’a, detaining Yemeni staff and confiscating equipment hours after storming the offices of five other international NGOs, including Médecins Sans Frontières and Islamic Relief.
• 11 November: The Houthis stormed the International Medical Corps office in Sana’a, detaining local staff and seizing equipment as part of a broader crackdown that has included the arrest of around 60 NGO employees since the start of the year and threats to prosecute 43 more.

● 13 November: Houthi forces raided the International Committee of the Red Cross office in Sana’a, detaining staff for hours and confiscating servers containing data on beneficiaries and detainees.

Yemen’s economy remains in severe crisis after nearly two years without oil exports, compounded by institutional fragmentation and delayed external support. Revenues continue to shrink, food prices climb, and public-sector salaries deteriorate, while remittances have become the main source of foreign currency. The government and international partners are offering limited assistance amid mounting risks of financial collapse.

• 2 November: The Presidential Leadership Council closed the illegal seaports of Qena, Al-Shihr, Nashtoon and Ras Al-Arah, ending unregulated oil and goods imports that diverted state revenues — excluding the Port of Mokha, controlled by Council member Tariq Saleh.
• 9 November: The Houthis converted the Ras Issa oil terminal into an alternative commercial port by constructing makeshift berths to receive ships, bypassing UN oversight on Hodeidah and Saleef. Satellite imagery shows expanded construction, including a new 1.56 km berth in Saleef.
• 16 November: Saudi Arabia deposited US$90 million into the Central Bank in Aden, enabling the government to begin paying public-sector salaries delayed for four months amid a severe revenue crisis.
• 17 November: The World Bank reported unprecedented strain on Yemen’s economy, projecting a 1.5% contraction this year due to halted oil exports, declining aid, institutional division, a 26% rise in food prices, a 30% drop in government revenue and humanitarian funding at its lowest level in a decade.
• 18 November: Thousands of government employees in Aden and other internationally recognized areas face worsening living conditions after months of unpaid salaries, driven by financial pressures linked to collapsed oil exports and limited external assistance.

• 20 November: The UK Minister for the Middle East announced that Britain has provided Yemen with £1.5 billion over the past decade, including £149 million this year, reaffirming continued UK support.
• 21 November: PetroMasila announced the handover of operations in Sector 5 in Shabwah to Jannah Hunt within a week, following a government directive, pledging to maintain facility readiness. The transition follows years of halted exports and administrative disputes, amid warnings over the new operator’s limited experience and potential operational and legal risks.
• 27 November: An analytical report found that remittances now represent more than 38% of Yemen’s GDP, exceeding US$7.4 billion in 2024, replacing oil revenues as the country’s main source of foreign currency. The report warned that sanctions or financial collapse could disrupt this lifeline for millions facing acute food insecurity.

Yemen’s human rights situation continued to deteriorate in November, marked by rising arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, gender-based violence and widespread violations against women and children. Both the Houthis and STC-aligned forces exert pressure on civilians and opponents, while rights organizations and activists face systematic repression, reflecting a deepening crisis that has persisted since the start of the war.

• 2 November: The Abductees’ Mothers Association documented 113 violations of women’s freedom of movement in Taiz over the past five years — 55% at Houthi checkpoints and 44% at government-controlled ones — ranging from searches and humiliation to extortion and detention.
• 3 November: The Houthis abducted more than 70 Salafi civilians in Dhamar, according to the Masawat Organization for Human Rights, following late-October raids that targeted former officials, doctors, teachers, students and academics, bringing the number of total detainees in the campaign to over 55.
• 4 November: The 2025 UN Panel of Experts report revealed widespread and systematic sexual and gender-based violence in Houthi-controlled areas, including rape, sexual slavery and child marriage. It highlighted the central role of the Zainabiyat units in detaining women and handing them over to fighters, digital blackmail of activists and abuses against children, describing the violations as part of a deliberate strategy to control society.
• 8 November: The Nobles Foundation for Rights and Development reported 99 enforced disappearances in Ibb between January 2025 and September 2025, mainly targeting teachers. It urged the release of the disappeared and the closure of secret prisons, while the Abductees’ Mothers Association called on the UN to act.
• 20 November: Rights Radar reported that the Houthis abducted 138 civilians in Dhamar since September 2025, including four children. Eighty-five remain forcibly disappeared, 25 are still detained, and only 28 have been released.
• 25 November: The Yemeni Women’s Empowerment Foundation reported that the Houthis committed more than 40,000 violations against women since 2015, including arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, killings by shelling and snipers, mine-related deaths, 42 documented rape cases and thousands of job dismissals and replacements. The group warned of a deepening humanitarian crisis affecting millions of women and displaced persons.
• 27 November: Human Rights Watch reported that the Houthis have abducted dozens of citizens since mid-2025, including political figures and UN employees, and carried out mass arrests in Dhamar, detaining over 70 people in one day and more than 200 members of the Islah Party. The organization highlighted rising fabricated charges, torture and enforced disappearances, and called for the immediate release of all detainees.

• 1 November: The Houthis accused the World Health Organization of politicizing humanitarian work and halting health programs in their areas, while simultaneously announcing plans to prosecute 43 UN staff amid a sharp decline in aid.

● 8 November: A UN report recorded the arrival of 17,685 African migrants to Yemen in October — a 99% increase from September — mostly from Djibouti and Somalia, heading to Abyan, Taiz and Shabwah. Men made up the majority, as tens of thousands continue entering the country annually in search of better opportunities.

• 12 November: A digital campaign, led by the Wa’ee platform, succeeded in shutting down hundreds of Houthi-linked accounts on Facebook, Instagram and TikTok that promoted violence and sectarian incitement — the first campaign to achieve this since the start of the war.

● 28 November: Belqees TV announced the end of its broadcast operations after 10 years, citing overwhelming constraints. The channel, launched after the Houthi coup, became known for its coverage of human rights violations and advocacy for Yemenis, despite losing staff members and facing raids, prosecution and office seizures. The network expressed gratitude to its young team for sustaining its mission under extreme pressure.